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The epistemological issue of disagreement comprises several related 
problems which arise in relation to disagreeing with another person. The central 
questions at issue are: (1) Can a body of evidence confer rationality on opposed 
propositions? (2) What is the relevance of unshareable evidence to disagreement? 
(3) What are one’s epistemic responsibilities in the context of disagreement? 
 I consider several arguments from the recent disagreement literature which 
suggest that reasonable disagreements between people who have shared their 
evidence and are epistemic peers--i.e., they are equally informed about the 
disputed issue, and are roughly equal with respect to intelligence, thoughtfulness, 
carefulness, alertness, and so on--are not possible. I also consider several 
arguments which suggest that one may rationally persist in one’s views in spite of 
peer disagreement. In the course of considering these arguments, I discuss the role 
of  “evidential seemings,” seemings of the form “It seems to one that evidence E 
supports proposition p”; their analogous relationship to perceptual seemings; and 
how such seemings might be outweighed by higher-order evidence provided by 
peer disagreement. 
I propose that the most difficult and interesting aspect of the peer 
disagreement problem is prolonged disagreement with a recognized epistemic 
peer, which may undermine one’s evidential seemings in the form of Parity: in the 
context of peer disagreement, both parties may be aware that things would seem 
just the same to them as they do if in fact the other party were correct and they 
were mistaken. This presents a localized skeptical problem that affects what one 
should believe in the context of such a disagreement, because prolonged peer 
disagreement puts one’s own evidential seemings into conflict. 
 I propose and discuss three possible solutions to the Parity Problem, one 
inspired by David Hume, and two inspired by Immanuel Kant: (1) Practical 
considerations stemming from the underdetermination of one’s views by the 
available evidence as well as one’s larger epistemic goals can justify maintaining 
one’s view. Alternatively, judgments that someone else is an epistemic peer may 
be classified as either (2) empty regulative theoretical judgments (a Kantian 
category), or (3) non-theoretic judgments (analogous to judgments about taste). In 
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The literature on the epistemology of disagreement contains several questions that 
must be clearly distinguished. A survey of this literature yields many similar but distinct 
emphases with respect to what the debate over rational disagreement is fundamentally 
about. If we ask, “What is the guiding question in this debate?” the answer is: There is no 
single guiding question. Rather, there is an array of related questions. Five of the 
fundamental questions are: 
(1) Can a single body of evidence support opposed conclusions drawn on the 
basis of that evidence? 
 
For example, Richard Feldman asks: “…how exactly can there be reasonable 
disagreements? And how can there be reasonable disagreements when the parties to the 
disagreement have been confronted with a single body of evidence?”1 
(2) Can one’s evidence for a proposition always be shared, and if not, what effect 
does unshareable (“private”) evidence have on the justification of one’s belief in a 
proposition? 
 
For example, Peter van Inwagen, one of the earliest framers of what has become 
the disagreement debate, discusses what he takes to be a relatively common form of 
evidence: 
… there seem to be plausible examples of “having evidence” that do not conform 
to the courtroom-and-laboratory paradigm of evidence.… There are, therefore, 
arguments by example for the conclusion that… evidence is not 
always of the public sort, that some evidence is not exportable, that some 
evidence cannot be passed from one person to another.2 
 
(3) When is it reasonable for one to hold onto a belief in a disputed proposition? 
 
1 Richard Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on 
Atheism and the Secular Life, ed. Louise Antony (Oxford University Press, 2007), 201. 
2 Peter van Inwagen, “We’re Right. They’re Wrong,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted 




For example, John Pittard writes: “…when can we reasonably maintain a 
confident belief in some proposition despite the fact that many people who seem as 
qualified as ourselves to assess the proposition’s plausibility hold it to be false?”3 He 
continues: 
It is obvious that the discovery that someone disagrees with my belief that p 
should at least sometimes cause me to be less confident in my disputed belief. The 
primary area of controversy in the epistemology of disagreement has to do with 
the conditions under which the prima facie threat posed by disagreement can be 
reasonably resisted… Can… partisan, dispute-dependent reasons be a good basis 
for doubting the reliability of my disputant? This question serves as the primary 
point of contestation in debates over the epistemic significance of disagreement.4 
 
Along the same lines, David Christensen asks: 
How should I react when I discover that my friend and I have very different 
beliefs on some topic? Thinking about belief in a quantitative or graded way, the 
question concerns cases in which my friend and I have very different degrees of 
confidence in some proposition P. Should my discovery of her differing degree of 
belief in P lead me to revise my own confidence in P?5 
 
Thomas Kelly puts it similarly: “…once you and I learn that the other has arrived at a 
different conclusion despite having been exposed to the same evidence and arguments, 
how (if at all) should we revise our original views?”6 
(4) How should one’s beliefs be affected by the beliefs of others? 
 
Adam Elga frames the question more generally: “How should you take into 
account the opinions of an advisor? ... How, exactly, should we be guided by outside 
 
3 John Pittard, Disagreement, Rationality, and Religious Belief, Doctoral Dissertation, Yale University 
(2013), 3. 
4 Ibid., 9-10. 
5 David Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” Philosophical Review 116, no. 2 
(2007): 188. 
6 Thomas Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman 
and Ted Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 112. 
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opinions?”7 This is a question about testimony rather than disagreement per se, although 
disagreement between epistemic peers is what is prompting the question in this debate. 
Similarly, Marc Moffett frames the issue as a matter of competing demands of rationality 
regarding one’s epistemic relationship to others. If critical scrutiny of one’s views by 
one’s peers is conducive to the justification of one’s beliefs, which seems plausible, he 
asks how one can avoid the problem of having one’s view swamped by the contrary 
views of one’s.8 
(5) Is it reasonable to maintain both one’s own belief in the face of disagreement, 
and also the reasonableness of one’s disputant? 
 
Feldman asks: 
Can epistemic peers who have shared their evidence reasonably maintain their 
own belief yet also think that the other party to the disagreement is also 
reasonable?9 
 
The concept of peerhood occupies a central place in the debate, and its primary 
importance is its role in the present question.10 For example, for Michael Bergmann, the 
central issue reflects both the sharing of a single evidence base and the peer-status of 
one’s disputant: 
The Question: Can two people – who are, and realize they are, intellectually 
virtuous to about the same degree – both be rational in continuing knowingly to 
 
7 Adam Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” Noûs 41, no. 3 (2007): 478–79. 
8 Marc Moffett, “Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry,” Episteme: A Journal of Social 
Epistemology 4, no. 3 (2007): 352–67. 
9 Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” 201. 
10 As we will see, what exactly peerhood amounts to is a contentious question. For present purposes, we 
can say that to be a peer is a context-dependent (i.e., not global) relational property whereby two or more 
knowers are similarly qualified to assess the evidence relevant to some disputed question. “Similarly 
qualified” is of course vague, and various commentators will argue for different interpretations. The two 
main divisions here are between those who prefer to define peerhood from the “bottom up”--so that two 
people are peers if they are roughly equal with respect to various relevant epistemic factors such as 
intelligence, thoroughness, background knowledge, etc.--and those who prefer to define peerhood from the 
“top down,” so that A and B are peers iff A is equally likely as B to judge correctly about the truth value of 
p, where p is some disputed proposition. These notions of peerhood will be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
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disagree after full disclosure (by each to the other of all the relevant evidence they 
can think of) while at the same time thinking that the other may well be rational 
too?11 
 
Clearly, these questions differ in important ways, though they also overlap. Many 
commentators discuss most of these questions at some point, or at least they take their 
arguments to have implications for all five questions. In my view, these questions can be 
reduced to a central three Main Questions (MQs): 
(MQ1) What expectations can one reasonably have of a body of evidence for a 
proposition? 
 
(MQ2) What is the relevance of private evidence to peer disagreement?  
 
(MQ3) What are one’s epistemic responsibilities in the context of disagreement? 
 
(MQ1) encapsulates the concerns of question (1). It will be the subject of Chapter One. 
(MQ2) encapsulates the concerns of question (2). It will be the subject of Chapters Two 
through Six. (MQ3) encapsulates the concerns of questions (3) through (5). It will be the 
subject of Chapters Seven through Nine. 
 The question of whether a single body of evidence supports more than one 
proposition of a competing set of propositions is answered in various ways in the 
literature on peer disagreement. The most notable figures who discuss it are Peter van 
Inwagen and Richard Feldman. As they frame the issue, the central question is whether 
two people could reasonably believe opposed propositions on the basis of the same 
evidence. Both van Inwagen and Feldman deny this possibility. Their reasons for this are 
discussed and critiqued in Chapter One. Both hold that evidence, of metaphysical 
necessity, can support only one of a competing set of propositions, a principle known as 
 
11 Michael Bergmann, “Rational Disagreement After Full Disclosure,” Episteme 6, no. 3 (2009): 336. 
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the Uniqueness Thesis. I argue that the Uniqueness Thesis is false, as it is far too strong, 
has counterintuitive consequences (even on weaker versions), and assumes things at issue 
in the disagreement debate.  
 Chapter Two considers the possibility of private evidence. Private evidence is 
evidence that cannot be shared, despite one’s best efforts. It may include the felt truth of 
some proposition, or the seeming to one that some piece of evidence supports p rather 
than ~p. I call these latter sorts of experiences “evidential seemings.” I argue that private 
evidence in the form of evidential seemings may justify one in maintaining one’s view in 
the face of disagreement, and whether it does depends on the confidence one has in one’s 
own private seemings, on the evidential value of disagreement itself, and on the 
confidence one has in the peer status of one’s interlocutor. 
Evidential seemings are often compared in the disagreement literature to 
perceptual seemings, such as the sense that one is experiencing a green expanse when 
standing in front of the quad in the springtime.12 This comparison is the subject of 
Chapter Three. There I argue that evidential seemings share broad structural similarity 
with perceptual seemings, including being non-doxastic, pre-theoretical, sui generis, 
basic, generative of prima facie justification, and incapable of non-circular justification 
themselves. I argue that such seemings have evidential significance in a similar way that 
perceptual seemings do, and that this significance does not disappear on the discovery of 
disagreement, though the seemings do of course remain defeasible. 
 
12 I borrow this example from Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of 
Knowledge, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2011), 1. 
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Chapters Four and Five tackle the related questions of (1) the evidential value of 
and the defeasibility of evidential seemings, and (2) the evidential import of disagreement 
itself. The goal of these chapters is not to determine what one should do in the context of 
disagreement, but rather to assess (a) what weight the mere fact of disagreement, or 
agreement, should have in one’s total evidence for some proposition, and (b) whether it 
may serve as a defeater for one’s felt sense of what a body of evidence supports. I 
consider and reject several ways in which disagreement may defeat one’s evidential 
seemings, such as by providing evidence of the contingency of one’s belief (à la Gideon 
Rosen), or by creating epistemic symmetry between peers so that a peer has no way to 
identify which peer’s seemings are correct (à la David Christensen and Adam Elga). I 
argue that the fact of disagreement itself does not necessarily provide counterbalancing 
evidence regarding what one should believe about a proposition. Chapter Four also 
introduces the Parity Problem: in a case of prolonged disagreement with a recognized 
peer, each party may be aware that things would seem just the same as they do if in fact 
the other party were correct and he/she were mistaken. This presents a skeptical difficulty 
that affects what one should believe about p in the context of such a disagreement, and 
may in fact undermine one’s justification for one’s prior beliefs. This is because 
disagreement under Parity puts one’s own evidential seemings into conflict. 
Chapter Six considers the role of higher-order evidence in peer disagreement in 
two forms: (1) as meta-evidence (i.e., evidence of there being evidence for a proposition), 
and (2) as the possibility that there is evidence, even if that possibility is not actually 
instantiated. In conjunction with (1), I also consider in this chapter the relationship 
between disagreement and testimony. The first section considers the claim, advanced by 
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Richard Feldman, that “evidence of evidence is evidence.”13 The idea here is that the fact 
of disagreement itself gives one extra evidence for or against some proposition that one 
would not otherwise have, because disagreement gives one evidence that there is 
evidence with respect to p. This fact itself is claimed to have evidential force, even if one 
is not aware of the evidence possessed by the other party. I argue that meta-evidence may 
not in fact constitute evidence for a subject that is directly relevant to the disputed 
proposition. However, I do hold that there is something important about meta-evidence: 
insofar as one is dealing with a perspective that is constituted by certain features of 
epistemic excellence, the views of a person with that perspective may count as evidence 
for a disputed proposition. 
The second section considers the relationship between disagreement and 
testimony. I suggest that a virtue theory of testimony can help to clarify whether negative 
testimony (disagreement), or any other form of testimony, carries evidential weight, and 
that such a theory helps to justify the critique of Feldman’s argument in the previous 
section. Finally, the third section discusses the problem of possible rational disagreement. 
There is some reason to think that if actual peer disagreement presents a problem for 
maintaining a view rationally because the disagreement provides higher-order evidence 
that one’s judgment of the first-order evidence is mistaken, then this problem can be 
generalized to include merely possible disagreement as well. If it can, then general 
skepticism looms as a possibility. I argue that this problem does not actually have the 
force that has been claimed for it. Thus, even if peer disagreement creates a localized 
skeptical problem, this does not entail generalized skepticism. 
 
13 See Richard Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” 208. 
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Chapter Seven considers the notion of peerhood. An influential view of peerhood 
advanced by Adam Elga, according to which epistemic peers are those who are equally 
likely to be correct or mistaken, is critiqued and rejected. In its place, a more common-
sense approach to defining peerhood is defended. The approach is based on similarities 
between people with respect to various factors that make one a good assessor of evidence 
for a proposition, such as intelligence, carefulness, time spent considering the evidence, 
sobriety, etc. The chapter then turns to both the Conformist and Nonconformist responses 
to the rational disagreement problem. 
The Conformist view holds that one ought to conform one’s view to one’s peer’s 
view. The Nonconformist view holds that one is typically justified in maintaining one’s 
own view in the midst of peer disagreement. I argue that both views, as presented, have 
problems. Conformist views (e.g., David Christensen, Richard Feldman, Adam Elga) 
place too much emphasis on the evidential value of disagreement itself, mistakenly taking 
the fact of disagreement to have some overriding power that it does not always have. 
They also tend to assume (e.g., Christensen) that peer disagreement is epistemically 
similar to disagreement with a superior, which is unwarranted. Nonconformist views 
(e.g., Thomas Kelly, Marc Moffett, Michael Bergmann), on the other hand, tend to 
underestimate the significance of epistemic parity produced by long disagreement with 
someone one takes to be a peer. Thus, I argue that the strength of the Conformist view is 
parasitic on the power of the Parity Problem. Likewise, the burden of the Nonconformist 
view is to overcome that problem and provide a clear explanation of how one remains 
justified in one’s view in cases of prolonged disagreement after full disclosure of 
evidence with a recognized epistemic peer. 
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In Chapters Eight and Nine, I offer three proposed solutions to the problem of 
rational peer disagreement under Parity. The first, inspired by David Hume and Marc 
Moffett, is presented in Chapter Eight. There I argue that (1) owing to the nature of 
judgments that someone is an epistemic peer, judgments that are at best inexact estimates, 
an objectively rational solution to the peer disagreement problem is not to be had, but that 
(2) nonetheless it can be reasonable to maintain one’s view in a peer disagreement given 
one’s overall epistemic goals. 
The second and third solutions, inspired by Immanuel Kant and William Alston, 
are presented in Chapter Nine. These solutions concern the nature of peerhood 
judgments--i.e., judgments that someone is an epistemic peer. I argue that Kant’s 
classifications of judgments provide two ways in which peerhood judgments may allow 
for the possibility of rational disagreement, disagreement such that each peer may 
justifiably believe that the other is responding rationally to the evidence, despite coming 
to an opposed conclusion. I argue that peerhood judgments may be classified as either (1) 
empty regulative theoretical judgments, or (2) non-theoretic judgments (analogous to 
judgments about taste). In either case, rational disagreement under Parity may be 
possible. I conclude with a critique and defense of these solutions, and some reflections 
on where they leave us with respect to the peer disagreement problem.
10 
 
Chapter One – Can Evidence Support Opposed Propositions? 
 
 
1.1 – Peter van Inwagen on Evidence and Exclusivity 
 
In his paper “We’re Right. They’re Wrong,” Peter van Inwagen introduces the 
issue of peer disagreement by distinguishing between what he calls “weakly exclusivist” 
and “strongly exclusivist” positions on religious disagreement.1 He then extends the 
discussion to philosophical, political, and other forms of disagreement. He calls any 
religion an “Ism,” and says that an Ism is “weakly exclusivist” if 
(1) it’s logically inconsistent with all other Ism’s, and 
(2) according to Ism, its adherents are rational to accept its teachings. 
(1) and (2) together entail that it is rational for the adherent of an Ism to believe that the 
teachings of all other Ism’s are at least partly wrong. Note that this does not entail that 
one should believe that the adherents of other Ism’s are irrational. An Ism is “strongly 
exclusivist” if 
(A) it is weakly exclusivist, and 
(B) according to Ism, its adherents (or anyone in their epistemic situation) are not 
rational to accept the teachings of any other Ism. 
Note that this still does not require that Ismists must believe that adherents of other Isms 
are irrational, though they may believe that. 
 
1 Peter van Inwagen, “We’re Right. They’re Wrong,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted 
Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 10-28. 
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Nearly everyone, van Inwagen argues, holds weakly exclusivist views about 
controversial issues in politics, art, science, philosophy, religion, etc. But what about 
strong exclusivism? If one were strongly exclusivist, one would hold that 
(1) There are positions inconsistent with my own, 
(2) I am rational to hold the view I do, and 
(3) Anyone else in my epistemic position would not be rational to hold any view 
inconsistent with my own. 
Van Inwagen believes that there are lots of strong exclusivists too; he mentions 
Darwinists, critics of Holocaust deniers, lots of political activists, various religious people 
(regardless of whether their religion actually teaches that it is strongly exclusivist), etc. 
But philosophers, too, often hold strongly exclusivist views. Consider this principle: 
If it is rational for S to accept p, then it cannot also be rational (in the same 
circumstances) for S to accept ~p.2 
 
Similarly: 
If S is deciding whether to accept p, to accept ~p, or to suspend judgment about p, 
it cannot be true both that it would be rational for S to accept p and to accept ~p.3 
 
And another: 
…if it is rational for a person whose total evidence is E to accept p, then it would 
be rational for anyone whose total evidence was E to accept p.4 
 
Van Inwagen calls this last principle “obviously correct.” These are intuitively 
compelling principles, accepted by many philosophers. The principles have the following 
 
2 Ibid., 20. Paraphrase. 
3 Ibid. Paraphrase. This is similar to--though less restrictive than--what Richard Feldman calls the 
“Uniqueness Thesis,” which is the view that a body of evidence can support at most one among a variety of 
inconsistent propositions. This thesis will be discussed below. 
4 Ibid., 22. 
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implication: philosophers who hold them are committed to the view that all other 
philosophers with whom they disagree about some contentious proposition are irrational. 
More precisely, they entail that any philosopher who shares their exact epistemic 
situation, and who still disagrees, is irrational. Such colleagues would, in van Inwagen’s 
words, be “comparable to ordinary, educated people of the present day who believe that 
cigarette smoking does not cause lung cancer or that the positions of the stars and planets 
at the moment of one’s birth determine one’s fate.”5 
Van Inwagen states the argument for these principles as follows: 
…a body of evidence cannot have the power to confer rationality on both a 
proposition and its denial. And…it is rational for one to accept a proposition at a 
certain moment if and only if one’s total evidence at that moment bears this 
impersonal ‘confers rationality on’ relation to that proposition.6 
 
This argument appeals to a metaphysically necessary property that evidence has of itself. 
Hence, what it is rational to do in a case of disagreement depends on this property of 
evidence: it cannot “confer rationality on” inconsistent propositions. From this it follows 
that: 
If two people have the same evidence, and if one of them accepts a certain 
proposition and the other accepts its denial, at least one of them is not rational…7 
 
But this just is strong exclusivism. So it seems that weak exclusivism entails strong 
exclusivism. This is significant because almost everyone holds propositions (especially in 
philosophy, politics, morality, etc.) in a weakly exclusivist way. 
This leaves anyone who holds a view regarding a controversial proposition (i.e., 
nearly everyone) with three options: 
 
5 Ibid., 19. 
6 Ibid., 20-21. 
7 Ibid., 21. 
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(I)  Doubt or deny one’s own rationality; 
(II)  Claim that at least some others who deny one’s own view are less intelligent, 
less rational, or in some other cognitive way deficient with respect to 
seeing the truth of p; or 
(III) Claim that at least some others who deny one’s own view are in inferior 
epistemic circumstances, i.e., lack some evidence that one possesses. 
But of course in real-world cases none of these options are very attractive. Van Inwagen 
is fond of referring to his longstanding disagreement with David Lewis over the 
compatibility of free will and determinism. It’s just obvious, he thinks, that both he and 
Lewis were rational, in similar epistemic circumstances, comparably intelligent, and so 
forth. And yet it also seems obvious that both he and Lewis were rational to hold the 
views they did, even after they disagreed and shared evidence. So the argument for the 
principles above must be mistaken in some way. Yet it is hard to see what is wrong with 
it. Van Inwagen thus concludes his essay in a state of uncertainty, unable to believe that 
either he or David Lewis is less rational than the other, and yet unable to see how they 
could be equally rational with respect to a single evidence base.  
 But there are questions to be raised in regard to van Inwagen’s argument for his 
principles. His argument, in full, is: 
Consider any person as he is at a certain moment. That person has available to 
him, at that time, a body of evidence, his total evidence at that moment. Call it E. 
Of metaphysical necessity, E has the following property (of itself, regardless of 
who may have it) with respect to any proposition p: either (i) it would be rational 
for anyone to accept p on the basis of E, or (ii) it would be rational for anyone to 
accept the denial of p on the basis of E, or (iii) it would be not be [sic] rational for 
anyone to accept either p or the denial of p on the basis of E. This ‘or’ is 
exclusive. It cannot be that it would be rational to accept p on the basis of E and 
rational to accept the denial of p on the basis of E. Loosely speaking, a body of 
evidence cannot have the power to confer rationality on both a proposition and its 
14 
 
denial. And, finally, it is rational for one to accept a proposition at a certain 
moment if and only if one’s total evidence at that moment bears this impersonal 
“confers rationality on” relation to that proposition.8 
 
In essence, van Inwagen is claiming that a person cannot be justified in believing p on the 
basis of E unless anyone else who possessed E would also be justified in believing p on 
its basis. The last sentence of his argument also commits him to evidentialism, which 
holds that rationality is solely a matter of believing what the evidence supports. 
This argument has several problems. First, van Inwagen defines “E” as the total 
evidence that is available to a person at a moment. “Available” is vague. Presumably, 
“available” does not imply that one can express all of his evidence, either to himself or to 
another, since this would rule out private evidence--evidence that cannot be shared with 
another, such as one’s felt sense that E supports p--which van Inwagen himself seems to 
think is possible and relevant to whether one is rational to accept p. Also, one’s private 
evidence, if such there be, intuitively would be a part of one’s total evidence pertaining to 
p at a time. So, if E does not need to be entirely expressible (and thus includes private 
evidence), then why think that it must be either rational or (exclusive) irrational for 
anyone to accept p on its basis? Presumably van Inwagen thinks that if some bit of 
private evidence supports p for one person, then it would support p for any other person 
who possessed it. This implies that someone else could possess another person’s private 
evidence. But how could this be? By definition, private evidence cannot be shared. 
Perhaps van Inwagen may reply here that he is not suggesting that someone could possess 
the private evidence of another, but that if they could, then it would support p just the 
same. I’m not sure this is coherent, since it seems to me to be logically necessary that 
 
8 Ibid., 20-21. 
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someone cannot possess the private evidence of another. But even if van Inwagen could 
somehow avoid incoherence here, his point ceases to be relevant to real-world cases of 
disagreement, since in such cases no one can in fact obtain anyone else’s private 
evidence. 
To put the point a bit differently, imagine that two parties to a dispute share all of 
their evidence, including the private “seemings” of the form “It seems to me that this 
evidence supports p.” Obviously, they differ in at least two ways: (1) with respect to their 
positions on p, and (2) in the indexical sense that when one says “It seems to me that this 
evidence supports ~p,” the “me” depends on who is saying it. Can they be said to have 
the same evidence in that case? Clearly not, since one has the private evidential seeming 
that the evidence supports p, and the other has the private evidential seeming that the 
evidence supports ~p. These are different evidence sets. Since there is no epistemological 
puzzle about the rationality of believing opposed propositions with different evidence 
sets, the disagreement problem does not arise here if we allow for private evidence. So 
insofar as van Inwagen accepts the possibility of private evidence, which he seems to do, 
he cannot consistently maintain that E must “confer rationality on” only one of the three 
stated assessments of E (that it supports p, supports ~p, or supports neither p nor ~p).9 
However, let’s assume for the sake of argument that E is the same for the two 
disputants. Would the claim that E must either support p, support ~p, or support neither p 
nor ~p follow in this case? This would follow only if one takes E to be everything that is 
relevant to deciding the rationality of one’s doxastic attitude toward p. But this is too 
 
9 As we will see in the next chapter, van Inwagen recognizes the importance of private evidence, and comes 
close to admitting the argument in these last two paragraphs. However, he ultimately rejects the ability of 
private evidence to allow for reasonable disagreement for reasons that do not withstand scrutiny. 
16 
 
strong--there are considerations other than E itself which are relevant to the rationality of 
one’s assessment of p, including (1) factors that are “unavailable” to one in the moment 
of a disagreement (and so not a part of E by van Inwagen’s definition of E), and (2) one’s 
interpretation of E, which is not itself reducible to E. A word of explanation about both 
(1) and (2) follows. 
(1) As van Inwagen defines E, it clearly does not include any consideration 
pertinent to p that is unavailable to one at a moment. But it seems that considerations that 
are not available to one can make a difference with respect to what it is rational for one to 
believe about p. Consider an atheist and a theist disagreeing over a particular miraculous 
claim. The theist recalls believing on good evidence in the past that there is a successful 
refutation of Hume’s argument against the rationality of belief in miracle reports, even 
though he cannot remember what the refutation is or where he learned it. This 
information is unavailable to him at the moment of the disagreement, and yet it seems 
relevant to the rationality of his assessment of the miracle claim. Alternatively, one may 
be in an epistemically lucky situation without realizing it, say by asking for directions in 
a neighborhood where people tell the truth about such things, but in a city where most 
people lie. This would make a difference with respect to the rationality of one’s believing 
the directions one is given. Or, perhaps someone could have a “neural quirk,” to borrow a 
phrase of van Inwagen’s, that makes them better at discerning the truth about p than other 
people, though they don’t know this about themselves. These possibilities suggest that 
factors other than what is included in E could be relevant to whether it is rational for one 
to believe p on the basis of E.  
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(2) Van Inwagen states that the ability of a body of evidence to “confer rationality 
on” the doxastic attitude that one takes toward a proposition is a metaphysically 
necessary property of the evidence itself, “regardless of who may have it.” What could 
this mean? Presumably, van Inwagen has in mind the objectivity of justification 
mentioned above: to be justified in believing p on the basis of E, E must objectively 
support belief in the truth of p--i.e., anyone else who possessed E would also be justified 
in believing p on its basis. But is this the right way to view how evidence supports a 
proposition? Jason Decker has argued, convincingly in my view, that it is not.10 
Decker describes this view as the “pan balance model of evidential support,” 
because it assumes that we determine whether an evidence set supports a proposition in 
the same way that we determine which of two objects weighs more by putting the objects 
on a scale. We drop some evidence into the pan on one side of the scale, which represents 
p, and some into the pan on the opposite side of the scale, which represents ~p, and the 
lowest pan at the end of this process is what the total evidence supports.11 However, as he 
says, 
It is at best elliptical--and, at worst, a category mistake--to say that a body of 
evidence supports a proposition. A body of evidence isn’t the right sort of thing to 
support a proposition.… only an interpreted body of evidence can serve such a 
role.12 
 
Decker gives two examples to illustrate his point. The first involves someone having an 
identical total evidence set with his counterpart on Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth: “For 
 
10 Jason Decker, “Disagreement, Evidence, and Agnosticism,” Synthese 187, no. 2 (2012): 753–83. In the 
portion of the paper that I am referencing here, Decker is discussing Roger White’s and Richard Feldman’s 
“Uniqueness Thesis,” which I discuss in the next section. However, what he says applies just as well to van 
Inwagen’s claim here about evidential support. 
11 Ibid., 777-778. 
12 Ibid., 778. 
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every experience you have had, your twin has had a phenomenally identical 
experience.”13 Now suppose that you come to think that your experiences are caused by 
mind-independent “material” objects, while your Twin Earth counterpart comes to adopt 
a Berkeleyan perspective. Decker thinks it is obvious that both you and your counterpart 
could be rational in your views, even if only one of you may be correct. However, van 
Inwagen’s view of evidence would insist that at most one of you could be rational. 
Alternatively, Decker offers another case: two people are looking, under the same 
conditions, at an image like the famous duck-rabbit, which may be seen in two ways.14 
One forms the belief that what they are looking at is only a duck; the other forms the 
belief that what they are looking at is only a rabbit. According to van Inwagen, at least 
one of them is irrational. But surely neither is irrational. “It’s not a failure of rationality,” 
Decker says, if either of the people fails “to be lucky enough to see that the [image] can 
be carved up in a second way.”15 The reason is that evidence cannot tell us how to 
interpret it. Decker goes on to give a somewhat crude description of what he means by 
“interpretation,” but this need not concern us here. The upshot is that van Inwagen’s view 
of evidence ignores the fact that evidence must be interpreted in order to support a 
proposition, and that therefore we cannot say that evidence can have support-properties 
“of itself.” Further, it won’t help to say (as, for example, Richard Feldman has said) that 
one’s interpretation of the evidence should itself be supported and hence become part of 
E, because (a) this won’t always be possible, as in the duck-rabbit case, and (b) even if it 
 
13 Ibid. 
14 I’ve modified this case slightly for ease of exposition. 
15 Ibid., 779. 
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were possible to find some extra evidence for one’s interpretation of E, that evidence 
would also need to be interpreted. 
So, as stated, van Inwagen’s argument that evidence can confer rationality on only 
one view will not work. Given that he offers no further support for this view, I will here 
set it aside, and turn to a closely related view of Richard Feldman’s. 
 
1.2 – Richard Feldman’s Uniqueness Thesis 
 
in his widely influential 2007 paper “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” 
Richard Feldman begins by noting that many people--e.g., his own students--take a 
tolerant attitude toward those with whom they disagree.16 They seem to think they can 
“agree to disagree” about an issue, and that all parties can remain reasonable. But what 
does this attitude amount to?17 Feldman notes two ways of failing to reasonably disagree: 
intolerance (viewing one’s interlocutors as opponents to be beaten or mocked), and 
relativism (viewing all sides of a dispute as somehow equally correct). Each fails to take 
seriously the views of their interlocutors. So what sense is there to “reasonable 
disagreement”? 
Feldman distinguishes two questions: 




16 Richard Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations 
on Atheism and the Secular Life, ed. Louise Antony (Oxford University Press, 2007), 194–214. 
17 For what it’s worth, Feldman describes himself as a “complacent atheist” and admits that this issue 
“challenges that complacency.” Ibid., 195. The emphasis here on complacency is not unique to Feldman; 
Gideon Rosen also speaks in these terms. See below, especially Chapter Four. 
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Q2 Can epistemic peers who have shared their evidence reasonably maintain their 
own belief yet also think that the other party to the disagreement is also 
reasonable?18 
 
Feldman thinks that affirmative answers to these questions cannot be defended. “As will 
become apparent,” he writes, “open and honest discussion seems to have the puzzling 
effect of making reasonable disagreement impossible.”19 
In this context, the cases under consideration are restricted to those in which the 
interlocutors hold that each party’s specific beliefs are reasonable, and not merely of 
practical value, or tied to desirable behavior. With the case so restricted, Feldman 
distinguishes four ways that reasonable disagreement might be possible. 
First, different conclusions can be drawn from the same evidence. For example, 
consider the case of Righty and Lefty. A detective has strong evidence incriminating 
Righty and (presumably equally) strong evidence incriminating Lefty of the same 
crime.20 Further, the detective knows that only one suspect could be guilty (though, 
presumably, he does not know that it must be either Righty or Lefty). One may think that 
the detective would be reasonable to draw either the conclusion that Righty is guilty or 
the conclusion that Lefty is guilty. But, Feldman argues, this isn’t right: any decision by 
the detective in this case is arbitrary; the reasonable thing to do is to suspend judgment. 
This suggests what Feldman calls the Uniqueness Thesis: 
UT: …a body of evidence justifies at most one proposition out of a competing set 




18 Ibid., 201. 
19 Ibid., 202. 
20 Ibid., 204-205. 
21 Ibid., 205. Feldman thinks that “our options with respect to any proposition are believing, disbelieving, 
and suspending judgment.” 
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Feldman takes this to rule out a “yes” answer to Q1. As he says, “If The Uniqueness 
Thesis is correct, then there cannot be any reasonable disagreements in cases in which 
two people have exactly the same evidence.”22 
Second, reasonable people may weigh evidence differently because of differing 
initial assumptions about evidence. Imagine, for example--this is my case, not Feldman’s-
-that two jurors are analyzing four pieces of evidence in a murder trial: (1) the murder 
weapon with the defendant’s fingerprints, (2) the known fact that the defendant hated the 
victim, (3) the known fact that the victim was depressed, and (4) a suicide note 
apparently in the victim’s handwriting. It seems as if this body of evidence is consistent 
with both the proposition “The defendant is guilty” and the proposition “The defendant is 
innocent,” and further that a juror could be justified in believing p (guilt) or in believing 
not-p (innocence) on the basis of the same evidence. This would be because the evidence 
admits of multiple consistent relative weights, depending on how the jurors weigh 
handwriting analysis versus fingerprint analysis. Thus, rational disagreement with a 
single evidence base seems plausible. 
However, Feldman argues that this only pushes the disagreement back a step: now 
the issue is which initial assumptions are true--in this case, which actually is more 
reliable, fingerprint analysis or handwriting analysis? Feldman says that the parties 
should share their evidence about that and come to a conclusion: 
These different starting points help support the existence of reasonable 
disagreements only if each side can reasonably maintain its starting point after 
they have been brought out into the open. And this idea can support the tolerant 
attitude…only if people can think that their own starting point is reasonable and 





understand how that could be true. Once you see that there are these alternative 
starting points, you need a reason to prefer one over the other.23 
 
The third way that reasonable disagreement might be possible is that both parties 
to a disagreement can have a bit of unshared, or “private,” evidence that makes their view 
reasonable. Perhaps, Feldman suggests, this is what we suspect is going on when we take 
the tolerant attitude. As he says, 
If we take (Q1) and (Q2) to be about cases in which all the evidence is shared, 
then the answer to both questions is ‘no.’ But if we take the questions to be about 
cases in which the evidence is shared as fully as is realistically possible, then the 
answers are ‘yes.’ We might say that the reasonable disagreements are possible in 
those cases in which each side has private evidence supporting its view.24 
 
But Feldman argues that this won’t work either. There is an analogy here with 
perception: imagine that two people are facing a quad; one sees the dean standing there 
and the other doesn’t. The reasonable thing here, Feldman thinks, is to suspend judgment 
once the parties realize that something strange is going on, not to conclude that they’re 
having a reasonable disagreement owing to private evidence.25 As he says: 
Each may have his or her own special insight or sense of obviousness. But each 
knows about the other’s insight. Each knows that this insight has evidential force. 
And now I see no basis for either of them justifying his own belief simply because 
the one insight happens to occur inside of him. A point about evidence that plays 
a role here is this: evidence of evidence is evidence. More carefully, evidence that 
there is evidence for P is evidence for P. Knowing that the other has an insight 
provides each of them with evidence.26 
 
 
23 Ibid., 206. One may reasonably wonder here what the evidence for “starting points”--like the principles 
about the reliability of handwriting and fingerprint analysis--would be like. Eventually, it may be that all 
we have to go on in preferring our own starting points is an intuitive “feel” or “seeming.” This will be 
discussed below. 
24 Ibid., 207. Private evidence will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
25 For what it’s worth, my own intuition about this case is that, in the absence of further evidence, I should 
not consider my interlocutor an epistemic peer with respect to whether the dean is in the quad--something 
has clearly gone wrong with one of our perceptions, and ex hypothesi, I have no reason to assume the 
problem is with me. 
26 Ibid., 208. These points will be explored further in Chapter Six. See Chapter Two for a critique of 
Feldman’s argument against private evidence. 
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Fourth and finally, perhaps it is possible to have a reasonable disagreement (so, an 
affirmative answer to Q1), but not to think that one is having one (so, a negative answer 
to Q2). As Feldman says: 
One way or another, then, the conclusion drawn is that the other person does not 
have a reasonable or justified belief. And the idea is that both parties to the 
disagreement can reasonably draw this conclusion. Thus, both parties have a 
reasonable belief, yet they reasonably think that the other side is not reasonable.27 
 
But, again, any reasons for thinking that one is cognitively superior can themselves be 
discussed and become part of the shared evidence. So here again, the best option would 
be to suspend judgment, not to insist on reasonable disagreement. 
Apparently, then, there cannot be reasonable disagreements. So what should we 
say about situations where it seems like there are? Feldman says there are two options: 
(1) The “hard line”: evidence can only support one view, and so whoever takes 
that view is reasonable, and everyone else is not. Feldman thinks the hard line view is 
probably appropriate in many cases (e.g., astrology, climate change, evolution, racism, 
etc.), but it is apparently inappropriate in many others (e.g., most complex moral, 
political, scientific, and religious disputes). Take, for example, the question of the 
existence of God: the theist and atheist may both take the hard line view and conclude 
that the evidence supports only her view, and so the other is mistaken and unreasonable. 
But is there any reason to suppose that one is more correct to do so than the other? 
Feldman thinks not. 
(2) The skeptical alternative: we should suspend judgment in cases of peer 
disagreement, i.e., become agnostics about a great many things. This is Feldman’s own 
 
27 Ibid., 209. 
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stated view in this article (in some of his later work, he backs away from this 
conclusion).28 Feldman insists that this is “a modest view, in the sense that it argues for a 
kind of compromise with those with whom one disagrees.” But it also: 
implies that one should give up one’s beliefs in the light of the sort of 
disagreement under discussion. This is a kind of modesty in response to 
disagreement from one’s peers. This is also a skeptical view, in the limited sense 
that it denies the existence of reasonable beliefs in a significant range of cases.29 
 
 Because Feldman here advocates the “skeptical” response to peer disagreement, 
he is usually classed as a “Conformist,” one who thinks that the rational response to peer 
disagreement, once evidence has been shared, is to suspend judgment about p. Several 
points Feldman makes here will be discussed in later chapters; here I want to focus on the 
Uniqueness Thesis (UT), which is very similar to van Inwagen’s view of evidence noted 
above. 
 First, what can be said in support of UT? In Thomas Kelly’s discussion of it in 
“Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” he mentions UT while discussing the 
“Equal Weight View.” 30 The Equal Weight View recommends that in cases of peer 
disagreement with shared evidence, one should accord equal weight to one’s own view 
and the view of one’s peer--i.e., one should split the difference. Kelly describes a case in 
which two parties consider evidence E and how well it supports hypothesis H. Assume 
that we can assign a numeric value to our confidence in a proposition such that 1 
represents certainty that the proposition is true, 0 represents certainty that it is false, and 
 
28 See Richard Feldman, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement,” Episteme 6, no. 3 
(2009): 294–312. 
29 Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” 213. 
30 Thomas Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman 
and Ted Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 111-74. 
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.5 represents suspension of judgment about the proposition--i.e., one takes the evidence to 
be 50/50 for and against that proposition. Party A is reasonable, let’s say, to accord H a 
credence of 0.7, and moreover, A knows that it would also be reasonable to be slightly 
less confident in H on the basis of E, say, a credence as low as 0.6. Party B accords H a 
credence of 0.6 on the basis of E, but knows that a slightly higher credence would also be 
reasonable, say, as high as 0.7. Now suppose the parties realize their differing credence 
levels. It seems that the Equal Weight View would recommend that they split the 
difference and opt for a shared credence of 0.65. But, says Kelly, there’s no reason at all 
to do this, since they both recognize that the other’s credence is a reasonable response to 
the evidence. In order to rule out the possibility of cases like this and thereby save her 
view, he argues, the Equal Weight Theorist will need to adopt UT.31 As he says: 
Suppose that the Uniqueness Thesis is true. Then, if it is in fact reasonable for me 
to give credence 0.7 to the hypothesis, it follows that you are guilty of 
unreasonable diffidence for being even slightly less confident. On the other hand, 
if you are reasonable in being slightly less confident than I am, then I am guilty of 
being unreasonably overconfident. Hence, the description of [the case] offered 
above is incoherent; [that] is not in fact a possible case.32 
 
But, Kelly says, the case just described makes UT highly counterintuitive, since if one 
has already allowed for some wiggle room in what she takes the reasonable credence for 
H to be, then there is no reason for one to alter her view, UT notwithstanding. In order to 
maintain her view, then, the Equal Weight Theorist must adopt a highly counterintuitive 
principle (UT), which seems ad hoc. But some of Kelly’s phrasing here suggests a way to 
alter UT to make it less counterintuitive. For example, he says: 
 
31 Whether or not this is a fair assessment of the Equal Weight View is not at issue here. My present 
purpose is merely to consider the merits of the Uniqueness Thesis itself. 
32 Ibid., 119-120. 
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Clearly, the Uniqueness Thesis is an extremely strong claim: for any given batch 
of evidence, there is some one correct way of responding to that evidence, any 
slight departure from which already constitutes a departure from perfect 
rationality.33 
 
Later, he says: 
 
Let us suppose for the sake of argument, then, that the Uniqueness Thesis is 
correct: for a given batch of evidence, there is some one way of responding to that 
evidence that is the maximally rational way.34 
 
The emphasis on “perfect” or “maximal” rationality here is suggestive. If we view 
rationality as a degree concept, then the door is open to notions such as “acceptably 
rational, though not perfectly or maximally rational,” as responses to evidence. Along 
these lines, we can adjust UT in the following way: 
UT*: For any batch of evidence E, there is at most one maximally rational 
assessment of that evidence. 
 
This reformulation of the Thesis doesn’t entail a single rational view and a host of other 
equally irrational views. Rather, there is a single most rational view, and a variety of 
other less rational views. One might also build into this some constraint regarding the 
natural limitations on human cognition to determine exact, fine-grained distinctions of 
warranted credence. Perhaps, for example, it would be inappropriate to expect even 
careful thinkers to correctly ascertain evidential assignments of warranted credence 
between 0.65 and 0.7. Thus, the proponent of a graded, differential version of the 
Uniqueness Thesis could build in allowances for human limitations, perhaps by 
rephrasing the Thesis as: 
 
33 Ibid., 120. 
34 Ibid., 122. The “for the sake of argument” here is worth noting, as Kelly in fact rejects the Uniqueness 
Thesis, though he does not explicitly argue against it in this paper. His focus in this portion of “Peer 
Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence” is refuting the Equal Weight View. See his comments to this 
effect on p. 121. 
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UT**: For any batch of evidence E, there is at most one maximally rational range 
of assessments of that evidence, consistent with the reasoning capacities of human 
thinkers. 
 
Such a modified UT seems to avoid the sort of problem raised by Kelly’s case. 
Unfortunately, it is not available to Feldman. Note that while UT** avoids the 
counterintuitive implication that all views but one are automatically irrational, it still has 
the consequence that all assessments of any evidence set that fall outside of a certain 
range of credence levels regarding p are automatically suboptimal. The reasonableess of 
this view depends on how narrow this range is. Unfortunately for Feldman, the range 
would have to be quite narrow in order to justify his view that one should suspend 
judgment about all issues disputed by epistemic peers. UT** simply isn’t restrictive 
enough to support this conclusion, since it is plausible that two careful thinkers could 
come to different conclusions about a set of evidence that are both within the maximally 
rational range of interpretations of that evidence. This is what Kelly’s case shows. 
What about the problems raised above for van Inwagen’s closely related view? 
Does UT** avoid those? Recall that the problems with that view are: 
(1) Considerations that are “unavailable” to one in the moment of a disagreement 
can be relevant to the rationality of one’s assessment of p. 
(2) Evidence must be interpreted in order to support a proposition; it has no 
metaphysically necessary intrinsic support-properties. 
With respect to (2), UT** does not include or depend on the claim that evidence 
has intrinsic support-properties. Rather, the question of why there is at most one 
maximally rational range of assessments of an evidence set is left open. 
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With respect to (1), if UT** were to be used in the way that Feldman and van 
Inwagen use UT--i.e., as a way to rule out the possibility of rational disagreement--then it 
would fare no better than UT, since in order to support that conclusion, one must also 
assume evidentialism, which both Feldman and van Inwagen do. But it is not necessary to 
use UT** in this way, and on its own it says nothing about whether or not considerations 
other than one’s total evidence may play a role in the rationality of one’s doxastic state 
regarding p. 
But there is still something counterintuitive about UT**. Say that it seems to me 
that argument X supports p, and I assign p a credence of 0.7. However, I might also 
recognize that owing to the limitations on how much weight I should accord my 
“seemings” about such things, I may be off by as much as 0.1. It seems to you also that X 
supports p, but you assign it a credence of only 0.6. But you also realize the same 
limitations about your own “seemings,” and so you accept a range of 0.1 higher as still 
consistent with the evidence, which in this case is exhausted by X. According to UT** 
we may both be maximally rational in this case. This would not be allowed on UT or 
UT*. However, if either of us has a private sense that is not extremely close to the private 
sense of the other (within, say, a 0.1 credence assignment range), then UT** requires that 
at most one of us can be maximally rational, even if it seems to both of us that we are 
both doing everything that we should be doing in assessing the evidence that we have. 
Applied to real-life disagreement cases, this is problematic, since often neither of us will 
be in a position to know which of our private seemings is more accurate. If neither of us 
can see how either of us could be doing any better than we are at assessing our evidence, 
it seems odd to be forced to conclude that one or both of us is doing worse than we could 
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with the evidence we have. Instead, we should conclude that we’re both within the 
maximally rational range. But if this is possible, then UT** cannot do the work that 
Conformists like Feldman need it to do, since it would allow for the possibility of more 
than one maximally rational conclusion on the basis of a single set of evidence. 
The Conformist may reply here that the distinctions we’re talking about are so 
fine (0.7 vs. 0.6) that for most real-life issues, we’d likely consider that an agreement, 
and so UT** would be irrelevant. But of course we could easily think of situations where 
that fine of a difference would make a difference. It often happens that the divergence of 
expert opinion on some issue is very slight, and yet it constitutes real disagreement 
between them. It seems in such cases that we should allow that the experts who differ by 
a slight amount between themselves may all have beliefs within the maximally rational 
range allowed by UT**. The only motivation for saying otherwise would seem to be the 
requirement that to be maximally rational in assessing our evidence, our assessment must 
be accurate. But of course in a real case of peer disagreement, we won’t be in a position 
to know this. So UT** cannot be used to decide between the private seemings of two 
disagreeing peers, which was the purpose of UT from the beginning. 
For his part, van Inwagen does offer an argument for an evidentialist 
interpretation of rationality, which he borrows from W.K. Clifford. In his essay 
“Listening to Clifford’s Ghost,” van Inwagen discusses Clifford’s famous essay “The 
Ethics of Belief.”35 He asks, “Why does Clifford think that it is wrong to believe things 
upon insufficient evidence?” And he answers that: 
 
35 Peter van Inwagen, “Listening to Clifford’s Ghost,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 65 (2009): 
15–35. Also see W.K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief,” in The Ethics of Belief and Other Essays, ed. 
Timothy Madigan (Amherst, MA: Prometheus, 1999), 70–96. 
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The central nerve of Clifford’s reason for supposing this is…: Of all the forces in 
the human psyche that direct us toward and away from assent to propositions, 
only rational attention to relevant evidence tracks the truth. Believing things only 
upon sufficient evidence is, therefore, the only device we have for minimizing the 
extent of our false beliefs, or at least the only such device that has any prospect of 
providing us with a useful set of true beliefs… If we form our beliefs on any other 
basis – if we allow them to be formed by some factor that does not track the truth 
–, we are, in effect, believing things at random.… Since there are a lot more ways 
to be wrong than there are to be right, beliefs formed by a method that does not 
track the truth will, to a high probability, be false.… A person who believes things 
upon insufficient evidence, therefore, is not taking care to minimize the extent of 
his false beliefs.36 
 
Although Clifford is less concerned with being rational than with being ethical, 
since his goal is to show that it is morally wrong to believe anything on insufficient 
evidence, not merely that it is irrational to do so, his argument applies to rationality as 
well as morality. This is because for Clifford, the only alternative to truth-tracking is 
randomness. It thus follows that rationality entails truth-tracking, since believing things at 
random is clearly not truth-tracking. To avoid the philosophical baggage associated with 
the term “truth-tracking” associated with Robert Nozick, I’ll instead use the phrase 
“based on evidence.”37 So a reformulated, Clifford-inspired maxim for rationality would 
be: Rationality requires holding beliefs which are based on evidence. But is it right that 
one is forced to choose between forming her beliefs in accordance with evidence or else 
at random? I think not. The literature on Clifford is vast, and full discussion of it would 
take us too far afield, but I’ll briefly point out a few ways that one may respond to 
Clifford’s argument.38 
 
36 Van Inwagen, “Listening to Clifford’s Ghost,” 33. 
37 See Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). 
38 For a nice overview of the topic, see Andrew Chignell, “The Ethics of Belief,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/ethics-belief/. 
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First, it can be argued that it may be rational to believe not on the basis of 
evidence. The basic idea here is that sometimes evidence may not point decisively in one 
direction or another, and that when this is the case it may be rational--if certain conditions 
are met, and contra various commentators in the disagreement debate39--to choose what 
to believe based on desires or practical concerns other than knowing the truth. This is a 
straightforward denial of the maxim above. William James famously responded to 
Clifford in just this way. He argued that it is neither immoral nor irrational to choose 
what to believe on such a basis.40 If we go further and argue that it can in fact be 
positively rational to choose on such a basis, given one’s overall epistemic goals, then we 
can reject Clifford’s dilemma: evidence-based or irrational.41 
Another avenue of response is to argue that non-evidential motivations may be 
rational in the truth-capturing sense.42 For example, it may be that the desire for goodness 
is itself productive of true beliefs more often than not, so that when one believes with the 
end of the good in view, one is eo ipso believing in a truth-capturing way, even though 
one’s goal in believing is not truth per se.43 
Thirdly, one may argue that “evidence” is broader than Clifford imagined, so that 
aligning one’s beliefs strictly in proportion to the evidence in his narrow sense is 
 
39 See, e.g., Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” 204-205. 
40 See William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1956), 1-31. 
41 For a contemporary example of someone who argues this way in the context of the disagreement debate, 
see Marc Moffett, “Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry” Episteme: A Journal of Social 
Epistemology 4 (2007): 352–367. I will discuss Moffett’s view at length in Chapter Eight. 
42 James sometimes speaks this way as well, e.g.: “to say… ‘Do not decide, but leave the question open,’ is 
itself a passional decision,--just like deciding yes or no,--and is attended with the same risk of losing the 
truth.” See James, “The Will to Believe,” 11. 
43 This would be an example of a non-evidentialist, reliabilist approach to rationality. For an overview of 
reliabilism, see Alvin Goldman and Bob Beddor, “Reliabilist Epistemology,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, Winter 2015, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reliabilism/. 
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epistemically wrong-headed. On such a view, contra much of the modernist tradition, 
desires and natural inclinations would be evidential, and therefore beliefs formed on their 
basis may be rational.44 This would be a way of affirming the maxim stated above, while 
insisting that it should be interpreted more broadly than Clifford does. 
Fourth, one may hold that evidence is not required at all for at least some beliefs 
to be held rationally. This would be an even stronger denial of Clifford’s maxim than the 
one James tendered, since his reply at least assumed that the evidence had been assessed 
and found indecisive. On this view, exemplified by so-called “reformed epistemology,” 
sometimes no evidence is needed for rationality. Primary examples of such rationally 
held, non-evidential beliefs include belief in other minds, belief in an external world, 
basic perceptual beliefs, and more controversially, belief in God.45 
All of these proposals are reasonable responses to the Clifford-inspired argument 
offered by van Inwagen, and on any of them, the line between rationality and arbitrary 
belief is not where Clifford takes it to be. 
Thus, for now it seems that no version of the Uniqueness Thesis will do what van 
Inwagen and Feldman want it to do: rule out the possibility of opposed rational responses 
to the same body of evidence. 
But what does it mean to have the “same body of evidence” in the first place? Is 
full disclosure of one’s total evidence possible, or is there some sense in which some 
evidence can remain private? This will be the topic of the next chapter. 
 
44 In certain places, Kierkegaard seems to take a view like this. 
45 For helpful overviews of reformed epistemology, see Peter Forrest, “The Epistemology of Religion,” in 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2017, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/religion-epistemology/, Section 7; and Anthony Bolos 




Chapter Two – Private Evidence 
 
 
2.1 – Van Inwagen on the Use of Private Evidence 
 
Can evidence always be fully disclosed, or is there such a thing as private 
evidence? Van Inwagen suggests some examples of such private evidence that he says 
seem “plausible”: 
I sometimes know that my wife is angry when no one else does, for example, and 
I cannot explain to anyone how I know this--I cannot give what Plato would call 
an “account” of what underlies my conviction that she is angry. It seems to me to 
be plausible to say that in such cases my belief that my wife is angry is grounded 
in some body of evidence, evidence that lies entirely within my mind and that I 
cannot put into words. A second example is provided by the case of the chicken 
sexer, beloved of epistemologists in the far-off days of my graduate studies… 
Mathematicians are often intuitively certain that some mathematical proposition is 
true, although they are unable to prove it. (Gödel, I understand, was convinced 
that the power of the continuum was aleph-2.) Since they often later do discover 
proofs of these propositions, it seems likely that, prior to their discovery of the 
proofs, they had some sort of evidence for the truth of those propositions.1 
 
Van Inwagen considers private evidence in the context of his disagreement over free will 
with David Lewis. Given that Lewis was obviously rational, and that he had all the same 
public evidence (arguments, distinctions, and the like) as van Inwagen, it follows, given 
van Inwagen’s assumptions about evidence, that if the evidence did not point Lewis 
toward incompatibilism, then it didn’t point van Inwagen toward it either. That is, of 
course, unless van Inwagen had some evidence that Lewis lacked, of a sort that could not 
be disclosed. Van Inwagen here admits that if this is even possible, then his earlier 
attempt to demonstrate that strong exclusivism follows from weak exclusivism fails, 
 
1 Peter van Inwagen, “We’re Right. They’re Wrong,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted 
Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 25. 
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since if one has private evidence, then one needn’t hold those with whom one disagrees 
to be irrational--they simply, through no fault of their own, lack some evidence.2 
It is worth pausing for a moment here over the connection between private 
evidence and intuition. As described by van Inwagen, private evidence is a matter of its 
seeming to one that something is the case, in a way that one is unable to express other 
than with a locution of the form “It seems to me that…” Is this an intuition? I think it is, 
in the sense of a pre-reflective judgment that something is the case. In that way, seeming-
intuitions are intellectual in that they are judgments with propositional content. In 
Chapter Three, I will argue that, in the disagreement literature, seemings that some 
proposition is true or false are treated as analogous to perceptual seemings, such as the 
seeming that there is a green expanse in front of me. One may argue that this makes 
seemings different from intuitions. For example, Joel Pust objects to the following 
definition of intuition on the grounds that it is “indiscriminate”: 
I: S has the intuition that p if and only if it seems to S that p.3 
 
This is indiscriminate in the sense that it does not distinguish between intellectual and 
perceptual seemings, and therefore implies that there are perceptual intuitions. According 
to Pust, “Clarity is served by stipulating that such states are not intuitions even if they are 
all species of some common genus.”4 Consequently, he prefers this definition of intuition: 
 
2 One may reasonably wonder whether it is possible for two people to have the same private evidence, in 
the sense that two competent chicken sexers could both have a private “seeming” that the chicken is a male. 
As I understand it, private evidence is indexical, so while two people may have similar private evidence, 
they cannot have the same private evidence. See Chapter One, pp. 14-15. It remains open, however, that 
one’s private evidence may be epistemically equivalent to another’s. As we will see below, private 
evidence in the form of propositional “seemings” bears a strong resemblance in this sense to perceptual 
seemings. 
3 Joel Pust, “Intuition,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2017, 




I*: S has the intuition that p if and only if it intellectually seems to S that p.5 
 
While I have no philosophical objection to distinguishing between perceptual and 
intellectual seemings in this way, for the purposes of clarity in what follows, I will use 
the term “seeming” in the indiscriminate sense identified above. Nothing in my argument 
will turn on whether perceptual seemings are intellectual. Consequently, I will also 
generally avoid use of the word “intuition,” since it is not my aim here to wade into the 
murky waters of whether intuition is doxastic, dispositional, or sui generis, or whether 
intuitions should include perceptual states. In my usage, “seeming” can bypass such 
issues. 
 In addition, intuitions/seemings are often treated as evidence by philosophers, van 
Inwagen being a case in point. As Pust says: 
… the view that intuitions are treated as evidence in philosophy is best thought of 
as the view that, with respect to many core questions of philosophy, our 
justification for believing an answer consists (at least substantially) in our having 
suitable intuitions.… Put simply, the view is that the occurrence of an intuiting is 
taken to provide the person in whom it occurs with prima facie justification for 
believing the intuited. Alternatively, it holds that S’s having an intuition that p 
prima facie justifies S in believing that p. Given a capacious view of evidence, 
then, both the intuiting and the intuited are treated as evidence, the occurrence of 
the former being treated as prima facie non-inferential justification for accepting 
the latter and the latter as a potential inferential justification for further 
propositions.6 
 
I will follow this common usage here, treating both the having and the content of a 




6 Ibid., Section 2.4. 
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So perhaps van Inwagen has some private evidence for the truth of 
incompatibilism--the sort of evidence that is exemplified by knowing when one’s spouse 
is angry, or by “chicken sexers,” or by mathematicians who intuit mathematical 
propositions prior to proving them, etc. Maybe so, but this is ultimately an unsatisfying 
response. 
Consider the implications: surely not all philosophical (or other) disagreements 
are due to differing private evidence. As van Inwagen says: 
Am I to believe that in every case in which I believe something many other 
philosophers deny (and this comes down to: in every case in which I accept some 
substantive philosophical thesis), I am right and they are wrong, and that, in every 
such case, my epistemic circumstances are superior to theirs? Am I to believe that 
in every such case this is because some neural quirk has provided me with 
evidence that is inaccessible to them? If I do believe this, I must ask myself, is it 
the same neural quirk in each case or a different one? If it is the same one, it 
begins to look more a case of “my superior cognitive architecture” than a case of 
“accidental feature of my cognitive architecture.” If it is a different one in each 
case--well, that is quite a coincidence, isn’t it?7 
 
I take it that “neural quirk” here is a stand-in for all forms of private evidence that one 
might have, even though, technically speaking, a neural quirk would be the a cause of 
private evidence, not private evidence itself. Ultimately, van Inwagen cannot believe that 
he has such private evidence in every case in which he disagrees with a peer.8 Since he 
cannot otherwise justify his superiority to Lewis, or Lewis’s to him, he is left with a 
dilemma: either he and Lewis are both irrational, or both rational. It’s unlikely to be the 
former, but he also thinks it cannot be the latter, owing to the arguments given above 
about the nature of evidence. The implication here is that we should become agnostics 
 
7 Peter van Inwagen, “We’re Right. They’re Wrong,” 27. 
8 Van Inwagen does not use “peer” language, though it is implied that Lewis is his epistemic equal with 
respect to the question of free will. 
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regarding a topic or proposition about which there’s a dispute among the informed. But 
we can’t do that--literally, are unable to--and so we’re stuck believing that we’re rational 
and that our disputants often are as well, although we have no way to justify this. 
 Fortunately, given the critique of the Uniqueness Thesis advanced above, we need 
not follow van Inwagen into this dilemma, as it remains an open question whether a body 
of evidence may support more than one conclusion. 
But what about the possibility of private evidence? Is it reasonable to believe that 
one’s view is correct while the view of one’s peer is mistaken, because one has some 
private evidence that this is so? Two questions arise here: 
(1) Just what is this private evidence? What is its nature? Can we say anything 
more about it that will help us understand why it is not communicable, 
and/or how it provides justification? 
 
(2) Is it ever reasonable to rely on private evidence in a dispute with an 
epistemic peer?9 
 
To my knowledge, (1) has not been explicitly discussed at length in the disagreement 
literature.10 It is often set aside, as in van Inwagen, in favor of focusing on (2). This is 
understandable if, whatever private evidence turns out to be, it is never reasonable to rely 
on it when disagreeing with a peer. In that case the concept of private evidence is of no 
use to the peer disagreement debate. But the “if” of two sentences back is a big one. So I 
think that (1) is worth considering in its own right. I will do so in the next chapter via a 
comparison with perceptual seeming, which is used throughout the professional literature 
 
9 Related to this is the question whether non-arbitrary criteria can be given for the application of private 
evidence as a way to break the apparent epistemic symmetry between peers. 
10 Even describing its relation to intuitions, as we did above, goes beyond what the major players in the 
disagreement debate have said, with the exception of Gideon Rosen, whose views we will discuss below. 
By and large, they are more focused on what one may reasonably do with one’s seemings than on the 
seemings themselves. I think this is an oversight. 
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on disagreement as an analogy with what I call evidential seeming--the seeming to one 
that evidence E supports proposition p. 
For the present, however, let’s consider (2) more closely. Here is van Inwagen’s 
argument for a negative answer to (2), paraphrased: 
Private evidence cannot be sufficient to justify a preference for one’s own view in 
every case of belief in a disputed proposition.11 This is because one would be left 
with a dilemma if this were the case: either the cause of one’s private evidence is 
the same in each dispute, or the cause is different in each dispute. If it is the same, 
then this is equivalent to saying that one is simply cognitively superior; i.e., it is 
equivalent to denying that any disputant is one’s peer. If it is different in each 
dispute, then this is too unlikely to be believed, since one would have to be 
supremely lucky to have been born with access to all the private evidence one 
would need to form all the correct beliefs about everything.12 
 
One obvious response to van Inwagen here is to say that private evidence need not 
justify a preference for one’s own view in every case, but rather only in those cases in 
which one has done all she can to share her evidence and to consider that of her peer, but 
to no avail, and yet it still really seems to her that she is correctly assessing the total 
evidence. Perhaps van Inwagen’s and David Lewis’s disagreement over free will was just 
such a situation. But how often do philosophers (or anyone else) take that kind of time to 
really get to know one another and hash out an issue for a period of years? I suspect, 
though I have no hard evidence on the matter, that this is rare, and that therefore full 
disclosure even of the evidence that is shareable with respect to some dispute, is rare. If 
this is right, then perhaps van Inwagen’s dilemma is not so bad, since a person would 
 
11 In the context of van Inwagen’s discussion, the propositions in question are substantive philosophical 
theses, and the disputants are other philosophers, but we can safely extend his argument to other sorts of 
disputed propositions. Also, for the time being, I will limit the class of disputants to experts, since in those 
cases, differences of opinion cannot so easily be chalked up to a lack of sharable information. 
12 One could, I suppose, bite this bullet. I once heard Richard Swinburne, known both for his uses of 
Bayesian probability theory in the examination of the existence of God and religious belief and for the 
remarkable stability of his opinions, observe with apparent seriousness how unlikely it must have been for 
him to have begun with all the correct beliefs. 
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only rarely, if ever, find herself in a situation where she would need to fall back on the 
likelihood of her having private evidence for some proposition. 
But this is not a completely satisfying response. Even if it is rare to share all of the 
evidence that one can, it surely happens, and in such a case it may still feel out of place to 
chalk the disagreement up to having one’s own private evidence. This is because in the 
imagined cases, one considers the interlocutor to be her intellectual equal, or in the jargon 
of the disagreement debate, her peer. The situation is really this: person S has shared all 
of the evidence that she can with a peer, and the peer has clearly understood all of that 
evidence and the arguments offered in support of a view. However, S thinks that the peer 
must still be mistaken because S has some evidence that she can’t articulate. To van 
Inwagen, this sounds like unjustified confidence. He claims that this is because S would 
not be able to use this same justification in every case of disagreement. It is for this 
reason that he is hesitant to accept that private evidence can account for both his and 
Lewis’s rationality, although they disagree. However, it seems to me that van Inwagen’s 
hesitancy to rely on private evidence is really rooted in the fact that his disagreement is 
with David Lewis, a man clearly at least his intellectual equal.13 This suggests that 
considering someone a peer has some evidential force. Indeed, the more confident I am in 
the peer-status of my interlocutor, the less comfortable I am likely to be with the notion 
 
13 Elsewhere, van Inwagen says:  
Look, it’s David Lewis we’re talking about here. I can remember a talented young philosopher 
saying to me in the 1970s, following his first encounter with Lewis, ‘Lewis is so smart it’s scary!’; 
and that has been more or less the response of all philosophers who have measured themselves 
against that formidable mind. Nor could anyone suggest with a straight face that Lewis was 
lacking in philosophical ability – not unless all human beings are lacking in philosophical ability. 
And he was scrupulously honest: he may have believed one or two odd things, but he did believe 
them, and believed them because he thought that they were straightforward objective truths. 




that I am correct by virtue of some private evidence that I have.14 It is peerhood itself that 
raises the question of when it is appropriate to rely on private evidence, because when I 
recognize someone as my epistemic peer, I cannot so easily discount their private 
evidence as less evidentially weighty than my own. This leads van Inwagen and others to 
answer “no” to (2) above. Whether this response is warranted will depend on the 
evidential value we assign to both private seemings (discussed in Chapter Four), and to 
disagreement itself (discussed in Chapters Five and Six). For the present it is sufficient to 
note that many commentators in the disagreement debate claim that there is a tension 
between the reasonableness of relying on private evidence and considering an 
interlocutor to be an epistemic peer. However, for all we’ve said so far, this tension does 
not yet provide sufficient reason to reject the reasonableness of relying on private 
evidence. So our answer to (2) for now is maybe, contingent on the answer to (1), which 
is just to say that, contra van Inwagen, there is no prima facie reason to reject the 
reasonableness of relying on private evidence in a dispute without a fuller account of the 
nature of that evidence. 
 
2.2 – Feldman on the Relevance of Private Evidence 
 
 
14 And yet I am still likely to consider it. This suggests that our intuitions about peerhood are compatible 
with the possibility of private evidence, since if the two were really incompatible we would presumably not 
feel any temptation to consider private evidence when disagreeing with a peer. This is a point in favor of 
one way of defining peerhood--as equality with respect to various “disagreement factors”--and against 
another way of defining it--as equal likelihood to be correct. For if I took you to be equally likely to be 
correct as me, then any private evidence either of us may have would already be accounted for in 
calculating our likelihoods, and would therefore be irrelevant to our present disagreement. For further 
discussion of these competing notions of peerhood, see Chapter Seven. 
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Richard Feldman also discusses, and dismisses, private evidence.15 Following van 
Inwagen and Gideon Rosen, whose view will be discussed below, Feldman understands 
private evidence to be a kind of seeming or intuition. As he says, “The idea… is that the 
seeming obviousness, or the intuitive correctness, of one’s position counts as evidence.”16 
Recall here van Inwagen’s knowledge of his wife’s mood, or the intuition of the chicken 
sexer. The defender of reasonable disagreement might argue that this sort of evidence 
gives one sufficient reason to justify her view, even if a peer disagrees. But Feldman does 
not think this will work either, for the simple reason that each party to the disagreement 
knows--or can be brought to know--about the private insight of the other party.17 Here 
Feldman gives an argument against the relevance of private evidence that echoes van 
Inwagen’s argument with respect to (2) above. The argument is as follows: 
(1) If the parties to a disagreement each have private evidence with respect to a 
proposition p, then each may be brought to know that the other also has private 
evidence. 
 
15 Richard Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations 
on Atheism and the Secular Life, ed. Louise Antony (Oxford University Press, 2007), 206-209. In this 
context, Feldman notes that “if all the evidence were shared, there could not be a reasonable disagreement. 
This is the consequence of The Uniqueness Thesis” (207). But this is too strong: the defender of reasonable 
disagreement need not concede this point. She needs only maintain the possibility of justifying evidence 
that cannot be communicated. She need not grant the further claim that if it were communicated, then it 
would also be justifying in the same way for the other party. In other words, private evidence supports the 
possibility of reasonable disagreement whether or not the Uniqueness Thesis is true. 
16 Ibid., 207. This way of framing the issue makes it seem as though one’s seeming is additional evidence 
besides whatever arguments or observations led one to believe a proposition in the first place. This, 
however, is not the only way to think about private evidence. Here is another: I have a low confidence level 
in my ability to communicate certain elements of my experience, which suggests that they could in 
principle be communicated better than I can manage, and that they certainly could be understood better if 
the other person could simply share the experience. This difference--between my experience and their 
understanding of my experience--is itself evidence to me of the following proposition: “I possibly possess 
private evidence of the truth of p.” I cannot be sure that the other person ever really understands my 
evidence, or I hers (indeed, the lower my confidence level in my ability to communicate my experience, the 
stronger my evidence for private evidence). Nonetheless, my private evidence, if it exists, is a proper part 
of my already accounted-for total evidence for p, prior to recognizing that it may be private. I’ll return to 
this point below when I discuss David Christensen’s dismissal of private evidence. 
17 If the reader has the strong reaction here that knowing about someone’s insight is obviously different 
from having that insight, keep reading. 
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(2) Knowing that there is evidence for a proposition itself constitutes evidence for 
that proposition. 
(3) If one’s disputant in a disagreement is taken to be an epistemic peer, then the 
peer’s private evidence should be considered to be on par with one’s own 
private evidence, unless one has some further reason to prefer one’s own private 
evidence. 
(4) Therefore, in the absence of a reason to prefer one’s own private evidence over a 
peer’s, one should suspend judgment about the disputed proposition.18 
 
Premise (1) is not intended to be controversial, and I do not wish to argue this point, so 
I’ll stipulate that in most realistic cases of disagreement, each party can in fact be made 
aware that the other claims private evidence. Premise (2) constitutes what I’ll call the 
“Meta-Evidence Principle,” and will be discussed in Chapter Six. For the present, I will 
grant this premise. Premise (3) is a ban on what Ralph Wedgwood has called an 
“egocentric epistemic bias,” i.e., a tendency to prefer one’s own view or to weigh one’s 
own insight more heavily simply because it is one’s own.19 This will be discussed below, 
but it is on this point that I wish to focus my critique of Feldman’s argument against the 
relevance of private evidence. 
As I will show in the next chapter, private evidence is generally thought of in 
terms of an analogy with perception: evidential seemings are taken to be analogous in 
some sense to perceptual seemings. Feldman, for example, employs the perceptual 
analogy in the case of the dean in the quad, mentioned above. Indeed, the case does much 
of the argumentative work for Feldman, since it is designed to support the view that in 
cases of straightforward perceptual disagreement, it is unreasonable to assume that it is 
the other person whose eyes are malfunctioning. When I see the dean and you don’t, it is 
 
18 This is a reconstruction of Feldman’s argument on pp. 208-209. 
19 See Ralph Wedgwood, “Disagreement and the A Priori,” in The Nature of Normativity (Oxford 
University Press, 2007): 261. 
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inappropriate for me to conclude, owing to my perceptual seeming which I cannot fully 
communicate, that you are in the wrong rather than me. As Feldman says, 
I cannot reasonably say, “Well, it’s really seeming to me like the dean is there. 
So, even though you are justified in your belief, your appearance is deceptive.” I 
need some reason to think you, rather than me, are the one with the problem.… 
To think otherwise, it seems to me, is to think something like this: “You have an 
insight according to which P is not true. I have one according to which P is true. 
It’s reasonable for me to believe P in light of all this because, gosh darn it, my 
insight supports P.” If one’s conviction survives the “confrontation with the 
other,” to use Rosen’s phrase, this seems more a sign of tenacity and stubbornness 
than anything else.20 
 
The perceptual case is especially powerful here because in that sort of case, the intuition 
of equality between oneself and the other is very strong. 
Even so, there are serious problems with the claim that a peer’s private evidence 
should be considered as evidentially equivalent to one’s own [premise (3)]. First, we 
should be clear about what each party knows. Feldman says: “Each may have his or her 
own special insight or sense of obviousness. But each knows about the other’s insight. 
Each knows that this insight has evidential force.”21 “About” is ambiguous here. It could 
mean that each is aware of there being evidence, or it could also mean that each is 
acquainted with that evidence. Clearly Feldman intends the former, and yet his 
conclusion seems to follow only from the latter. Each knows that the other has an insight 
or sense of obviousness, and each may assume or grant that that insight has evidential 
force for the other person, but neither fact provides sufficient justification for either party 
to conclude that the other person’s insight is on par with one’s own. How could it, when 
neither knows--is acquainted with, or has in a strong sense--that evidence? In other 
 




words, the actual evidence here (whatever it is) remains private, even when the other 
party is made aware of its existence. So here we have a clear dissimilarity: one’s own 
seeming or insight or sense of obviousness on the one hand, and the peer’s report of a 
seeming, insight, sense of obviousness, etc., on the other. The decision to accord the 
peer’s private evidence, to which one does not have access, equal weight as one’s own is 
itself an irrational decision, since it cannot be motivated by the evidence one actually 
possesses. We do not need to deny that the peer’s claim of private evidence carries 
evidential force (though we will complicate this claim later); but it does not follow that it 
carries sufficient force to overcome the prima facie presumption in favor of one’s own 
seeming. 
 This is made clearer in Feldman’s example of accused criminals and Lefty and 
Righty, which he modifies to illustrate his point: 
Consider again the example involving the two suspects in a criminal case, Lefty 
and Righty. Suppose now that there are two detectives investigating the case, one 
who has the evidence about Lefty and one who has the evidence incriminating 
Righty. They each justifiably believe in their man’s guilt. And then each finds out 
that the other detective has evidence incriminating the other suspect. If things are 
on a par, then suspension of judgment is called for. If one detective has no reason 
at all to think that the other’s evidence is inferior to hers, yet she continues to 
believe that Lefty is guilty, she would be unjustified. She is giving special status 
to her own evidence with no reason to do so, and this is an epistemic error, a 
failure to treat like cases alike. She knows that there are two bodies of equally 
good evidence for incompatible propositions, and she is favoring the one that 
happens to have been hers originally.22 
 
Note the inclusion of “If things are on a par…” This is a very large if. How could either 





it is? But she cannot know that if it’s private.23 Granted, she may lack a reason for 
thinking that it’s inferior to her own, but she also lacks any reason for thinking that it’s 
superior or even equal to her own. All she has evidence for is that it’s sufficient to 
motivate conviction in her peer. It may be, for all we have said so far, that this alone is 
reason enough to lead her to lower her credence in her own view, but if so that is due to 
the epistemic relevance of peerhood, not to private evidence per se. Given that peerhood 
is the subject of Chapter Seven, I will reserve discussion of this point. 
Note also that Feldman claims the detective “knows that there are two bodies of 
equally good evidence for incompatible propositions…” But this isn’t right--she knows 
only that there are two bodies of evidence sufficient to warrant belief in opposed 
propositions. If the evidence is really private, she can discern nothing about its objective 
value. 
As we will see below, peerhood implies, among other things, that we are 
generally equal with respect to whatever faculties contribute to assessing evidence well. 
However, it does not imply anything in the present case, which concerns private 
evidence. If I believe that you and I are epistemic peers, then I will accord your view 
some evidential weight, even if I don’t know the specifics of your evidence, but I must 
also weigh your view against my own seemings, and it is not yet clear that your view 
should counterbalance mine. Indeed, given that most instances of peer disagreement are 
unlikely to move far beyond the initial recognition of disagreement, we can already say 
 
23 This quote comes from the section where Feldman is considering private evidence. He is here using a 
case which includes in-principle shareable evidence to help him make the point that knowing that someone 
else has comparable evidence to your own implies that you should not prefer your own to theirs simply 
because it is your own. This comparison (between shareable evidence and private evidence) is problematic 
for the reasons I point out in the text. 
46 
 
that one is usually justified in maintaining one’s view after recognition of peer 
disagreement, owing to one’s possession of private evidential seemings which are not 
overcome by the report of another’s contrary seemings. Nothing Feldman has said about 
private evidence should lead us to reject this conclusion. Indeed, it will be strengthened 
when we consider the relationship between evidential and perceptual seemings in the next 
chapter. So Feldman, like van Inwagen, has not given us sufficient reason to regard the 
possibility of private evidence as irrelevant or unreasonable. 
 
2.3 – Christensen on the Symmetry of Private Evidence 
 
 David Christensen, another Conformist, has also argued against the relevance of 
private evidence.24 Christensen argues that once I discover that a peer disagrees with me 
about p, this gives me two sorts of evidence: evidence that the peer has made a mistake--
because she has reached what I take to be a wrong conclusion--and evidence that I have 
made a mistake, because an epistemic peer disagrees with me.25 This results in an 
evidentially symmetrical situation, according to Christensen, and so the reasonable thing 
to do is to lower one’s credence in p. He illustrates this with an example: I check my 
wristwatch for the time, and my friend does the same. The watches are of comparable 
quality and, so far as I know, equal reliability.26 But on this occasion they disagree by 
about 10 minutes. Clearly, says Christensen, I should not prefer the time given by my 
watch simply because it is on my wrist. 
 
24 David Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” Philosophical Review 116, no. 2 
(2007): 199-205. 
25 Ibid., 196. 




This analogy is crude: watches are external objects and can be neutrally 
compared. I, on the other hand, cannot get out of my epistemic perspective to compare it 
with a peer’s. But Christensen says the watch analogy is accurate in the following way: I 
have no reason, outside of the disagreement itself, to prefer my view to my peer’s. 
Indeed, explaining our disagreement by saying that my peer must be the mistaken one 
because she disagrees with me, is question-begging. Further, Christensen argues, 
stipulating that it seems to me that my peer is the incorrect one from within a first-person 
perspective won’t change the epistemic situation. Though Christensen does not use the 
phrase “private evidence” here, I take it that this is what he has in mind with the “first-
person perspective” language. As he says, “it seems to me that taking a first-person 
perspective on the situation does not license me in thinking that disagreement with my 
friend is better explained by her error than by mine.”27 So the challenge is to explain the 
disagreement from my first-person perspective “in a way that does not just beg the 
question in favor of the opinion I currently hold.”28 
Christensen’s solution is to require that any explanation of the disagreement that 
favors one party over the other must be based on reasoning that is independent of the 
matter under dispute.29 The question is then whether private evidence is independent of 
the disputed matter.30 Taking it to be so is anomalous, for private evidence is typically 
thought of in terms of a seeming or intuition that such-and-such evidence really does 
support p. 
 
27 Ibid., 197. 
28 Ibid., 198. 
29 Ibid., 199. 
30 See footnote 16, this chapter. 
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Consider, in this regard, another of Christensen’s cases: two meteorologists study 
the same weather data and come to slightly different conclusions about the chance of rain 
tomorrow: meteorologist A puts it at 55%, and meteorologist B puts it at 45%.31 Assume 
that prior to examining the weather data, both A and B take one another to be peers with 
respect to discerning the likelihood of rain based on this kind of data. We can even 
stipulate that if we asked them prior to examining the data who they thought would be 
correct in the event of this kind of disagreement, they both would have said that they had 
an equal chance of being correct. When A learns about B’s differing assessment of the 
evidence, she should probably be a bit less confident in her own assessment than she had 
been a moment before, given that she considers B a peer and had even predicted that in 
just this sort of situation, B would be as likely as herself to be correct. So let’s say she 
goes back through the weather data and examines it even more carefully than before, and 
she still comes away with the view that there is a 55% chance of rain. Moreover, after 
having spent this extra time with the data, she is now more aware than before just how 
apparent this result is, and she has a hard time imagining how B could come away with a 
lower result. In other words, she has a seeming or a felt sense of obviousness that 55% is 
the chance that the data supports. 
Is this seeming new evidence independent of the issue which is already in 
dispute? It seems not. Granted, she noticed the seeming after becoming aware of the 
disagreement, and we can even say that she would not have noticed it without the 
disagreement, and we can grant that the seeming is strengthened by reviewing the data, 
but it always seemed to her that the chance of rain was 55%. If she were asked why she 
 
31 Ibid., 193-194. 
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thinks that is the right prediction, her answer would certainly involve the weather data 
that she and B examined, the application of various meteorological models, her 
calculation, and so on. It would certainly not involve her own seeming. If this is right--if 
seemings are not independent evidence--then Christensen’s condition rules them out, and 
thereby prohibits private evidence in the form of seemings. Indeed, Christensen later 
implies that private evidence would not be independent: he references van Inwagen 
mentioning “incommunicable insight” and concludes that since “van Inwagen does not 
claim to be able to point to any reason, independent of the disagreement itself, for 
thinking that those who disagree with him lack some special insight he has,” he therefore 
ought to conciliate.32 
 Is Christensen’s independent evidence condition warranted? First, note some of 
its counterintuitive consequences: the theist who has had what she takes to be obvious 
and compelling mystical experiences must consider these private seemings to be 
evidentially empty when she encounters an atheist peer who has had no such experiences. 
Similarly, a savant who can “see” the answer to a calculation immediately and clearly--
and who has never been wrong--must consider this seeming to be evidentially irrelevant 
when confronted with a peer who gets a different answer.33 Van Inwagen, who can sense 
when his wife is angry, must set that seeming aside when her sister (say) insists that she 
 
32 Ibid., 205. Italics in original. 
33 Christensen mentions just such a case and concludes that the savant should in fact move her belief in the 
direction of her peer--presumably another savant (202). I disagree, both because my intuition does not 
suggest that the savant should discount the clear evidence of her seeming, and because I think that the 
disagreement of a peer--rather than a superior--does not give one positive reason to alter her view. 
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isn’t. And so on.34 This does not by itself show that the condition is unwarranted, but it 
does cast some doubt on it. 
There are, in addition, more serious problems with it. The condition is open to 
counterexample in cases in which either: (i) there is no independent evidence but it is 
clear whether one should conciliate or not, or (ii) there is independent evidence, and it is 
clear whether, ceteris paribus, one should conciliate or not, but, all things considered, one 
should not do what is ceteris paribus required because of the independent evidence, or 
(iii) gathering independent evidence is unrealistic or practically costly. 
Let us consider these cases in order: 
(i) Consider Christensen’s case of the bill calculation. One person arrives at an 
obviously false answer, say, a $450 share. In this case, it is apparent that one should not 
move one’s belief in the direction of one’s peer at all, since the peer’s result is plainly 
wrong. Christensen agrees but says that this is because there is independent evidence 
here: the peer’s violation of a norm of common sense. After all, common sense dictates 
that a share of a bill cannot be more than the total bill. So once one realizes that her peer 
has violated this norm, she has evidence independent of the original dispute that justifies 
her in maintaining her own view. But Christensen acknowledges, rightly, that this may 
not be convincing because the person is still experiencing the violation of the norm as a 
felt sense of obviousness. He, however, rejects this point. But he shouldn’t. Christensen 
himself is simply redescribing the basis for the act of non-conciliation so that it sounds 
 
34 These last two examples are complicated by the fact that the persons in question--the savant and van 
Inwagen--both also possess inductive evidence for the truth of their conclusion based on past success. 
Nonetheless, in both cases the independent evidence condition entails that their private seemings are 
evidentially irrelevant, which is counterintuitive, especially considering that their past success should be 
attributed to these very seemings. 
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independent of the dispute at issue, when it in fact is not. One’s sense that her peer’s 
answer is obviously wrong is part of the original evidence that constitutes the 
disagreement.35 
Christensen attempts to dodge this bullet by switching cases. He brings up a 
different case in which it is clearer that there is no independent evidence. He does this in 
order to show that in such cases, maintaining one’s view is arbitrary and therefore 
unreasonable. The example he uses is the mathematical savant case. Imagined two peer 
savants who both “see” the answer to a math problem and yet disagree. He thinks that the 
savants should both conciliate, since neither can appeal to an outside piece of evidence to 
support the view that it is his peer who is mistaken. 
That is Christensen’s intuition. I have a different one. Mine is that if it seems to 
one in the clear and vivid way that the “seeing” metaphor suggests that p is true, then that 
is sufficient reason to maintain belief in p, even if a peer disagrees and also claims a clear 
and vivid seeming. This is due largely to my view of peerhood and its significance, which 
will be discussed in Chapter Seven. For now, it is enough to point out a problem with this 
case. Christensen apparently intends it to mollify the objector in the previous case, about 
which he acknowledges that one may not share his intuition that the evidence there is 
truly independent. But this case is no improvement, since it does not in fact show that in 
peer situations with no independent evidence, one should conciliate. Rather, it shows that 
in cases of perceptual disagreement between peers (for that is what the savant case 
amounts to), there is no good reason to break the stalemate. It is true, but unremarkable, 
 
35 Consider: the calculation would not violate common sense except in the context of this particular bill. 
Thanks to Michael Wreen for this observation. 
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that in such a situation one cannot be sure that one’s seeming is veridical. Nonetheless, it 
may still be reasonable to stick to one’s vivid seeming, rather than to cast about for some 
“independent evidence,” find none, and on that basis decide to lower one’s credence. 
(ii) In the bill calculation case with an obviously false answer, a person is 
reasonable to “stick to her guns” because she has a clear and vivid seeming that the peer 
must have made a mistake. This is why in fact most people in such a situation would 
refuse to alter their view, and this is the proximal explanation of the reasonability of 
refusing to alter one’s view, even if there is, as Christensen argues, a possible distal 
explanation having to do with violations of norms of common sense. If Christensen is 
right about the independent evidence condition and about the norm violation being 
independent evidence, this would entail that most people in such circumstances are not in 
fact acting reasonably when they maintain their view, as he admits they should, since 
they would be doing so for the wrong reason: a seeming. Even if we agree with 
Christensen that in the bill calculation case one’s appeal to a violation of a norm of 
common sense is in fact an appeal to independent evidence, if one is not conciliating 
because of that independent evidence, then one is not in fact reasonable to conciliate. I 
take it this consequence is sufficiently counterintuitive--counter to Christensen’s own 
stated intuitions--to reject the independent evidence condition. 
(iii) It is also possible that there would be practical costs to seeking independent 
evidence that would outweigh the potential benefit of finding such evidence, even if there 
is independent evidence to be found.36 Take, for example, the case of two epistemic peers 
 
36 Marc Moffett considers something like this; see Marc Moffett, “Reasonable Disagreement and Rational 
Group Inquiry” Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4 (2007): 362. 
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disagreeing over abortion.37 Neither has any particular expertise in the matter, but both 
have a felt sense of obviousness about the morality of abortion. They’ve shared all of the 
arguments and evidence in the form of data, statistics, moral principles, and so on, that 
they can think of, and each remains convinced that the other is mistaken. As things stand, 
on Christensen’s account, neither has any reason to prefer her own view, and so both 
should conciliate, unless there is independent evidence to appeal to that would make it 
reasonable to conclude that the other person is mistaken. Presumably, either party could, 
if she chose, go out and begin interviewing people who have direct experience with 
abortion, physicians, policy-makers, judges, ethicists, and the like. On the basis of these 
interviews, one may find some additional support for or against one’s own view that was 
not included in the previously shared evidence. But given the practical difficulty of 
undertaking such an enterprise, can we really consider someone irrational for not 
conciliating? Some commentators have allowed for a rational resistance to this sort of 
effort under the label of “epistemic conservatism,” the view that one may be rational in 
resisting belief revision if the practical cost is very high, or more modestly, that there is 
an epistemic presumption in favor of one’s standing beliefs, even when one is aware of 
the existence of equally justified conflicting beliefs.38 If some version of epistemic 
conservatism is plausible, then one may be justified in avoiding gathering independent 
evidence on practical grounds. 
Thus, Christensen’s independent evidence condition is open to counterarguments. 
It therefore cannot be used as a prohibition on private evidence. 
 
37 I borrow and modify this case from Adam Elga. 
38 See Gideon Rosen, “Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism,” Noûs 35, no. 15 (2001): 85-86; and 
Moffett, “Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry,” 361-363. 
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Chapter Three – The Perceptual Analogy 
 
3.1 – Perceptual Seeming in the Disagreement Debate 
 
What is a seeming? As we saw above, there is a tendency in the literature to 
understand seeming to be the case that p--call this evidential seeming--as analogous to 
perceptual seeming--seeming to see that p.1 
Alvin Plantinga gives a nice characterization of what he calls “doxastic 
experience,” based primarily on memorial and a priori sources of belief. It can, I think, be 
applied to what I’m calling evidential seeming:2 
…experience comes in several varieties. First, there is sensuous imagery, the kind 
of experience you have most prominently in vision but in hearing, smelling, 
tasting, and touching as well. To use Roderick Chisholm's terminology, in this 
kind of experience one is appeared to in such and such a way. Sensuous imagery 
plays an enormously significant role in perception; perceptual beliefs are formed 
in response to sensuous imagery and on the basis of such imagery. Still, this isn’t 
the only kind of experience that goes with belief formation…the formation of 
memory beliefs is often unaccompanied by phenomenal experience, or else 
accompanied only by fragmentary, fleeting, indistinct, hard‐to‐focus sensuous 
imagery. You remember that you went to a party in Novosibirsk; there is a bit of 
imagery, all right, although it is fleeting, partial, indistinct, and such that when 
you try to focus your attention on it, it disappears. But there is another kind of 
experience present: the belief that it was Novosibirsk (and not, say, Cleveland) 
seems right, acceptable, natural; it forces itself upon you; it seems somehow 
inevitable (the right words are hard to find). The belief feels right, acceptable, and 
natural; it feels different from what you think is a false belief. The same goes for 
 
1 One may wonder here if such evidential and/or perceptual seemings are essentially conceptual, in the 
sense that they essentially have conceptual items, such as propositions, as objects. I intend my arguments 
here to remain neutral between conceptual and nonconceptual understandings of evidential and perceptual 
seemings. I want only to illustrate the widely assumed view in the disagreement literature that whatever can 
be said about the justifying role of perceptual seemings should apply, mutatis mutandis, to the justifying 
role of evidential seemings. For an account of the epistemological role of conceptual/nonconceptual and 
perceptual/nonperceptual experiences, including an extended argument regarding how nonconceptual 
perceptual contents play an evidential, justifying role, see Paul K. Moser, Knowledge and Evidence 
(Cambridge University Press, 1989), especially Section 2.3.2 (esp. pp. 84-6), Section 3.4 (esp. pp. 156-8), 
Section 4.1.1. (esp. pp. 181-3), and Section 4.2 (esp. p. 192). See also pp. 34-35 above. 
2 One difference is that evidential seeming need not yield belief--it may yield a variety of other cognitive 
attitudes such as acceptance, assumption, or deferral of judgment. In this sense it is not properly “doxastic” 
according to Plantinga’s usage. 
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a priori belief. You believe that no dogs are sets. This belief, too, involves little 
by way of sensuous imagery. When you consider that proposition, perhaps it is as 
if you catch a momentary and fleeting glimpse of part of a sentence expressing the 
proposition, or perhaps a fragmentary glimpse of a dog, or perhaps of a dog 
enclosed within braces; this imagery seems unimportant, however, more like mere 
decoration than something on the basis of which the belief in question is formed. 
And here, too, there is also this other sort of experience: it’s just seeming true and 
indeed necessarily true that no dogs are sets. Thinking about this proposition feels 
different from thinking about the proposition that some dogs…are sets. Still a 
third kind of example…: the knowledge that it is you (as opposed to someone 
else) who is now perceiving the page in front of you. This too is not a matter of 
sensuous imagery: it is not on the basis of sensuous imagery that you believe it is 
you who are perceiving that page, rather than your cousin in Cleveland. Here too 
there is that other sort of phenomenal experience, that feeling that the proposition 
in question is the right one. Suppose we call this second kind of phenomenal 
experience doxastic experience because it always goes with the formation of 
belief….3 
 
This sense that an epistemic state of affairs is “right, acceptable, natural” also applies, I 
believe, to evidential situations. It seems to a person that her evidence supports p, that 
concluding that p is the case on the basis of this evidence is the “right, acceptable, 
natural” thing to do. As Plantinga says, there need be no imagery that accompanies this 
felt sense, but it nonetheless feels different from the thought that the evidence does not 
support p. That thought feels wrong, unacceptable, unnatural. Perhaps the closest we can 
get to a fuller account of this feeling is by comparing it with the more imagistic 
experience of sense perception. Note that Plantinga implies that the paradigmatic case of 
experience or seeming is perceptual, and that what goes for it epistemically also typically 
goes for other forms of experience. 
This comparison is also common in the disagreement literature. For example, van 
Inwagen, speaking of private evidence, writes: 
Owing to some neural accident (I might say) I have a kind of insight into the, oh, I 
don't know, entailment relations among various of the propositions that figure in 
 
3 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 110-111. 
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the Ism/Nism debate that is denied to the Nismists. I see, perhaps, that p entails q 
(although I am unable to formulate this insight verbally) and they are unable to 
see that p entails q.4 
 
Here the sense that some proposition follows from another is analogous to the sense that 
perceptually something is the case. Similarly, Feldman’s dean-in-the-quad analogy 
suggests that he takes perceptual and evidential seemings to be analogous, and so what 
goes for one goes for the other. For example, he disallows the evidential relevance of 
private evidence analogous to van Inwagen’s “insight” or “sense of obviousness” by 
citing the case of perceptual disagreement: 
…compare a more straightforward case of regular sight, rather than insight. 
Suppose you and I are standing by the window looking out on the quad. We think 
we have comparable vision and we know each other to be honest. I seem to see 
what looks to me like the dean standing out in the middle of the quad.… I believe 
that the dean is standing on the quad. Meanwhile, you seem to see nothing of the 
kind there. You think that no one, and thus not the dean, is standing in the middle 
of the quad. We disagree.… Either I am “seeing things,” or you are missing 
something. I would not be reasonable in thinking that the problem is in your head, 
nor would you be reasonable in thinking that the problem is in mine.5 
 
This case would not be a sufficient response to the epistemic relevance of private 
evidential seemings unless Feldman took such seemings to be analogous to perceptual 
seemings. 
Gideon Rosen has perhaps been most explicit in drawing this analogy, and it is 
worth quoting him at length. In the context of discussing how the realization of the 
contingency of one’s beliefs may affect one’s confidence in those beliefs, Rosen airs the 
 
4 Peter van Inwagen, “We’re Right. They’re Wrong,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted 
Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 27. 
5 Richard Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on 
Atheism and the Secular Life, ed. Louise Antony (Oxford University Press, 2007), 207-208. 
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possibility that perception-like seemings could play a justificatory role in non-perceptual 
contexts: 
It is a familiar thought that perceptual knowledge rests on a principle to the effect 
that certain non-doxastic ‘perceptual seemings’ constitute grounds for belief. If it 
seems to me that there is a cat on the mat, then I have reason to believe that there 
is a cat on the mat. Its seeming to me that P is not a matter of my believing 
anything. It is a sui generis propositional attitude that does not stand in need of 
justification but which is capable of supporting a perceptual judgment that P. The 
justificatory connection between seeming and believing is immediate. It does not 
depend on the reliability of the transition.… Nor does it depend on the subject’s 
believing that perceptual seemings are reliable.6 
 
After providing this characterization, Rosen discusses three cases in which such 
seemings--such “non-doxastic appearing-true” as he puts it--are justificatory in an 
analogous way to perceptual seemings.7 The first is desire: 
Mark Johnston has argued that a certain sort of desire is best understood as a 
matter of being “struck by the appeal of things.” This “being struck by the appeal” 
is a quasi-perceptual matter--it is phenomenologically vivid, for example; but 
since it is typically directed at hypothetical states of affairs, it is not literally a 
matter of perception.8 
 
The second is moral evaluation: 
Like perceptual seeming, evaluative seeming is not doxastic. It is a matter of an 
object’s seeming to one to possess one or another highly determinate evaluative 
property. There may be other routes to evaluative knowledge. But it is plausible 
that insofar as perceptual judgment is canonically grounded in perceptual 
appearances, evaluative judgment is canonically grounded in evaluative 
appearances. That one finds a certain contemplated course of action appalling is a 
reason for taking it to be appalling. And once again, it is plausible that this is a 
basic epistemic norm, ungrounded in further facts (or thoughts) about the 
reliability of evaluative seeming.9 
 
The third is modal judgment: 
 
6 Gideon Rosen, “Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism,” Noûs 35, no. 15 (2001): 86-87. 
7 Ibid., 88. 
8 Ibid., 87. Rosen here cites Mark Johnston, “The Authority of Affect,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 




Steve Yablo has argued that judgments of metaphysical possibility are typically 
grounded in intuitions of conceivability. On Yablo’s view, to conceive that P in 
the relevant sense is a compound act: One first imagines a P-world, and that world 
then strikes one as possible. The model is as above. The non-doxastic modal 
seeming provides a sufficient though defeasible ground for the modal judgment. 
And in this case in particular there is no thought that the seeming need be a matter 
of sensitivity to the facts in question.10 
 
He concludes: 
These cases suggest a pattern. It may be that as a general matter, one’s finding it 
obvious upon reflection that P is the case--its striking one that P; it seeming 
clearly to be the case that P--amounts to a ground for believing that P.11 
 
Seemings are non-doxastic, pre-theoretical, sui generis, basic, and generative of prima 
facie justification.12 This is the fullest description one gets in the disagreement literature 
of this phenomenon. And it is noteworthy that this description is assumed by almost 
everyone else in the literature, along with the perceptual analogy on which it is based. 
For example, Adam Elga uses the perceptual analogy to highlight what he takes to 
be the strengths of his “Equal Weight View,” which recommends according equal weight 
to one’s own assessment of the evidence and to that of one’s epistemic peer. Considering 
a case of perceptual disagreement in which two peers  differently judge the outcome of a 
horse race, he says: 
 
10 Ibid. Rosen here cites Stephen Yablo, “Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 53, no. 1 (1993): 1–42. Cf. Kripke on modal intuitions: “Of course, some 
philosophers think that something’s having intuitive content is very inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I 
think it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything, myself. I really don’t know, in a way, what more 
conclusive evidence one can have about anything, ultimately speaking.” See Saul Kripke, Naming and 
Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 42. 
11 Ibid. 
12 On the non-doxastic character of seemings, see footnote 2, this chapter. See also pp. 34-35 above. 
Essentially, while all seemings may be “intellectual” in the sense of having propositional content, they do 
not necessarily yield or justify beliefs--they may instead justify weaker cognitive states, like acceptance. 
Going forward, I will gloss this distinction and speak of “belief” in a loose way to connote any of the class 
of propositional attitudes which may be justified by a seeming. 
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Here is the bottom line. When you find out that you and your friend have come to 
opposite conclusions about a race, you should think that the two of you are 
equally likely to be correct. The same goes for other sorts of disagreements.13 
 
Elga then adapts an argument brought against reliabilism about perceptual knowledge, 
and uses it against those who would argue that it is reasonable to maintain one’s view in 
the context of peer disagreement, regardless of the type of disagreement.14 The details of 
these arguments don’t matter in this context. The important point is that Elga takes for 
granted that an objection to a view about perceptual disagreement can be applied to all 
other sorts of disagreement. 
Similarly, Thomas Kelly, in his critique of the Equal Weight View, does not deny 
the perceptual analogy--he implicitly accepts it--and then takes pains to show that his 
own “Total Evidence View” yields the same verdict as the Equal Weight View in 
perceptual cases.15 
 Elsewhere, Michael Bergmann adopts the perceptual analogy in defending the 
claim that disagreement with an epistemic peer after full disclosure of evidence need not 
lead one to revise her view. To the conformist, Bergmann says: 
I think that the rational response for S1 to E is to continue believing p. However, I 
don’t have an argument for that conclusion, just as I don’t have an argument for 
the conclusion that the rational response for us to a tactile experience like the one 
we typically have when grabbing a billiard ball is to believe something like 
“that’s a small hard spherical object”. I can see, in the case of the billiard ball, that 
that belief is a rational response to the tactile experience in question. But I don’t 
have an argument for why that is so. Likewise, I don’t have an argument for the 
view that the rational response for S1 to E is to continue believing p.16 
 
 
13 Adam Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” Noûs 41, no. 3 (2007): 487. 
14 Ibid., 488. 
15 Thomas Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman 
and Ted Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 150-152. 
16 Michael Bergmann, “Rational Disagreement After Full Disclosure,” Episteme 6, no. 3 (2009): 345. 
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Here the analogy with perception is especially clear, as is the assumption that like 
perceptual seemings, evidential seemings are basic and prima facie justified (i.e., without 
need of argument or further evidence). Bergmann goes on to give examples of other cases 
in which one need not modify one’s view, despite knowing that a peer disagrees for 
reasons similar to those one uses to reject the peer’s view. The examples need not detain 
us here, but it is noteworthy that they are inspired by an epistemological issue in which 
perceptual beliefs are typically implicated: skepticism about the external world. “We 
realize,” Bergmann says, “that it’s possible for things to seem to us perceptually just as 
they do now even though we are mistaken.”17 Nonetheless, it is rational to hold onto our 
belief in an external world, even if we can’t prove it. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, 
to cases of peer disagreement in realms as varied as morality, religion, and politics. 
 Other commentators also assume the perceptual analogy. Marc Moffett argues 
that it may be reasonable to use disagreement as the basis for reassessing an interlocutor’s 
status as a peer. To illustrate this, he uses the now-familiar perceptual case of looking out 
the window and seeing someone in the quad. Interestingly, however, his conclusion about 
the case differs from those of other commentators: Moffett argues that in such a case, 
“my visual evidence is so strong, that it simply makes more sense to jettison my 
antecedent belief that you are an epistemic peer than to accept that I am mistaken.”18 This 
is because the changes to my “overall theory of the world” are less radical on the 
supposition that you are not my peer than on the supposition that my senses are presently 
 
17 Ibid. 
18 Marc Moffett, “Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry,” Episteme: A Journal of Social 
Epistemology 4, no. 3 (2007): 358. 
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deceiving me.19 Moffett then takes this point to apply broadly to all types of peer 
disagreement, including non-perceptual cases, implying that what holds for visual 
evidence also holds for other sorts of evidence. 
Lastly, Jennifer Lackey suggests that conclusions drawn on the basis of perceptual 
cases can and should be applied more broadly. For example, while she rejects the 
Nonconformist view, she admits that the Nonconformist position yields the correct 
verdict in cases of perceptual disagreement, and that this helps to explain what is 
attractive about the Nonconformist position in general.20 Moreover, she notes as much in 
the course of observing that Nonconformists (and everyone else in the debate) hold to 
“Uniformity,” the view that peer disagreement functions the same--and therefore has the 
same type of solution--in all epistemic contexts.21 She eventually rejects Uniformity, 
since some types of disagreement have apparently Nonconformist solutions, such as 
perceptual disagreement, while other types have apparently Conformist solutions. 
However, she does not question the basic idea that perceptual disagreement is analogous 
to other sorts of disagreement. She merely attributes the connection between 
disagreement-types to the fact that many cases of disagreement, perception among them, 
involve highly justified underwriting beliefs.22 Insofar as a case of disagreement does not 
involve highly justified underwriting beliefs--i.e., beliefs which resemble the justification 
 
19 Ibid., 365 (footnote 4). 
20 Jennifer Lackey, “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance,” in Social 
Epistemology, ed. Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford University Press, 2010), 
305-14. 
21 Ibid., 302. 
22 Ibid., 323. 
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structure of perceptual beliefs--it is more likely to be susceptible to a Conformist-style 
solution. So on Lackey’s justificationist account, the perceptual analogy is preserved. 
 
3.2 – Implications of the Analogy 
 
 I take it that this survey of the disagreement literature is adequate to establish that 
the analogy between perceptual seemings and evidential seemings is widely assumed and, 
indeed, apparently uncontroversial. This is a telling feature of the debate. For one thing, it 
suggests broad agreement among commentators on the basic justificational structure of 
evidential seemings, namely, that they are like perceptual seemings, and that this entails 
that they are prima facie justified. It also has the interesting consequence that attempts to 
argue for the epistemic legitimacy of one’s evidential seemings, as with one’s perceptual 
seemings, will be inevitably circular (hence Bergmann’s comment above about the proper 
epistemic response to his perception of the billiard ball). This is because any argument 
for rational reliance on one’s perceptual seemings will necessarily involve premises 
which appeal to one’s perceptual experience. As Rosen says: 
…insofar as we are justified in believing that perceptual seemings are generally 
veridical, it is because we are independently justified in accepting a detailed 
account of the perceptual mechanisms which can only be grounded in particular 
instances of the transition from ‘seems’ to ‘is’.23 
 
Similarly, Ralph Wedgwood says, “…the only primitively rational way of coming 
to know facts about the material world is by relying on the very experiences that are in 
question.”24 Continuing, Wedgwood explains his justification for holding that there is an 
 
23 Rosen, “Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism,” 87. 
24 Ralph Wedgwood, The Nature of Normativity (Oxford University Press, 2007), 246. 
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“egocentric epistemic bias” by claiming a dispositional capacity shared by all humans 
capable of perceptual experiences. As he says: 
I propose that the practice of forming beliefs by taking one’s sensory experiences 
at face value has the following essential connection with the truth. It may be that 
it is essential to sensory experiences that any subject who has such experiences at 
all has some disposition to have experiences that veridically represent certain 
aspects of her environment.25 
 
Notice that this is equivalent to answering the question “How is sensory belief connected 
with the truth?” by saying: “To have a sensory experience is to be disposed to have an 
accurate sensory experience.” And this, in turn, is equivalent to answering: “Sensory 
belief is connected to the truth by virtue of being a sensory belief.” Wedgwood continues: 
“Whenever one’s experience does consist in the manifestation of this essential 
disposition, then the content of the experience will be true.”26 
This, however, is just unquestioning and absolute reliance on the assumed 
accuracy of perceptual seemings, and is certainly too strong a claim, even if such 
seemings are basic and therefore prima facie--not absolutely--justified and fundamental. 
Wedgwood is essentially building truth into mechanisms that aim at truth, which is 
question-begging. 
 The epistemic fundamentality, or “basicality,” of perceptual seemings, and the 
epistemic circularity engendered by it, is widely acknowledged. For example, William 
Alston has argued that owing to the social nature of our epistemic practices, justifying 
our basic sources of information inferentially, or giving a non-circular argument for them, 
is impossible. At the end of “Perceiving God,” Alston writes: 
 




Apart from reliance on doxastic tendencies with which we find ourselves, we 
literally have nothing to go on. Indeed, what Descartes did, as Thomas Reid 
trenchantly pointed out, was arbitrarily to pick one doxastic practice he found 
himself engaged in--accepting propositions that seem self-evident--and set that as 
a judge over all the others, with what results we are all too familiar. This is not to 
say that we must acquiesce in our prereflective doxastic tendencies in every 
respect. We can tidy things up, modify our established practices so as to make 
each more internally consistent and more consistent with the others. But, on the 
whole and for the most part, we have no choice but to continue to form beliefs in 
accordance with these practices and to take these ways of forming beliefs as 
paradigmatically conferring epistemic justification. And this is the way that 
epistemology has in fact gone, except for some arbitrary partiality. Of course it 
would be satisfying to economize our basic commitments by taking one or a few 
of these practices as basic and using them to validate the others; but we have 
made little progress in this enterprise over the centuries. It is not self-evident that 
sense perception is reliable, nor can we establish its reliability if we restrict 
ourselves to premises drawn from introspection; we cannot show that deductive 
reasoning is valid without using deductive reasoning to do so; and so on. We are 
endowed with strong tendencies to engage in a number of distinct doxastic 
practices, none of which can be warranted on the basis of others. It is clearly the 
better part of wisdom to recognize beliefs that emerge from these practices to be 
rational and justified, at least once they are properly sifted and refined.27 
 
Alvin Plantinga concurs with Alston, saying: 
I believe he succeeds in establishing the important conclusion that it is not 
possible to show in a noncircular fashion that SP [sense perception] is reliable--at 
any rate he gets as close to establishing this conclusion as philosophers ever get to 
establishing any important conclusion.28 
 
Elsewhere, Plantinga himself argues for a similar point in connection with his 
defense of the idea that belief in religious propositions can be justified, rational, and 
“warranted” (i.e., can amount to knowledge) without any argument or evidence 
whatsoever to support them. He draws upon the perceptual analogy we’ve noted in the 
disagreement literature, and says: 
We have perceptual beliefs: in general, there won’t be ‘appropriately cogent 
evidence’ for these beliefs by way of beliefs that are themselves evidentially 
independent of perceptual beliefs. The same goes for the beliefs about the past, 
 
27 William P. Alston, “Perceiving God,” The Journal of Philosophy 83, no. 11 (1986): 664. 
28 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 119. 
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inductive beliefs, beliefs about other minds, and the like. In each of these cases, 
there is a source of warranted belief; and beliefs produced by the source in 
question can’t in general be provided with that “appropriately cogent evidence” 
from beliefs emanating from some other source. But of course that is nothing 
against them.29 
 
Similarly, Robert Audi has said that “To acquire justified beliefs about the 
reliability of perception, moreover, we would need to use perception, say in looking at 
objects again to see if our initial color perceptions were accurate.”30 To the response that 
this justification may be a priori, Audi replies: 
On the most plausible kind of reliability theory of justification… a belief is 
justified by virtue of being grounded in reliable belief-producing processes such 
as perceptual ones; and it is apparently not an a priori matter what processes are 
reliable, that is, actually produce a suitably large proportion of true beliefs. This is 
the sort of thing that must be determined largely by observation.31 
 
So epistemic circularity, in the case of perceptual experience, is held by many 
philosophers to be unproblematic.32 So if the perceptual analogy holds, and perceptual 
seemings as justificatory cannot be non-circularly justified, then neither can evidential 
seemings of the form “It seems to me that E supports p.” Demanding a further argument 
for the justificatory force of this seeming, or expecting one for comparison and 
assessment,33 is out of place. One cannot justify a seeming that E supports p without 
relying on the same faculty of judgment that produced the initial seeming, just as one 
 
29 Alvin Plantinga, “On ‘Proper Basicality,’” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75, no. 3 (2007): 
619–20. 
30 Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed. (New 
York: Routledge, 2011), 371. 
31 Ibid. 
32 For more on this, see William P. Alston, “Epistemic Circularity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 47, no. 1 (1986): 1–30; and Ernest Sosa and Barry Stroud, “Philosophical Scepticism,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 68 (1994): 263–307. 
33 Recall Feldman’s demand in the last chapter. 
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cannot justify perceptual seemings without relying on the same faculty of perception 
which entails that perceptual seemings have evidential value. 
 It is clear that if the perceptual analogy we’ve been discussing holds, then if 
perceptual seemings yield basic and prima facie justified beliefs, then so do evidential 
seemings of the sort exemplified by van Inwagen’s intuition about his wife or the chicken 
sexer. This has the apparent consequence that cases of peer disagreement involving 
conflicting conclusions based on the same shared evidence base, where the evidence 
seems to one to support p, and the evidence seems to the other to support not-p, ought to 
be judged on the basis of analogous cases of perceptual disagreement. That is to say, 
when I find myself in disagreement with a peer about what evidence supports, it should 
be useful to ask myself what I would do in a case of disagreeing with a peer about what I 
am currently seeing. If in such a case I would be justified in holding onto the perceptual 
belief, then I would, ceteris paribus, be similarly justified in the evidential case (assuming 
the seemings involved are similarly clear, vivid, stable, and so forth). But recall that 
opinions on what one should do in the perceptual case are divided: some (e.g., Feldman) 
think one ought to suspend judgment, while others (e.g., Moffett) think that one ought to 
maintain one’s view. Thus, the perceptual analogy will unfortunately not satisfy all of the 
commentators in the disagreement debate. 
It does, however, help to constrain potential reasonable solutions to the problem. 
For example, it suggests that one should not simply disregard one’s evidential intuitions 
(e.g., that the preponderance of the evidence supports p), counting them as irrelevant in 
the case of peer disagreement, unless it would be reasonable to do so in the case of 
perceptual disagreement. I believe this is an important consequence, since this is 
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precisely what is recommended by Conformists such as Christensen and Elga who insist 
that only evidence independent of the disputed issue can be relevant to breaking the 
stalemate created by peer disagreement. If this is correct, then such Conformists are 
committed to the same policy in cases of perceptual disagreement, or else they must 
admit inconsistency. Should they reject the analogy, they would bear the burden of 
showing what is special about perceptual seemings that does not hold for evidential 
seemings, such that the former are evidentially relevant under dispute, while the latter are 
not. 
But if they bite the bullet and maintain that disputed perceptual seemings are in 
fact evidentially irrelevant to what one should believe, then their position becomes 
implausible. For if perceptual seemings are evidentially irrelevant in the context of 
perceptual disagreement, then any perceptual seeming anyone is having at any time could 
be evidentially neutralized simply by someone else having a different seeming, or, at 
least, by a peer having a different seeming. In the case of perception, peers are 
remarkably easy to come by: I assume that almost any stranger I meet has perceptual 
capacities which are roughly equal to my own. It therefore follows on the Conformist 
“independent evidence only” view that I actually have no evidence that is relevant to the 
truth of any proposition about the world that things are the way they seem to me to be. 
But this is absurd: I of course do have perceptual evidence that things are some way or 
other, and this evidence is highly relevant to my beliefs about the world, even if it can be 




So the Conformist independent evidence requirement cannot be sensibly applied 
to cases of perceptual disagreement, and if not to those, then not to other cases of non-
perceptual disagreement either, at least where one has a seeming that some evidence 
supports a proposition. Thus, the perceptual analogy, apparently assumed by everyone in 
the disagreement debate, has consequences that have been missed by those in the debate. 
But as we said above, this will not convince everyone in the disagreement debate, since 
there is dispute about what one should do in cases of perceptual disagreement between 
peers. It should be clear that one should not accord one’s perceptual seemings no 
evidential weight, but it does not follow that they should be trusted blindly either. And 
there are cases in which it is apparent that even a clear, vivid, and stable perceptual 
seeming can be overridden by considerations of the views of others. We must, then, 
determine the evidential weight of seemings--of the perceptual or evidential type--within 
the context of disagreement as such. This is the subject of the next two chapters. 
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Chapter Four – The Evidential Value and Defeat of Seemings 
 
4.1 – Rosen on the Contingency of Evidential Seemings 
 
As we saw above, seemings of either the perceptual or evidential variety are 
widely held to be basic, i.e., they are not justified by virtue of an inferential relationship 
with other cognitive states. They are not based on anything further; rather, they are 
themselves that on which other reasonably held cognitive states (beliefs primarily, but 
also desires, volitions, and others) are based, if not themselves basic. We also saw that 
owing to their basic nature, and perhaps to their tendency to produce true beliefs, 
seemings are also typically taken to be productive of prima facie justification.1 We 
concluded in the last chapter that evidential seemings--seemings of the form “It seems to 
me that E supports p”--have evidential weight, and that this weight does not disappear on 
the discovery of disagreement. However, it is in the nature of prima facie justified beliefs 
that they may be overridden, or defeated, in the parlance common among 
epistemologists. Classic examples of perceptual defeat include learning that one is not in 
a sound state of mind, learning that one is in a simulation, learning that there are lots of 
barn facades around, etc. Similar examples could be adduced for evidential seemings: 
learning that one has missed some crucial evidence, learning that one has been slipped a 
drug with the side effect of making 99% of people misjudge evidence sets, and so on.2 
 
1 The “perhaps” here alludes to the ongoing disagreement between epistemologists about internalism and 
externalism, and the role of reliability in both justification and knowledge. 
2 This second example comes from David Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” 
Philosophical Review 116, no. 2 (2007): 207-208. 
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Our question in this and the next chapter is whether disagreement serves as a defeater for 
evidential seemings, and if so, to what extent.3 
Gideon Rosen has argued that disagreement can be a defeater. In his 2001 paper 
“Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism,” Rosen takes as his point of departure 
the experiences of nominalists versus anti-nominalists regarding the existence of abstract 
objects. He uses this to prod the reader’s intuitions about cases of disagreement. He 
begins by noting that belief in abstract objects is rationally permissible but not obligatory. 
One may rationally believe in them, suspend judgment about them, or even reject them. 
He lists some reasons to think that it’s permissible to believe in them (he calls these his 
“dogmatic assumptions”): 
1. We take them for granted in nearly everything we do. 
As he says, “…if our considered worldview is roughly accurate, abstract entities exist.”4 
2. By ordinary standards, we are justified in accepting this worldview--i.e., we 
are not normally obliged to establish the existence of, say, numbers, before 
using them.5 
 
This shows “that any case for compulsory nominalism must be a skeptical case: a case for 
revising a pervasive (and by ordinary standards, unproblematic) commitment of common 
sense and established science.”6 The nominalist can make such a case in two ways: she 
can argue either that abstract objects are inadmissible from the point of view of science, 
or from that of philosophy. Unfortunately, 
 
3 The language of “defeat” is preserved here because of its use in the literature. Defeat, however, has the 
connotation of the complete removal the evidential value, which is not always appropriate for disagreement 
contexts. For this reason, it would be more precise to speak of disagreement as providing countervailing 
considerations which may or may not override or outweigh one’s first-order evidential seemings. 
4 Gideon Rosen, “Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism,” Noûs 35, no. 15 (2001): 70. 
5 This is analogous to the lack of an obligation to rule out radical skepticism about the external world. 
6 Ibid., 71. 
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3. No such arguments against abstract objects are compelling. 
 
If the above assumptions are correct, Rosen claims, then belief in abstract objects 
(antinominalism) is rationally permissible. 
But can it also be rationally permissible to take a contrary view? Can it be 
rationally permissible, for example, to suspend judgment on the existence of abstract 
objects, especially considering that, per assumption 1, this entails the rejection of much of 
our usual view of the world? If it can, then the person who suspends judgment--or the 
nominalist who advocates suspension of judgment--must still be able to take “science 
seriously as a source of information about concrete nature.” 7 That is, straightforward 
skepticism about the deliverances of science is not rationally permissible. But it seems 
that there is a way for the suspend-judgment-nominalist to do this--to take science 
seriously and still not be committed to the existence of abstract objects. 
There is, Rosen thinks, a “trick” for “nominalizing at a stroke any theory 
whatsoever.”8 Rosen asks us to imagine a place called Bedrock, where instead of taking 
Platonism for granted as we do (at least as Rosen assumes we do), people believe, and 
can articulately support, that platonistic language is a useful fiction. When they “assert” 
some mathematical truth, for instance, they are doing something different from what we 
are doing. We presuppose that we’re aiming for truth, but they presuppose only that 
they’re aiming for “nominalistic adequacy.” All they are presupposing is that the 
aggregate of concrete objects in the world in which the assertion is made is identical to 
the aggregate of concrete objects in a world in which the assertion would be true. That is, 
 




“things [in the actual world] are in all concrete respects as if [the assertion] were true.”9 
And nominalistic adequacy has all the same practical effects as platonic realism: “To the 
extent that practically relevant conclusions are all claims about the concrete array, it 
follows that there is no practical difference between believing a theory to be true and 
believing it to be nominalistically adequate.”10 
Now we ask: “Are the Bedrockers rationally entitled to persist in their 
fictionalism? And is it a rational option for us?”11 If the answer to either question is yes, 
then rational people can disagree; if the answer to the second question is yes, then we can 
be rational both in accepting p and in accepting ~p, even when we have no compelling 
case against p (where p is the proposition that abstract objects exist).12 With respect to the 
first question: if the Bedrockers are not rationally entitled to their fictionalism, then we 
should be able to show them their error, but it’s hard to see how we could, especially 
since they’re as lucid and well-informed about the relevant scientific evidence as we are. 
Does this mean we should become fictionalists too, since we cannot show that it 
would be unreasonable to do so? Or is it rational to hold onto our complacent platonism? 
One thing to note is that our platonism is contingent--if things had gone differently 
 
9 Ibid., 75. 
10 Ibid., 77. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Note that acceptance here does not entail belief. The Bedrockers, strictly speaking, are agnostic about the 
existence of abstract objects, preferring to speak in terms of nominalistic adequacy. Rosen notes a 
similarity between this position and Bas van Fraassen’s empiricism: 
The task is analogous to the challenge that confronts van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. Van 
Fraassen’s main claim is that agnosticism about unobservables is consistent with immersed 
participation in science. The claim in the present section is a weaker claim to the same effect, viz. 
that immersed participation in science is compatible with agnosticism about the abstract. 
Ibid., fn. 13, p. 90. For further discussion, see Gideon Rosen, “What Is Constructive Empiricism?,” 
Philosophical Studies 74, no. 2 (1994): 143–78; and Bas van Fraassen, “Gideon Rosen on Constructive 
Empiricism,” Philosophical Studies 74, no. 2 (1994): 179-92. 
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historically, we might have been Bedrockers (indeed, there is some reason to suspect that 
this is close to our natural attitude).13 Does this recognition of contingency mean we 
should modify our belief? Not necessarily: this will depend on the case. It is true both 
that it is “psychologically possible for us to maintain a belief in full awareness of its 
strong contingency,” and that in “some cases there is absolutely nothing wrong with 
doing so.”14 For example, if one were raised by Genghis Khan, one would likely believe 
different things about cruelty than one in fact does; if one were raised by a certain kind of 
empiricist, one would reject the existence of atoms. Moreover, these positions might 
withstand reflection. Nonetheless, one need not now revise her view simply because it is 
contingent in this way. On the other hand, in some cases--and Rosen thinks complacent 
theism and complacent platonism are such cases--he does recommend that one revise 
one’s view, though he thinks it is not obligatory to do so. As he says: 
When I reflect on the fact that I might have found it natural to suspend judgment 
on the existence of mathematical objects and that I have nothing to say to 
someone who does find this natural, I find my complacency somewhat shaken, 
and rightly so, in my opinion. I grant that I am entitled to persist on grounds of 
conservatism, or on the ground that it takes effort and ingenuity to sustain the 
fictionalist epoché. But belief on such a basis strikes me as hollow: as a 
lamentable concession to necessity or to laziness. It may be permissible, but it is 
hard to see the virtue in it.15 
 
So what is the epistemic difference between the cases in which one should revise 
a belief upon recognizing its contingency and those cases in which one should not? Rosen 
 
13 There is a sense in which every belief is contingent: there is a possible world where I do not have that 
belief. This is not the sense of contingent that Rosen has in mind. Instead, he seems to think of contingent 
in the sense of the Islamic concept of taqlid, discussed below, which he takes to imply “‘derivative’ or 
‘second-hand’” belief. (Ibid., 84.) That is, it is belief which is held only because it is the accepted belief of 
one’s group. Using the example of theism, he says, “I am imagining… a theist who believes simply 
because he has been immersed in a culture in which God’s existence is taken for granted.” (Ibid., 85.) For 
more on taqlid, see note 28 below. 
14 Ibid., 85. 
15 Ibid., 85-86. 
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does not say--or rather, he says that different cases just seem, phenomenally, different to 
him. Revising in the cases of the alternate morality or science feels or seems unnecessary, 
whereas revising in the case of theism feels or seems right.16 But why should we care 
about individual psychology? The question, after all, is whether we should revise our 
beliefs upon recognition of coherent, apparently equally motivated alternatives, not 
whether we are inclined to do so. 
Rosen responds by drawing the analogy discussed in the last chapter between 
perceptual seemings and evidential seemings. For perception, seemings serve as the 
justifying basis of beliefs, and the beliefs need no other ground. Similarly, there are non-
perceptual seemings (e.g., evaluative seemings) that can ground their analogous beliefs. 
And so, if an encounter with an alternate view removes this natural tendency to ascribe 
prima facie justificatory force, then it may be recommended--or even “virtuous”--to 
revise one’s belief, though still not obligatory, owing to the potential costs involved to do 
so. “But if one does have the time, and one can see one’s way through to a more coherent 
overall view, then, as I say, there would seem to be virtue in rethinking.”17 Rosen classes 
platonism along with theism as topics that he personally finds to be affected by the 
realization of contingency, i.e., the force of the initial seemings are altered for him. This 
results in a form of relativism based on one’s non-doxastic seemings. Rosen concludes by 
reiterating that if one can avoid agnosticism on some issue only by appealing to the 
 
16 Ibid., 86. 
17 Ibid., 88. 
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practical difficulty of belief revision (he calls this “conservatism”), then one may still be 
“rational,” but is nonetheless epistemically defective.18 
So, to recapitulate: Rosen understands the potential for disagreement to defeat 
one’s evidential seemings to be a matter of the recognition of the contingency of one’s 
belief. But he also admits that not all contingent beliefs are defeated upon the recognition 
of their contingency. This happens only when this recognition is able to overcome the 
seeming that one has--and thus the prima facie justification--that the belief is true. When 
does this happen? His answer seems to be that there is no way to tell, except by 
experiencing it, hence his conclusion of epistemic relativism. That is, whether or not 
one’s evidential seemings are defeated is relative to the felt sensibility of the force of 
recognizing their contingency. As such, Rosen’s is a very strong relativism, for it makes 
the justification of one’s belief entirely a matter of the felt sensibility of the individual.19 
Is this strong relativist conclusion correct? I think not. Indeed, I do not think that 
contingency is the right place to focus in order to locate the evidential significance of 
seemings, or how they might be defeated. To see this, consider more closely the 
examples of belief contingency that Rosen himself discusses. 
 His first and most prominent example is “complacent theism”: 
When the complacent theist first asks himself whether or not there is a God, and 
then notices that there is nothing intrinsically unreasonable in agnosticism, it 
 
18 One may legitimately wonder here what use the word “rational” has if it does not imply lack of epistemic 
defect. On p. 85, Rosen says, “even if such persistence is rationally permissible, it seems to me that there is 
something admirable in the choice to reconsider. Reconsideration manifests a virtue for which we have no 
standard name: non-complacency, a concern to be responsive to reasons.” But being responsive to reasons 
just is being rational. Analogously to moral norms, if it is a virtue, then to knowingly fail to practice it is a 
vice. Presumably, by “defective,” Rosen means something like “suboptimal.” On this reading, one is 
rational to persist, in the sense of not having violated any epistemic norms, even though one is not doing 
the best one could. 
19 While Rosen does not use the word “justification” here, he does strongly imply that reconsidering due to 
the recognition of contingency is the epistemically virtuous state of affairs. 
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would be bizarre to insist that he is nonetheless obliged to remain a theist simply 
because that is where he started out, and he has been given no ‘positive grounds’ 
for thinking that he is mistaken. In a case of this sort, retrenchment is obviously 
an option. The case of nominalism is no different in principle in my opinion.20 
 
It is certainly true that the complacent theist is not obliged to remain a theist, but I think 
that it is at best misleading to say that “retrenchment” is simply an “option.” Surely it is 
in some sense unreasonable for him to become an agnostic just on the basis of coming to 
believe that agnosticism is not “intrinsically unreasonable” (whatever that may mean). 
The complacent theist may have some reason to think he’s wrong, but so has the 
agnostic--or atheist--who meets a reasonable theist. It would be at best misleading to say 
that theism is not obviously an option because of such meetings. The complacent theist 
merely sees that it is possible to be a reasonable agnostic--but these do not become his 
reasons just because he now recognizes that they exist.21 
 Rosen continues: 
It can be disconcerting to realize that one’s views are strongly contingent in this 
way. When it first dawns upon the complacent theist that his belief in God is not 
forced upon him by compelling reasons, but is rather a matter of what he has been 
raised to take for granted, one response is to say, “There but for the grace of God 
go I. It’s a matter of luck that I wound up believing. But thank goodness for it. If I 
had been raised differently, I would have been mistaken.”22 But another possible 
response is to wonder, “With what right do I suppose that I am one of the lucky 
ones?” The structure of this familiar predicament is as follows. You have always 
believed that P for no reason in particular. P is part of the worldview you take for 
granted: neither inculcated by argument nor supported by argument after the 
 
20 Ibid., 83-84. 
21 In what sense the recognition that someone else has evidence counts as one’s own new evidence will be 
considered in Chapter Six, which concerns Richard Feldman’s “Meta-Evidence” principle. 
22 Interestingly, David Enoch has argued that this sort of reflection is an indicator of the objectivity of the 
facts about which one is speaking. Specifically, the fact that this sort of statement can be made without any 
humor implied is an indicator that the referent of one’s beliefs are independent of one’s cognitive 
dispositions. To see this, replace the word “believing” in this response with “disliking spinach,” and note 
that it becomes humorous, presumably because liking spinach is not independent of one’s cognitive 
dispositions. See David Enoch, “Why I Am an Objectivist about Ethics (And Why You Are, Too),” in The 
Ethical Life: Fundamental Readings in Ethics and Moral Problems, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, 4th ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 208-211. 
77 
 
fact.23 You then encounter someone else who finds it natural to doubt it. Neither 
of you can offer arguments to sway the other. Nor is it plausible to suppose that 
you have special access to the truth in the relevant domain (e.g., a special sense 
for detecting the truths in question). In such circumstances the only thing to think 
is that the differences between you and them [sic] are due to historical 
contingencies which in themselves favor neither option.… How should one 
respond to this sort of predicament?24 
 
Let’s leave aside for the moment the unmotivated claim that the “historical 
contingencies… favor neither option,” a claim which neither party is likely to be in a 
position to know. Why should the recognition of historical contingency be disconcerting 
in the first place? Presumably, it is because one may think of “contingent” in the sense of 
“arbitrary,” or “lacking supporting reasons.” But this is a confusion to be avoided. It is a 
matter of contingent history that we now take general relativity for granted. Things may 
have gone differently if, say, Eddington and his team had failed to detect the bending of 
light around the sun during the 1919 solar eclipse.25 Nonetheless, belief in general 
relativity is not arbitrary, even if one holds it only because it is an assumption of one’s 
culture. This distinction helps explain why Rosen thinks that two of his cases--the 
Genghis Khan case and the atomist case--are different from his complacent theist and 
complacent platonist cases. In the former, one’s views--that Khan was morally bad and 
that atomism is true--are not arbitrary even though they are historically contingent. In the 
 
23 Of course, it does not follow that a belief’s being unsupported by argument means that there is no reason 
to hold it, as Plantinga and others have famously argued. For example, the belief that the world was not 
created five minutes ago with the appearance of age is a belief for which I can provide no argument, and 
yet I think I have very good reason to hold it. If they are right about this (and I think they are), then there is 
no prima facie reason to doubt one’s belief upon realizing that it is assumed as part of one’s worldview, nor 
is there any prima facie reason to criticize another’s rationality for not so doubting. 
24 Rosen, “Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism,” 84. 
25 When this possibility was suggested to Einstein, he reportedly replied: “The theory is correct all the 
same.” See Ilse Rosenthal-Schneider, Reality and Scientific Truth: Discussions With Einstein, Von Laue, 
and Planck, ed. Thomas Braun (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1980), 74. 
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latter cases, Rosen thinks, one’s beliefs are both historically contingent and arbitrary.26 
So when Rosen says, “I can acknowledge the fact that my commitments are contingent 
without finding myself with anything like a compelling ground for retreating from them,” 
this is because in these cases he is admitting contingency, but denying arbitrariness.27 
Call cases like this cases of mere contingency. In such cases--Khan and atomism--one has 
reasons to prefer one’s view to others. For example, one has the strong sense that Khan’s 
lifestyle was morally repugnant, and some reason to think that such a view is not 
culturally relative.28 Also, one knows that scientists from various cultures were 
apparently motivated by the discovery of truth, and have converged on the idea that some 
version of atomism is true. One is also not likely to be complacent about these issues--in 
the sense that one would be unbothered by the suggestion that one’s beliefs about them 
are false--which would constitute a relevant difference from the complacent theist and 
platonist cases. But even if one were complacent about them, one’s view would not be 
arbitrary. It would be undergirded by lots of reasons, reasons that would presumably be 
persuasive even to people of different eras if they could be brought to understand them. 
The only way I see to make the Khan case comparable to the complacent platonist case is 
if in fact one thinks that one has no better reasons for one’s moral views that a reflective 
Genghis Khan--in other words, that there could be a community of Khanians analogous 
 
26 Note that this reflects an apparent bias on Rosen’s part against theism. In the cases of Khanian morality 
and atomism, the beliefs are not arbitrary because there is reason for one view over others, even if I do not 
possess those reasons. To contrast these views with theism is to assume that it lacks such reasons. 
27 Rosen, “Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism,” 85. 
28 See note 20. If one is tempted to object here that one’s moral sense should not count as a reason, note that 
Rosen himself maintains that it does: “The recognition that my moral view is an historical artifact does not 
destroy the palpable obviousness that attaches to certain claims about right and wrong. I can dwell 
indefinitely on how I would have felt if I had been raised by Ghengis [sic] Khan. I can acknowledge that I 
would have reveled in deliberate cruelty, and that this stance would been [sic] stable upon reflection. And 
yet this exercise does not lead me to find deliberate cruelty any the less repellant.” Ibid., 86. 
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to the community of Bedrockers who recognize all the same data about concrete actions 
but draw wildly different moral conclusions. Presumably Rosen doesn’t think this. If he 
did, then based on what he says about the complacent platonist, it would be a virtue to 
reconsider his view in light of the reflective Khan community. 
Rosen’s notion of contingency is made clearer in what he says immediately 
following the quotation above. There, he references al-Ghazali’s use of taqlid, a concept 
in Islamic thought that signifies “‘derivative’ or ‘second-hand’ belief.”29 Rosen 
apparently takes this to mean belief that is held “for no reason in particular”; it is simply 
the belief of one’s culture or tradition.30 He then notes that al-Ghazali thinks that 
abandoning taqlid when one becomes aware of it is both the epistemically appropriate 
and psychologically necessary course of action. Rosen then disagrees with al-Ghazali, 
and introduces the Khan and atomism cases as examples where it is both psychologically 
possible and epistemically permissible to maintain one’s taqlid belief. But if I am right 
that Rosen is confusing contingency with arbitrariness, then perhaps there is room to 
interpret al-Ghazali more charitably here. This is because abandoning one’s belief when 
one discovers that it is arbitrary does seem to be the appropriate response. On the other 
 
29 Ibid., 84. 
30 Note, however, that taqlid also has the connotation of “authoritative,” in the sense of deference to past 
interpreters of religious texts whose views are held to be unsurpassed. This would not be an arbitrary belief. 
Notably for our discussion of disagreement, taqlid also had a classical sense in which one was unjustifiably 
conforming one’s view to another. This happened when one who was an authority (a mujtahid) conformed 
his view to one who was not, or to the view of another mujtahid, who was considered a peer. This is 
somewhat ironic considering Rosen’s position that there is virtue in rethinking a view when one is 
presented with evidence of the view’s contingency in the form of a peer’s disagreement. Here the classical 
Islamic view just referenced would seem to suggest that the opinion of a peer should have no bearing on 
one’s own. See Bernard G. Weiss, “Taqlid,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World (Oxford 





hand, abandoning it when it is contingent but not arbitrary--as with many moral and 
scientific beliefs--is obviously not appropriate. 
 The next question to ask is whether disagreement provides one with evidence that 
one’s belief is arbitrary, rather than simply contingent. And the answer, of course, is no. 
This is the case whether one is an expert about the disputed issue, an informed non-
expert, or someone who has no reasons for the belief other than that it is the received 
view of his tradition. In any of these cases, disagreement highlights the contingency of 
the belief, but in no way suggests that it is arbitrary in the strong sense of lacking any 
reasons. Granted, disagreement may serve as an occasion for the discovery of 
arbitrariness, but it is not itself evidence of it. Hence, disagreement is not a defeater of 
evidential seemings, insofar as it is not an indicator of arbitrariness. But it may still be a 
defeater in other ways, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 Another thing to note about Rosen’s case is that there is an element of tautology 
in his view, in the sense that the thing that actually motivates his relativism is trivially 
true for all views of belief. As we’ve seen, he thinks that one should reconsider a view 
when one recognizes that his seeming is contingent. As he says, 
When the encounter with an alien sensibility destroys this felt obviousness--or 
when it makes it plain that it was never there to begin with--it knocks the ground 
out from under what one has previously taken for granted.31 
 
The language of “never there to begin with” is telling: it suggests that the virtue of 
reconsideration accompanies beliefs that are held on the basis of nothing. In other words, 
if one’s seeming is removed (“destroyed”)--if one has nothing to go on--then it is 
recommended to revise one’s view. But surely this holds for all of the cases Rosen cites. 
 
31 Rosen, “Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism,” 87. 
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Who wouldn’t say that one should revise his belief when he discovers that he has nothing 
to support it? Notice also that belief revision here is not due to anything peculiar to 
disagreement, or even to contingency. It is based solely on the loss of one’s seeming. 
This effectively trivializes Rosen’s position. 
 So far, then, we have no reason to think that disagreement provides a defeater for 
one’s evidential seemings, except insofar as it provides evidence of arbitrariness, which it 
usually does not. 
 
4.2 - The Epistemic Parity of Seemings 
 
Some have construed seemings in such a way to make it very unlikely that they 
could be defeated by disagreement. For example, Thomas Kelly has argued that if one 
“recognizes” that some evidence supports a proposition, then one knows that it does, or at 
any rate, one is justified in thinking that it does, and is also justified in believing the 
higher-order proposition that one is reasonable to hold that belief.32 If he is right, then 
disagreement is unlikely to defeat one’s recognition in cases where one is in fact 
correct,33 and guaranteed not to defeat it if recognition entails knowledge. 
The problem here is that “recognize” is ambiguous. It can mean see, where one 
perceives that p, and is thereby prima facie justified in p in the normal way that 
perceptual beliefs are prima facie justified. This would be the sense of the word in usages 
such as “I recognize that bird as a cardinal.” But it can also mean “know,” as in “I 
 
32 Thomas Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman 
and Ted Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 139. 
33 This is the thrust of the passage: Kelly wants to defend the idea that when one is in fact correct, then one 




recognized my friend in the lineup,” but in that case Kelly’s argument would be clearly 
question-begging. If recognition entails knowing, then the word “recognize” is simply 
inappropriate for what happens in many cases of determining what a body of evidence 
supports, which is much more akin to the “seeing” sense of recognition. Kelly is surely 
right to say that “in some cases, one’s recognition that one’s evidence supports a given 
belief is based on an unmediated appreciation of that evidence itself.”34 But this is just 
what we’ve been calling a seeming. It would be more precise to think of the relevant 
sense of “recognition” in the following way: the claim “My evidence supports p” is prima 
facie justified when based on the experience of E supporting p, but can be defeated by, 
for example, further higher-order evidence that one’s initial evidence really did not 
support p. The question, again, is whether disagreement provides such higher-order 
defeating evidence. 
Kelly raises an interesting point here: it seems that if one person has done a better 
job assessing the evidence than another, then the conclusion of the former should not be 
defeasible in the same way as the conclusion of the latter. For example, if you and I 
disagree about, say, Davidson’s theory of indirect discourse, and you have assessed his 
argument correctly, and I have not--assume that we’ve shared all the reasons we can 
think to share and remain deadlocked, each finding the other’s assessment weak--it seems 
wrong that your view should be overcome just as easily as mine. The problem is that 
neither of us are in a position to know which of us has made the incorrect assessment. If 
each of us has a seeming (or “recognition”) that the evidence supports his view, then each 
of us is prima facie justified in believing that the evidence supports his view. Now, for all 
 
34 Ibid., 159. 
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we’ve said about the Uniqueness Thesis, it may be possible that the evidence supports 
both our views, but let’s say in this case it does not. How is either of us to decide which 
of our beliefs ought to be defeated by the evidence presented by the other’s 
disagreement? “From the inside,” as Kelly says, “a case in which you fail to appreciate 
the genuine merits of what I say on behalf of my view because of dogmatic commitment 
on your part might seem just like a case in which my defense is indeed without merit.”35 
I’ll call this the Parity Problem: 
Parity: From the perspective of either party in a peer disagreement, the epistemic 
situation is indistinguishable from one in which the strength of the peers’ 
evidence assessments are inverted. Things would appear just as they do to the 
correct party if she were incorrect, and vice versa. 
 
For his part, Kelly says that “the fact that it might be difficult to tell which of these is the 
case does not mean that it makes no difference.”36 But it may mean that it can make no 
difference to me, even if it is true that it ought to make a difference in some all-things-
considered, epistemically idealized way. 
 Another philosopher who holds that seemings are unlikely to be defeated by 
disagreement is Michael Bergmann. In essence, he concludes that there simply is no way 
to solve the Parity Problem--the best one can do is to maintain one’s view based on one’s 
own seemings, no matter how dialectically unsatisfying this may be. It will be helpful to 
consider his view here. 
In “Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure,” Bergmann defends a form of 
Nonconformism, according to which reasonable disagreement with an epistemic peer is 
 




possible.37 Bergmann understands peerhood to be a matter of two (or more, presumably) 
peers who are, and take themselves to be, equally “intellectually virtuous,” where 
intellectual virtue implies “intelligent, thoughtful, and sincerely seeking the truth.”38 
“Full disclosure” means that each party has taken the time to lay out all the evidence for 
his position that he can think of. Suppose that disagreement persists after such disclosure, 
and that both parties are still convinced of their equal intellectual virtue. Are they rational 
to be convinced of this? 
Bergmann distinguishes between “internal” and “external” rationality. Consider a 
person who comes to believe p (where p is a noninferential belief) on the basis of 
experience e, and suppose it is the case that the reasonable thing to do when confronted 
with experiences of “the same phenomenal type as e” is to believe p. Suppose further that 
this person believes p as a result of brain damage which caused the experience. Is this 
belief rational? Bergmann here borrows Alvin Plantinga’s distinction between internal 
and external rationality.39 For Bergmann, “a belief is internally rational if and only if it is 
an epistemically appropriate response to the subject’s mental states,” and it is “externally 
rational if and only if the believer’s cognitive processing mechanisms are working as 
they epistemically should be in producing the belief (including where their working well 
is not in response to the subject’s mental states).”40 So external rationality rules out 
rational beliefs formed due to cognitive malfunction, while internal rationality does not. 
With this distinction in mind, Bergmann provides some answers to the question of 
 
37 Michael Bergmann, “Rational Disagreement After Full Disclosure,” Episteme 6, no. 3 (2009): 336-53. 
38 Ibid., 336. 
39 See Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 110-112. 
40 Bergmann, “Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure,” 337. 
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whether the parties to the disagreement are rational to hold each other to be equally 
intellectually virtuous. 
With respect to internal rationality: imagine a case of peer disagreement in which 
peers S1 and S2 are such that S1 believes p and S2 believes ~p.41 Further, each has a 
broader outlook, O1 and O2, of which their beliefs about p are a part. Part of S1’s outlook 
O1 is an error theory about why O2 seems true but isn’t, and vice versa for S2’s outlook. 
Further, these beliefs of S1 and S2 in p and ~p, and in the error theories of O1 and O2, 
respectively, are based partially on “apparent insight” into the truth of these propositions, 
where an “insight” is a special case of “seeing that” a proposition is true, in other words, 
evidential seemings.42 As Bergmann says, “If there are no defeaters, the rational response 
to a strong apparent insight that p--like the rational response to a strong apparent memory 
that p--is to believe p.”43 Now, note that S1 and S2 do not have the same evidence, even 
after full disclosure. After all, having an insight (even an apparent one) and hearing about 
someone else’s insight are not the same thing. Note also that S2’s apparent insight that ~p 
does not count as a defeater for S1’s belief that p because S1 has an error theory that 
anticipates that belief (even from someone as intellectually virtuous as oneself) and 
explains why it’s wrong. The same thing is of course also true for S2. So, it seems that 
when internal rationality is intended, it is possible for both parties to rationally hold 
themselves to be equally intellectually virtuous after full disclosure of evidence. 
With respect to external rationality, Bergmann argues as follows. If it is possible 
for two disagreeing parties to be internally rational while taking themselves to be equally 
 
41 Bergmann does not use the word “peer,” but it is convenient here. 
42 See Bergmann’s endnote 5, p. 350. 
43 Ibid., 339. 
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intellectually virtuous, then this suggests that they may be externally rational while doing 
so as well. This is because all that is required in order to be wrong and yet still externally 
rational is a little epistemic bad luck.44 One of the parties is generally reliable but in this 
case (against the odds) wrong. Nonetheless, both parties remain externally rational. 
Bergmann says it is also possible that “both parties are externally rational in continuing to 
disagree and in thinking that the other may well be externally rational in continuing to 
disagree.”45 This is because “may well be” implies that, from the vantage point of one of 
the parties, the other party may be--for all one knows--a victim of said epistemic bad 
luck, even though everything else is working as it should. Nonetheless, Bergmann holds 
that in such cases--in which one thinks that another is internally rational but mistaken--
one will likely conclude that the other is in fact externally irrational, especially if the 
disagreement is a persistent one (more on this below). 
So it turns out that “recognized disagreement about p with someone you view as 
roughly equal to you in intellectual virtue” need not provide a defeater for your belief that 
p. But Bergmann also thinks that it may, in the following kind of case: 
If in response to recognizing that S disagrees with you about p (which you 
believe), you either do or epistemically should disbelieve or seriously question or 
doubt the claim that you are, on this occasion, more trustworthy than S with 




44 As Bergmann says, “…although the other person’s belief is externally rational and formed in an 
epistemically appropriate environment, that guarantees only that it is likely to be true, not that it is true. 
Suppose you believe you own a car and that this belief is externally rational and formed in an epistemically 
appropriate environment. If, a few seconds ago, unbeknownst to you, a stray meteorite destroyed your only 
car, then your belief is false. Here the explanation is that the reliability of externally rational beliefs formed 
in an epistemically appropriate environment is combined with unlikely falsehood.” Ibid., 341. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 343. 
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So when is it the case that one “epistemically should” question whether one is 
more trustworthy on this occasion than a peer? Unfortunately, says Bergmann, there is no 
uncontroversial answer to this question, even if we look at specific cases: 
It’s unfortunate that, even after full disclosure of evidence among people 
seemingly equal in intellectual virtue, disagreement persists about precisely when 
disagreement provides a defeater. But I think that’s what we’ll find.47 
 
A Conformist like Elga or Christensen might here raise the following objection: 
what reason does either party have to assume that she is the one who has avoided error on 
this occasion? Bergmann’s response to this is already quoted above in another context: 
I think that the rational response… is to continue believing p. However, I don’t 
have an argument for that conclusion, just as I don’t have an argument for the 
conclusion that the rational response for us to a tactile experience like the one we 
typically have when grabbing a billiard ball is to believe something like ‘that’s a 
small hard spherical object’.48 
 
Bergmann is here appealing to the basic nature of evidential seemings in order to 
reject the demand for an argument supporting a bias in one’s own favor. He provides two 
cases to help make his point: 
Case 1: We may not be able to satisfactorily answer the radical skeptic, but this 
does not thereby provide a defeater for our perceptual beliefs. 
Likewise, the fact that we think someone is mistaken (in a moral or religious or 
political disagreement with us) despite her being confident in ways similar to the 
ways in which we are confident doesn’t automatically mean that we should 









Case 2: Imagine an instance of obviously morally wrong behavior,50 and imagine 
further that two other parties disagree with you about its wrongness--one because he is an 
ethical egoist, and the other because he is a moral nihilist. Assume that you’re peers with 
respect to intellectual virtue and other relevant factors, and that you discuss it and reach 
full disclosure. Should you “have significant doubts about the reliability of your own 
apparent insight that [the] behavior is morally wrong? Is this what internal rationality 
requires?”51 Of course Bergmann thinks not. Your own apparent insights are based on 
seemings which provide great confidence in your belief and which you have no reason to 
give up just because someone else apparently lacks those seemings or has different ones. 
 Unfortunately, Bergmann underestimates the force of the seeming that one should 
modify her view in light of the disagreement of an informed peer about issues regarding 
which one’s seemings are not as clear and vivid as those in the cases of current perceptual 
experiences or grossly immoral behavior. When informed peers disagree about, say, the 
causes of the gender pay gap, and they reach full disclosure, it is much less clear that 
either of them is entitled to say, “Well, my insight supports p, and even though I have no 
argument for preferring my insight to yours, I am reasonable to believe p.” If asked what 
makes one reasonable to do so in this case, one will simply not be able to say. And as 
Rosen says, if one has nothing to say, then one should be less confident in one’s view.52 
Since we are imagining a situation of parity, neither party to the disagreement will be 
able to determine that her own assessment is the correct one, outside of her own 
 
50 Bergmann here falls prey to the regrettable habit among philosophers of using examples involving 
depraved cruelty. 
51 Ibid., 346. 
52 Rosen, “Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism,” 83. 
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evidential seemings, and both parties will know this about their own and their peer’s 
situation. 
So even if Bergmann has successfully shown that it is possible for peer 
disagreements to be rational,53 as in the case of epistemic bad luck, he has not established 
that one is reasonable to think that one’s own peer disagreement is rational, especially if, 
as he admits, it is a persistent disagreement. In his own words: 
I think the most natural outcome of a case where both parties to a disagreement 
sensibly believe the other is internally rational but mistaken is that both parties 
will also sensibly think the other’s belief is probably externally irrational--i.e., the 
other probably has some cognitive processing problem that has resulted in her 
having misleading experiential evidence for a false proposition. … But at most 
one of the parties to the dispute will be basing her belief in the disputed 
proposition (and in the probable external irrationality of the other) on 
nonmisleading evidence.54 
 
But of course neither party can know if she is the one with the nonmisleading evidence, 
so we’re back to the Parity Problem. 
Bergmann avoids this problem only by defining “intellectual virtue,” which is his 
stand-in for “peerhood,” in an idiosyncratic and unmotivated way, saying that “in 
thinking that one’s friend is roughly on a par with oneself in terms of intellectual virtue, 
one needn’t think that the apparent insights of one’s friend are produced in a cognitively 
healthy and fitting way.” But this is precisely what most commentators on peerhood have 
thought, and what strict peerhood would seem to require. If I do not think that your 
seemings are produced in a cognitively healthy way, then there is no interesting epistemic 
 
53 Technically speaking, he has argued only that disagreements between equally epistemically virtuous 
people are rational, with epistemic virtue being taken to be a matter of “intelligence, thoughtfulness, and 
sincerity in seeking truth.” Were he to take certain other views of peerhood, such as that of Elga, for 
example, his argument would not work. See Bergmann, “Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure,” 
342. Competing views of peerhood will be discussed in Chapter Seven. See especially footnote 8 in that 
chapter. 
54 Ibid., 342. 
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problem with respect to our disagreement. So Bergmann avoids the primary issue by 
instead answering a more trivial problem. 
 Another possible avenue for dealing with the Parity Problem is to claim that there 
is a presumption in favor of one’s own view just by virtue of it being one’s own. This has 
been called an “egocentric epistemic bias,” most notably defended by Ralph 
Wedgwood.55 According to Wedgwood, it is reasonable to assume that the other party in 
a disagreement is mistaken, and not oneself. This is a rational stance because it is rational 
to have a primitive trust in one’s own intuitions--i.e., to regard them as reliable, take them 
at face value, even if one has no independent or antecedent reason to do so. But, 
Wedgwood argues, it is more rational to have this sort of primitive trust only in one’s 
own intuitions, rather than in someone else’s, because this minimizes risk of error, which 
is already quite high. He explains: 
In general, it seems to be a general requirement of rationality that one must in 
some non‐arbitrary way minimize the number of sources of information that one 
has this sort of primitive trust in. (The non‐arbitrariness condition is crucial here: 
it would, for example, be arbitrary to have a primitive trust in one’s vision but not 
in one’s hearing or one’s sense of touch.) If I have a primitive trust only in my 
own intuitions, then clearly there is a smaller number of sources of information 
that I have such a primitive trust in than there would be if I had such a primitive 
trust in everyone’s intuitions. Moreover, it seems to me that it would not be 
arbitrary for me to have this sort of primitive disposition to trust only my own 
intuitions: after all, my own intuitions by their very nature involve my having an 
inclination to believe the corresponding proposition, whereas other people’s 
intuitions do not involve my having any such inclination.56 
 
In other words, there is an asymmetry between the epistemic advisability of relying on 
one’s own intuitions and relying on those of other people. Hence, owing to this rational 
 
55 Ralph Wedgwood, “Disagreement and the A Priori,” in The Nature of Normativity (Oxford University 




egocentric bias, one may reasonably conclude in the face of peer disagreement (even if 
one is forced to lower one’s confidence in one’s view) that it is the other party who is 
wrong. 
 Is the egocentric epistemic bias a solution to the Parity Problem? I think not, 
though I do think it gets at something important that is worth taking into account. It is 
true that there is an initial asymmetry between the trust one should place in one’s own 
seemings and the trust one should place in the reported seemings of a peer. And it may be 
true that this asymmetry is justified in much the way that Wedgwood describes. This is 
not an insignificant point. It entails that there is a prima facie presumption in favor of 
one’s standing view (assuming it is accompanied by the right sorts of evidential 
seemings) in any dispute. This puts the burden of proof squarely on the disagreeing party 
to overcome this presumption. Given that many disputes never move past the initial stage 
of recognition of disagreement, this entails that people are often within their epistemic 
rights to go on believing as they have after becoming aware of disagreement with those 
they take to be peers. I am, after all, epistemically responsible for me, not for my peer, 
and all I have to go on are my own seemings. 
Nonetheless, the egocentric bias cannot solve the Parity Problem because there 
the relevant comparison is not between one’s own seeming and the report of someone 
else’s--it is between the subject’s own conflicting seemings. In a sustained disagreement 
with an epistemic peer and shared evidence, the Parity Problem stipulates that I will 
eventually reach a point where I cannot tell, phenomenally, whether I am in the right or 
not, because I recognize that things would seem just the same to me in either situation. So 
I have two seemings: 
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(1) the evidential seeming that suggests (and produces justified belief that) E 
supports p, and 
(2) the higher-order seeming that I have reason to believe  that (1) is not 
accurate. 
An egocentric epistemic bias, even if true, will not help here. 
Now, it is of course true that I always have some reason to think that I might be 
mistaken. But this worry only becomes salient if I am confronted in some way with the 
need to worry about it. The peer disagreement problem is akin in this way to the broader 
epistemological problem of skepticism, and it has been recognized as such by prominent 
commentators.57 Bryan Frances calls this “disagreement skepticism,” and defines it as 
follows: 
The disagreement skeptic focuses on beliefs that satisfy the following recognition-
of-controversy conditions. You know that the belief B in question has been 
investigated and debated (i) for a very long time by (ii) a great many (iii) very 
smart people who (iv) are your epistemic peers and superiors on the matter and 
(v) have worked very hard (vi) under optimal circumstances to figure out if B is 
true. But you also know that (vii) these experts have not come to any significant 
agreement on B and (viii) those who agree with you are not, as a group, in an 
appreciably better position to judge B than those who disagree with you.58 
 
Thus, disagreement skepticism is significantly different from traditional global 
skepticism, as its effects are limited to beliefs that satisfy conditions (i)-(viii). As Frances 
says, this form of skepticism is limited in three ways: 
 
57 See Bryan Frances, “Scepticism and Disagreement,” in Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, ed. 
Diego Machuca and Baron Reed (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 581–91; David Christensen, 
“Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy,” Philosophy Compass 4, no. 5 (2009): 760; 
and the articles assembled in Diego Machuca, ed., Disagreement and Skepticism (New York: Routledge, 
2013). 
58 Bryan Frances and Jonathan Matheson, “Disagreement,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/disagreement/, Section 7. 
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(1) It is contained: “Only beliefs that meet something like the recognition-of-
controversy conditions are subject to this skeptical threat.”59 
(2) It is contingent: “The nature and extent of disagreements are both 
contingent matters, so since disagreement skepticism relies on these 
factors, the skeptical consequences of disagreement are also contingent.”60 
(3) It is exclusively epistemic: it does not imply anything about “what moral, 
prudential, or even religious reasons you may have for holding a 
controversial belief. The skeptical threat from disagreement only concerns 
our epistemic reasons.”61 
The effects of the Parity Problem would also be similarly limited, since there are various 
conditions one must meet to be in it, analogous to Frances’s recognition-of-controversy 
conditions. Nonetheless, these effects are serious: they include the fact that many 
controversial beliefs, in areas as important as morality, religion, politics, and philosophy, 
can be defeated--even when they start out as justified--by prolonged peer disagreement. 
This includes beliefs for which one has clear, vivid, and stable evidential seemings. Thus, 
there is something to the Conformist stance: via the Parity Problem, there are many cases 
in which a person is seemingly epistemically obligated to alter her view because of peer 
disagreement. Potential solutions to the Parity Problem will be discussed in Chapters 
Eight and Nine. 
 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. Of course, one could have a contingent disagreement that entails contingent skepticism about a 




Are there other ways that peer disagreement may lead to the defeat of one’s 
evidential seemings? To answer this, we need to understand what evidential value 




Chapter Five – The Evidential Value of Disagreement Itself 
 
5.1 - Idealization, Independence, and Bootstrapping 
 
The clearest explanation in the disagreement literature of the epistemic 
significance of disagreement--and the clearest justification for the discussion of 
peerhood--is due to Jennifer Lackey. She notes that many disagreements are due to 
differences in access to evidence, cognitive inequalities between the parties, or other 
epistemic defects such as bias. Such cases would not easily yield what is epistemically 
interesting about disagreement per se. This is because, as she says, 
…adjusting our doxastic states in all of these sorts of cases does not reveal 
anything significant about disagreement itself, since the fact that you and I 
disagree drops out of the explanation of this adjustment; it is, for instance, the 
difference in our familiarity with the relevant evidence or the asymmetry in our 
cognitive capacities that does the explanatory work.1 
 
To examine the effect of disagreement itself, we must control for these sorts of 
inequality, which means we must assume some notion of peerhood. No other method 
captures the intrinsic significance of disagreement as well as this, since it allows us to 
isolate disagreement as an epistemic issue.2 
Defining peerhood is not my aim here--that is the subject of Chapter Seven--I 
want merely to note that the idealization of peer disagreement cases in the literature is 
primarily motivated by the reason Lackey explains.3 Idealizing cases somewhat (e.g., by 
 
1 Jennifer Lackey, “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance,” in Social 
Epistemology, ed. Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford University Press, 2010), 
298-299. Note that Lackey’s point here follows only if factors other than the disagreement account 
completely for the belief adjustment. 
2 Ibid. 
3 For her part, Lackey finds this idealization a bit overwrought. She says, “…it is very common for 
philosophers writing on this topic to motivate interest in it by citing debates in history, philosophy, politics, 
religion, and other areas where disagreement is widespread and impassioned. But these debates bear very 
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considering cases of epistemic peers) helps to focus on the epistemic nature of 
disagreement itself. Our question here is what contribution the disagreement with another 
makes to one’s total evidence base. One way of approaching this question is to begin with 
the related question: What evidential difference does agreement make? 
Thomas Kelly approaches this question via a consideration of the Common 
Consent Argument (CCA) for the existence of God. He first notes that when a large 
number of peers independently converge on some opinion, that affords that opinion 
significant evidential weight.4 He then notes that: 
As arguments go, the Common Consent Argument for the Existence of God is not 
exactly an overwhelming one, possessing as it does the twin defects of transparent 
invalidity and the having of an obviously false claim as its sole premise. 
Nevertheless, even though God exists does not follow from Everyone believes that 
God exists, we can ask: if it were true that everyone, or almost everyone, believed 
that God exists, how much support would that lend (if any) to the proposition that 
God exists?5 
 
The answer, he says, depends on whether those people came to their belief independently 
or not. If I believe p merely because you believe p, then the fact that two people now 
believe p is no more epistemically significant (i.e., it affords no greater evidence for p) 
 
little resemblance to the hyper‐idealized scenarios under consideration here.” (Ibid., 311) I sympathize with 
Lackey’s view here, even while disagreeing with other statements she makes. For example, she continues: 
“It would rarely, if ever, happen that two people continue to disagree with one another about, say, gay 
marriage where there is evidential and cognitive equality with known epistemic symmetry in situations of 
full disclosure.” I disagree. Even idealized symmetry seems plausible in cases where the parties have 
known each other for a long time, and/or have had sufficient interaction to become acquainted with the 
personal characteristics of the other. Lackey claims that “…conclusions drawn from hyper‐idealized 
situations involving disagreement ultimately tend to have very little connection to the disagreements we 
face every day.… I think that, at least for the most part, ordinary disagreement ought to be the focus of this 
debate.” (Ibid.) I certainly agree that the philosophical debate ought to be sensitive to--even constrained by-
-what disagreement is like in real life. However, I deny that the cases Lackey describes are all unrealistic. 
The seminal examples in the disagreement debate (e.g., the disagreement we discussed above between van 
Inwagen & Lewis on free will, or the older debates in religious pluralism) are very real and yet exhibit a 
high degree of what Lackey calls idealism. 
4 Thomas Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman 
and Ted Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 146. 
5 Ibid., 147. 
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than the fact that you believed p all by yourself before convincing me. “In principle,” he 
says, “the fact that a small handful of people arrive at the same belief independently of 
one another might be better evidence that that belief is true than if many millions of 
people arrive at the same belief non-independently.”6 This entails that if one is in 
disagreement with a whole group of people about some issue, the scales are not obviously 
shifted in favor of the group, if the members of the group have not arrived at their view 
independently of one another.7 Kelly borrows an example here from G.A. Cohen, who 
recounts a division among philosophers from his days as a student at Oxford: 
Now people of my generation who studied philosophy at Harvard rather than at 
Oxford for the most part reject the analytic/synthetic distinction. And I can’t 
believe that this is an accident. That is, I can’t believe that Harvard just happened 
to be a place where both its leading thinker rejected that distinction and its 
graduate students, for independent reasons--merely, for example, in the 
independent light of reason itself--also came to reject it. And vice versa, of 
course, for Oxford. I believe, rather, that in each case students were especially 
impressed by the reasons respectively for and against believing in the distinction, 
because in each case the reasons came with all the added persuasiveness of 
personal presentation, personal relationship, and so forth.8 
 
So, as someone trying to decide what to think about the analytic/synthetic distinction, one 
need not be overwhelmed by the number of people who reject (or accept) it, since in 




7 A danger lurks here with respect to testimony. Kelly’s view could be read as Lockean to the extent that 
beliefs rooted in testimony are seen as non-independent, and therefore epistemically less valuable, than 
beliefs rooted in some other knowledge source, such as direct perception. If in fact this is an entailment of 
Kelly’s view, I take that to be a further weakness of his account, in addition to the one I here discuss. I 
discuss the relationship between testimony and disagreement below. 
8 G.A. Cohen, If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2000), 18. Quoted in Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” 147-148. 
9 Note again the implications for testimony: nearly every belief the average person holds about the world is 
susceptible to Cohen’s critique, since almost no one is in a position to independently assess most of the 
things they believe. So if being affected by the “persuasiveness of personal presentation, personal 
98 
 
Now, this is true to an extent, but there is a danger here: we do not want to go so 
far as to say that a substantial number of people who believe p, and who trace that belief 
to a common source, carries no epistemic weight. That would ignore the fact that it’s 
well-nigh impossible for every individual to do all of her own investigating, given how 
many propositions most individuals need to believe or disbelieve. It is perfectly rational 
to accept the well-reasoned views of one’s community, with or without investigating 
them for oneself, and if the views are sufficiently detailed and accurate to have survived 
in a large population for a long time (a population in which it is the job of some members 
to investigate, refine, and if necessary, alter these views), then there is no reason the 
average person shouldn’t take the commonality of a view as evidence of its truth.10 
Kelly clarifies his view as follows: “… insofar as one believes as one does 
because this is what one’s teacher believes, the fact that one believes as one does is not an 
additional piece of psychological evidence, over and above the psychological evidence 
 
relationship, and so forth” is a mark against the epistemic value of a belief, then it is a mark against nearly 
all beliefs. 
10 J.L. Austin says something similar, not regarding ordinary belief but ordinary language. Still, what 
Austin says seems to apply, mutatis mutandis, to ordinary belief: 
Certainly ordinary language has no claim to be the last word, if there is such a thing. It embodies, 
indeed, something better than the metaphysics of the Stone Age, namely, as was said, the inherited 
experience and acumen of many generations of men. But then, that acumen has been concentrated 
primarily upon the practical business of life. If a distinction works well for practical purposes in 
ordinary life (no mean feat, for even ordinary life is full of hard cases), then there is sure to be 
something in it, it will not mark nothing: yet this is likely enough to be not the best way of 
arranging things if our interests are more extensive or intellectual than the ordinary. And again, 
that experience has been derived only from the sources available to ordinary men throughout most 
of civilised history: it has not been fed from the resources of the microscope and its successors. 
And it must be added too, that superstition and error and fantasy of all kinds do become 
incorporated in ordinary language and even sometimes stand up to the survival test (only, when 
they do, why should we not detect it?). Certainly, then, ordinary language is not the last word: in 
principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded. Only remember, 
it is the first word. 
See J.L. Austin, “A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
New Series 57 (1956-1957): 11. 
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afforded by the teacher’s belief.”11 This seems correct: one person believing p merely 
because someone else believes p does not provide additional evidence for p. But Kelly 
continues this line of thought in a footnote: 
… the need to discount the numbers is not limited to 
cases in which there is causal dependence present, as in the examples considered 
above. If I know that two individuals will respond to given evidence in the same 
manner, then I should treat their having arrived at some particular answer as one 
piece of evidence, and not two pieces of evidence, in favor of that answer (even if 
their both having arrived at that answer is in no way underwritten by some causal 
link).12 
 
This is surely mistaken. I think here of William P. Alston, who reportedly 
defended his dissertation in front of Charles Hartshorne, Rudolf Carnap, and W.V.O. 
Quine, the first two of whom were on his committee.13 Let’s say Alston agreed with 
something his committee members also believed, and for the same reasons--surely it is 
possible that the assent of that prodigious mind could have contributed additional support 
for the view besides what it already enjoyed. Similarly, imagine two mathematicians 
examine the same proof and decide that it is successful. If I believe that it is successful on 
the basis of both of their testimony, then my belief is better justified than if it were based 
on the testimony of only one of them, even though I know that they responded to the 
evidence “in the same manner.”14 I am inclined to think that the perspective of certain 
thinkers, who exhibit certain characteristics like incisiveness, care, thoroughness, 
creativity, etc., count for something, even when they agree with the perspective of others, 
 
11 Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” 148. 
12 Ibid., 149, footnote 28. 
13 This anecdote is related in a memoriam written by Tom Senor, archived here: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20130510142744/http://prosblogion.ektopos.com/archives/2009/09/memories-
of-bil.html. 
14 Thanks to Michael Wreen for this example. 
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and for the very same reasons. One might argue that this is still a matter of independence, 
with the difference that here the independence is a trait of personality, rather than of 
reasons. Nonetheless, this serves as a counterexample to Kelly’s claim that two 
individuals responding to the evidence in the same way is only ever one piece of 
evidence. I believe that it can be additional evidence, and whether or not it is depends on 
the epistemic characteristics of the individuals, and not merely on how similar the 
contents of the arguments are between them.  
So we can discern two senses in which agreement has epistemic weight over and 
above what a testimonial report would typically carry on its own: when the view of others 
is either (i) supported by multiple independent lines of evidence (represented by 
individuals arriving at the view independently of one another), or (ii) supported by the 
assent of individuals who are independent and especially careful reasoners. 
 Another way to approach this question is via a disagreement over the so-called 
Equal Weight View, championed by Adam Elga. This view is a species of the Conformist 
view, which holds that peer disagreement provides one with reason to adjust one’s own 
view, and adds that it is most rational to accord equal weight to the view of one’s peer 
and to one’s own view.15 Elga contends that views which reject this conclusion--i.e., 
views which hold that it is reasonable to accord more weight to one’s own view than to 
one’s peer’s--incur a bootstrapping problem. As he says: 
…suppose that it was legitimate to give your own evaluations more weight than 
those of a friend who you initially count as a peer. Then it could be legitimate for 
you to “bootstrap”--to come to be confident that you are a better evaluator than 
the friend merely by noting cases of disagreement, and taking it that the friend 
made most of the errors. But that is absurd. So it is not legitimate to give your 
own evaluations more weight than those who you count as peers. A similar 
 
15 Adam Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” Noûs 41, no. 3 (2007): 478-479. 
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argument shows that it is not legitimate to give your own evaluations less weight 
than those who you count as peers. So the equal weight view is correct.16 
 
If this is correct--if Nonconformist views have a bootstrapping problem--then it follows 
that disagreement itself is evidentially significant. This is because if it is illegitimate to 
give one’s own view more weight than a peer’s based on the same evidence, this can only 
be because the fact of disagreement itself acts as a counterweight against the first-order 
evidence one had prior to the disagreement. It is not that one assumes the peer has 
evidence one lacks--this is ruled out by stipulating shared evidence. And it is not that one 
assumes that the peer’s reasoning abilities indicate evidence one has missed--Elga 
explicitly disallows this by insisting on the “independent evidence only” view discussed 
above.17 What makes the Equal Weight View the correct view, Elga thinks, is that it 
recognizes that disagreement itself carries epistemic weight sufficient to defeat the 
evidential seemings one possesses for her view that p. The bootstrapping objection is 
intended to bring this out by showing that denying disagreement’s epistemic significance 
commits one to inventing justification out of thin air by saying, in effect, “We disagree; 
you’re wrong; therefore, we’re not peers on this issue.” If disagreement provides its own 
counterbalancing evidence, one would not be able to dismiss the view of an assumed 
peer. 
 
16 Ibid., 488. Because Elga, like most commentators in the disagreement debate, limits peerhood to local 
disagreements over specific propositions, it would not follow immediately that non-Equal Weight views 
entail that a person is justified in thinking that he is a better evaluator full stop than anyone who disagrees 
with him. It follows only that he can bootstrap his way into thinking he is a better evaluator of p. 
Nonetheless, Elga would likely think that enough such disagreements would legitimate the belief that one is 
a better evaluator than one’s peer entirely. 
17 That is, if we are peers, then for Elga, we are equally likely to be correct, regardless of what we take our 
evidence about p to be. He therefore thinks that the only thing that can break a stalemate between us is 
other evidence that is independent of our dispute about p but that bears on our likelihood to be correct in 
the dispute. This has the effect of rendering the specific propositional content of our evidence, and the 
specific characteristics that make us peers, evidentially irrelevant. 
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 However, the bootstrapping objection does not work. Or, to put it differently, it 
works too well, since it cuts against the Equal Weight View itself. Elga contends that 
when someone considers her own view to be superior to her opponent’s, she is 
bootstrapping--even if she is correct--since she has no evidence that she has in fact 
evaluated the evidence correctly. This much is true. However, for Elga, the person also 
has no evidence that she is mistaken. This counterintuitive result is a consequence of 
Elga’s independent evidence only requirement. Notice: intuitively, the way that peer 
disagreement justifies counterbalancing one’s confidence in a standing belief with that of 
a peer is by providing higher-order evidence that one has misjudged the first-order 
evidence for p. Why does peer disagreement provide this meta-evidence? Because a peer 
is as capable as oneself to correctly judge the evidence for p. How do we know if 
someone is a peer with respect to p? According to Elga, it is by observing how that 
person judges the evidence pertaining to allied issues related to p. Considering a 
disagreement about abortion, for example, Elga says: “setting aside [another’s] reasoning 
about abortion does not set aside her reasoning about allied issues.… the accuracy of an 
advisor’s views on these allied issues indicates how accurate the advisor is likely to be, 
when it comes to abortion.”18 Since in “messy real-world cases, the disputed issues are 
tangled in clusters of controversy,” one cannot help but determine the peerhood of an 
interlocutor based on issues related to the one under dispute.19 
The upshot of this, says Elga, is that one will only count as peers those who “have 
views that are similar to one’s own.”20 Hence, in cases like the abortion case, I cannot 
 
18 Ibid., 493. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 494. 
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appeal to independent evidence to break a stalemate with a peer because a peer is simply 
someone who probably already agrees with me in general, so there shouldn’t be a peer 
disagreement in the first place. But let’s say that, against the odds, there is. Given Elga’s 
view of how judgments of peerhood work, one would not be justified in lowering her 
confidence in p in response to peer disagreement, because there is no independent 
evidence to appeal to that would justify this change. Any such evidence has already been 
accounted for in deciding that one is a peer with respect to p, which in Elga’s view means 
that one is equally likely to be correct about p as oneself.21 But if one has no evidence 
independent of the dispute to appeal to in order to justify thinking that one is more likely 
to be correct about p, then for the same reasons one has no evidence independent of the 
dispute which justifies thinking that one is less likely to be correct about p. Elga thinks 
this implies that one should “split the difference” and assign equal weight to both views. 
But if I am right, any change in confidence, up or down, would be unjustified on Elga’s 
account. This is based on the intuitively plausible principle that a change in credence for 
p (in either direction) requires justification, and owing to the independent evidence only 
restriction on judgments about peerhood, no such justification exists in these cases. So 
decreasing one’s confidence in p (say, by according it “equal weight” as the opponent’s 
view) as a result of disagreement is a kind of “reverse” bootstrapping.22 
 
5.2 - David Christensen on Symmetry between Apparent Peers 
 
 
21 This conception of peerhood will be critiqued in Chapter Seven. 
22 Kelly also makes a compelling bootstrapping argument against the Equal Weight View itself. See Kelly, 
“Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” Section 3.2, 125-128. 
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 David Christensen has also taken peer disagreement to constitute defeating 
evidence which counterbalances one’s evidential seeming. Consider his restaurant bill 
case: two friends at a moderately priced restaurant mentally calculate their split bill and 
come to slightly different totals for their share, say, $43 and $45. Christensen describes 
his initial intuition about this case as follows: 
If we set up the case in this way, it seems quite clear that I should lower my 
confidence that my share is $43 and raise my confidence that it’s $45. In fact, I 
think (though this is perhaps less obvious) that I should now accord these two 
hypotheses roughly equal credence.23 
 
What could motivate the idea that the hypotheses should be accorded equal credence? 
Christensen admits that this is not obvious, and I suspect it is not obvious because 
Christensen’s view assumes that disagreement itself provides equal evidence rather than 
merely being an indicator that there is evidence against one’s view. My own intuition 
about the bill calculation case is that one should lower one’s credence about the amount 
pending recalculation, and form no beliefs at all about the peer’s answer. Assigning the 
answers equal credence is unwarranted because I lack sufficient evidence to overrule my 
seeming until I know more about why the peer takes a different view. 
Alternatively, consider Christensen’s discussion of a case he borrows from Kelly, 
in which two meteorologist peers interpret a set of weather data differently. Kelly says 
that in a case like this--in which each takes the other to be a peer initially and then 
discovers their disagreement--from the perspective of one of them, the disagreement 
provides evidence that they’re not peers after all. About this, Christensen says: 
It seems to me that there is clearly something right about this line. As applied to 
the weather case, my discovering that my friend has reached what seems to me to 
 




be the wrong conclusion does constitute evidence that she has made a mistake, 
and thus does give me reason to trust her opinion less than I ordinarily would. 
However, another point needs equal emphasis: the fact that she disagrees with my 
prediction also constitutes evidence that I have made a mistake. So it’s not clear 
so far that any asymmetry has developed.24 
 
So Christensen thinks the evidential situation here is a wash, because the fact that she 
disagrees constitutes evidence that I have made a mistake, and that evidence counts the 
same as the evidence I have that she made a mistake. 
But is this right? It seems to me that Christensen (and Kelly) are correct that 
learning of peer disagreement in a case like this does provide some evidence that one’s 
peer is mistaken, and therefore (Kelly, contra Christensen) contributes to breaking the 
symmetry between the peers, i.e., making them not peers in that case. However, the 
symmetry is not broken because of the discovery that the other party interprets the 
evidence differently from me, in the sense that because one disagrees with me, therefore 
she must be mistaken. After all, it’s not as though being mine makes a belief more likely 
to be justified. Rather, the symmetry is broken because of what the disagreement is based 
on--namely, my own seeming that the evidence points my way.25 But I do not have my 
peer’s seeming--that the evidence points her way--and so it does not follow that her 
disagreement gives me evidence that counterbalances my own seemings. I can 
simultaneously acknowledge that she is usually my peer about this sort of evidence, but 
that she is apparently making a mistake in this case, and also acknowledge that her view 
counts somewhat against mine (owing to her peer status), but not enough to outweigh my 
first-order evidential seemings. 
 
24 Ibid., 195-196. 
25 So the inference is: “We disagree; the evidence supports my view and not yours; therefore, we are not 
peers in this case.” It is not: “We disagree; I am usually right; therefore, we are not peers in this case.” 
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Further, in some cases the discovery of disagreement will not make any difference 
with respect to the total evidence one has for or against p. For example, if you predict a 
30% chance of rain on the basis of evidence which, to me, clearly supports a much higher 
percentage (say, 70%), then this is evidence to me that you may not be my peer after all 
with respect to predicting rain in circumstances like this. It is not clear that my evidence 
for the proposition “There is a high chance of rain” has changed at all because of our 
disagreement, even if I thought you my peer prior to disagreeing.26 Compare disagreeing 
with a child: intuitively, the disagreement alone typically provides no evidence against p. 
In the case of disagreeing with a presumed peer, on the other hand, the effect of the 
disagreement on one’s total evidence for p depends on the strength of one’s judgment that 
the other is in fact a peer in this case. But we’ve just said that the discovery of 
disagreement provides some evidence against peerhood. So, because I have only my 
evidential seeming to go on, not my peer’s, the fact of disagreement will often only count 
against her view, not mine, unless of course my seeming is that the evidence could go 
either way. The exception to this will be cases where I am very confident that she is my 
peer on issues like this one and I cannot bring myself to think that she is suffering some 
kind of unusual defect in this case, such as in a situation of Parity. Thus, a typical (non-
Parity) disagreement does produce an asymmetry between us, assuming that I take the 
evidence to support my view. 
Now, the same will of course be true from my friend’s perspective: she will also 
think (rightly) that an asymmetry has been created by the disagreement, and that I am no 
 
26 Some, e.g., Feldman, would object here that disagreement is evidence in the following way: it is evidence 




longer her peer with respect to this question. Perhaps this is what Christensen is getting 
at. But he is wrong to conclude that “it’s not clear so far that any asymmetry has 
developed.” It is more accurate to say that an asymmetry has developed from both 
perspectives, but in opposite directions. This suggests that both parties are within their 
epistemic rights to regard the other as temporarily less than a peer, and that therefore 
rational disagreement between apparent peers (viewed from a third party perspective) is 
possible. The case also suggests that from the perspective of either party, one is justified 
in maintaining her view, and there is nothing here to suggest that it would be somehow 
more epistemically virtuous to conciliate (contra Rosen). 
Christensen also takes his wristwatch analogy, mentioned above, to indicate 
symmetry between peers: 
To focus in on the symmetry question, let me begin with an admittedly crude 
analogy: I look at my watch, a one-year-old Acme that has worked fine so far, and 
see that it says 4:10. Simultaneously, however, my friend consults her watch--also 
a one-year-old Acme with a fine track record--and it reads 4:20. When she tells 
me this, it clearly gives me new evidence that her watch is fast: I should not trust 
her watch as much as I would have before finding out that it disagreed with mine. 
But just as clearly, I’ve just gotten new evidence that my watch is slow, and this 
should diminish my trust in it. In this case, it’s obvious that the fact that one of the 
watches is on my wrist does not introduce an epistemically relevant asymmetry.27 
 
But here, as above, the symmetry is confused. It is true that the watch’s being on my wrist 
is not a relevant asymmetry. However, whatever reasons I have for trusting my watch are 
relevant, and if they are no more than as stated, I should pretty clearly suspend judgment. 
This is not simply because the other person disagrees with me, but because I have two 
objective, conflicting pieces of evidence (the two watches), and no way to tell which is 
 
27 Ibid., 196. 
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more reliable. Christensen himself comes close to acknowledging something like my 
points here when he says: 
… it is certainly true that when I consider how to regard my friend’s 
disagreement, I must do so from within the first-person perspective--that is, using 
my own beliefs. Might this give my beliefs--which include my belief about the 
matter on which my friend and I disagree--a kind of privileged position that the 
watch on my wrist doesn’t share?28 
 
Of course Christensen goes on to argue that it does not, for reasons we saw above in 
Chapter Two. But again, one’s beliefs should be privileged only if things really do appear 
to be a certain way after investigation (checking for defeaters, etc.), not merely because 
they are one’s own beliefs. 
So Christensen has not provided a compelling argument for the view that peer 
disagreement necessarily produces epistemic symmetry between the peers which entails 
according the views of a peer equal weight as one’s own. While peer disagreement may 
certainly (in fact, typically does) provide some evidence against one’s view--though I 
will argue below that it does not do so necessarily--it does not follow that it provides 
counterbalancing or defeating evidence. However, Christensen is right about one thing: it 
can happen in a case of peer disagreement that I am justified in counting the present 
disagreement against you, and therefore considering you temporarily not my peer, and I 
am also aware that you are justified in doing the same with me, and I cannot say for sure 
which of us is right. And as we saw above, the longer the disagreement lasts and the 
better we know one another’s reasons--i.e., the more confident we are that we are peers--









Chapter Six – Higher-Order Evidence and Testimony 
 
 
6.1 – The Meta-Evidence Principle 
 
As we saw in Chapter One, Richard Feldman understands the epistemic 
significance of disagreement to be a matter of higher-order evidence that there is 
evidence against one’s view. This provides another way in which disagreement may 
defeat one’s private evidential seemings, namely by providing evidence that one’s initial 
evidence assessment was mistaken. This differs from David Christensen’s proposed 
symmetry between peers, discussed in the previous chapter. With symmetry, there are 
two equally good evidence assessors, neither of which has any reason (allegedly) to 
prefer her view over the other. From a first-person perspective, Christensen thinks, one 
should weigh the peer’s contrary testimony (disagreement) the same as one’s own 
evidential seemings. In other words, peer disagreement defeats one’s evidential seemings 
by providing counterbalancing evidence. On the other hand, with higher-order evidence, 
one obtains evidence about one’s own evidence via disagreement which suggests that 
one’s first-order evidential assessment was sub-par. The difference between these two 
justifications for conciliating in a case of peer disagreement roughly tracks the distinction 
between “undercutting” and “rebutting” defeaters. As Thomas Kelly says: 
Following Pollock (1986), we can distinguish 
between undercutting and rebutting defeaters. Intuitively, where E is evidence 
for H, an undercutting defeater is evidence which undermines the evidential 
connection between E and H.… In contrast, a rebutting defeater is evidence which 
prevents E from justifying belief in H by supporting not-H in a more direct 
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way.… It is something of an open question how deeply the distinction between 
‘undermining’ and ‘rebutting’ defeaters cuts.1 
 
Alternatively, it may be better to think of Christensen’s argument for epistemic 
symmetry between peers not as a matter of gaining a rebutting defeater, but rather as a 
simple case of gaining new first-order evidence which renders one’s total evidence set 
inconclusive. Christensen describes the difference between first-order and higher-order 
evidence as follows: 
Any new evidence… that rationalizes a change of belief state… is, in a trivial 
way, evidence against one’s previous belief state.… But while this sort of 
evidence does indicate that my previous beliefs are, in a certain sense, suboptimal, 
it does not indicate that I’ve been anything less than a perfectly rational believer. 
The evidence that there’s something suboptimal about my pre-change beliefs is 
merely a byproduct of the evidence bearing directly on the subject matter of the 
beliefs. Sometimes, however, evidence rationalizes a change of belief precisely 
because it indicates that my former beliefs were rationally sub-par. This is 
evidence of my own rational failure.… in this case, the indication that my former 
beliefs are suboptimal is no mere byproduct of my reasoning…2 
 
The focus of this chapter is on the evidential effect of disagreement considered as higher-
order evidence, which provides, as Christensen says, “evidence of my own rational 
failure.” 
One of the most prominent commentators about the role of higher-order evidence 
in peer disagreement is Richard Feldman. He describes the views of a peer as providing 
“evidence that there is evidence for p,” which in a case of disagreement can sometimes 
defeat my own first-order evidence about p. Discussing private evidence, Feldman says: 
Each may have his or her own special insight or sense of obviousness. But each 
knows about the other’s insight. Each knows that this insight has evidential force. 
And now I see no basis for either of them justifying his own belief simply because 
 
1 Thomas Kelly, “Evidence,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2014, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evidence/, Section 1. Kelly is here citing John Pollock, Contemporary 
Theories of Knowledge, 1st ed. (Towota, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1986). 




the one insight happens to occur inside of him. A point about evidence that plays 
a role here is this: evidence of evidence is evidence. More carefully, evidence that 
there is evidence for P is evidence for P. Knowing that the other has an insight 
provides each of them with evidence.3 
 
This section will explore the claim that “evidence of evidence is evidence,” which we 
earlier labeled the Meta-Evidence Principle (MEP). In two later papers, Feldman clarifies 
his intent in advancing this principle and responds to some objections.4 The idea, he says, 
is not that one peer acquires the other’s experiential evidence--“When you tell me that 
you have a headache, I don’t thereby get your headache,” he says.5 Rather, it is that your 
believing that p gives me reason to believe that there is some reason for p, which in turn 
gives me reason for p. 
 The function of MEP in the context of peer disagreement is to explain why one is 
not justified in maintaining one’s prior belief after discovering the disagreement. The 
idea is that encountering a disagreeing peer gives one higher-order evidence that there is 
first-order evidence against one’s view that one has either missed, misinterpreted, or 
weighed incorrectly. Further, this holds even if one does not know what the peer’s first-
order evidence is. It is enough that a peer disagrees to undercut one’s first-order evidence 
assessment. Or so Feldman claims. But is MEP defensible? 
 Several other commentators in the disagreement debate have had some (mostly 
negative) things to say about this principle. Much of this discussion centers on the 
relationship between evidence and justification. Plausibly, evidence typically produces 
 
3 Richard Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on 
Atheism and the Secular Life, ed. Louise Antony (Oxford University Press, 2007), 208. 
4 Richard Feldman, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement,” Episteme 6, no. 3 (2009): 
308-310; Richard Feldman, “Evidence of Evidence Is Evidence,” in The Ethics of Belief, ed. Jonathan 
Matheson and Rico Vitz (Oxford University Press, 2014), 284–300. 
5 Feldman, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement,” 309. 
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justification for believing a proposition. If one is an evidentialist, like Feldman, then in 
fact evidence is the only thing that can produce justification. So on first glance, the 
principle seems to imply that evidence that someone else has evidence for p gives one 
justification for the belief that p. But several commentators have wondered about this 
implication. 
For example, Earl Conee notes that the principle does not entail justification 
because justification is a “summary evaluation” of a belief.6 Meta-evidence could easily 
be defeated by other considerations. For example, if I learn that you, normally my 
epistemic peer about such things, believe that it will snow today (despite having been 
quite warm yesterday), then by the principle, I thereby gain some evidence that it will 
snow today. However, say I also find out that the weather app you’ve been using has a 
known malfunction that results in false predictions of snow. Then the evidence I gained 
from your evidence is canceled out, and so I am not justified in believing that it will 
snow. 
Nonetheless, both Conee and Feldman suggest that evidence of evidence provides 
some defeasible evidence for a person--even if that evidence is always defeated. Conee 
considers a case where someone has some evidence that there is evidence for some 
proposition, but that person also knows that her belief in the proposition is a guess, with 
no better than a 50/50 chance of being true. This knowledge that it is a guess plausibly 
 
6 Earl Conee, “Rational Disagreement Defended,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted A 
Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 76-78, and Appendix 1, 84-89. Conee is specifically discussing 
the principle: 
EE: Evidence for Evidence. If S has evidence for the proposition that evidence exists in support of 
X, then S has evidence for X. (76) 
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defeats the meta-evidence, but it--the meta-evidence--nonetheless counts as evidence.7 
Similarly, Conee considers another case in which one gains evidence that someone else 
has evidence for a proposition, in the context of being told about a hoax being perpetrated 
on that person. So Smith tells you that he made it seem to Jones as though Black was in 
the room today, when in fact Black was not. By the Meta-Evidence Principle, you now 
have evidence that Black was in the room--Jones’s evidence--but that evidence is 
immediately defeated by the fact that the source of your evidence--Smith’s testimony--is 
also defeating evidence for the proposition that Black was in the room. Feldman has a 
similar case: you read a retraction in the newspaper of a story from yesterday that you 
had not read. You now, says Feldman, get simultaneous evidence for and against what 
was reported yesterday, because the retraction gives you meta-evidence (and therefore 
evidence) for the content of yesterday’s report. But the retraction also gives you defeating 
evidence. As he says, “if you were asked whether you had any evidence at all in support 
of P, it is clear that the answer is ‘Yes’--you have evidence about yesterday’s newspaper 
report. To ignore this would be wrong.”8 In other words, “defeated evidence is 
evidence.”9 
Another commentator, Alvin Goldman, interprets Feldman’s principle to mean 
that if one person “truthfully reports evidence Q concerning P, this evidence is also 
acquired by the hearer.”10 Now, this is not what Feldman means--and Goldman admits 
 
7 Ibid., 78. 
8 Feldman, “Evidence of Evidence Is Evidence,” 297. 
9 Ibid., 298. 
10 Alvin Goldman, “Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard 
Feldman and Ted Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 211. 
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that it isn’t--but nonetheless Goldman makes a point that is relevant to Feldman’s 
intended usage: 
Hearing such testimony may give the hearer default justification for believing Q, 
but such default justification can be defeated by other information in the hearer’s 
possession. In that case, Q does not qualify as an item of evidence for the 
hearer.”11 
 
Goldman seems to imply here that evidence that is defeated--i.e., evidence that cannot 
justify a belief--is not really evidence.12 
 A related objection to the Meta-Evidence Principle comes from Hud Hudson: 
Suppose that at some APA conference we’re having our yearly beer together and I 
say, “Hey Rich, something kind of cool...it’s my birthday today!” And I do it in 
that winning and trustworthy way you’ve come to trust over the years. But I’m 
lying and I know I’m lying. I now have evidence for the proposition that evidence 
exists in support of the claim that it’s my birthday today, but I don’t have 
evidence (not even a little bit) for the claim that it’s my birthday today.13 
 
Hudson’s point here is that if MEP is correct, then Hudson would have evidence that it’s 
his own birthday, when he knows that it isn’t, which seems absurd. 
 
11 Ibid. Italics added. 
12 Other critiques of Feldman’s principle include: John Biro and Fabio Lampert, “What Is Evidence of 
Evidence Evidence Of?,” Logos & Episteme 8, no. 2 (2017): 195–206, John Biro and Fabio Lampert, 
“‘Peer Disagreement’ and Evidence of Evidence,” Logos & Episteme 9, no. 4 (2018): 379–402; Juan 
Comesaña and Eyal Tal, “Evidence of Evidence Is Evidence (Trivially),” Analysis 75, no. 4 (2015): 557–
59; Juan Comesaña and Eyal Tal, “Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?,” Nous 51, no. 4 (2017): 95–112; 
Jason Decker, “Disagreement, Evidence, and Agnosticism,” Synthese 187, no. 2 (2012): 771; Anna-Maria 
A. Eder and Peter Brössel, “Evidence of Evidence as Higher Order Evidence,” in Higher-Order Evidence: 
New Essays, ed. Mattias Skipper and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (Oxford University Press, n.d.); Branden 
Fitelson, “Evidence of Evidence Is Not (Necessarily) Evidence,” Analysis 72, no. 1 (2012): 85–88; Andrew 
Reisner, “Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against,” in 
Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals, ed. Pedro Schmechtig and Martin Grajner (De Gruyter, 2016), 95–
114; William Roche, “Evidence of Evidence Is Evidence Under Screening-Off,” Episteme 11, no. 1 (2014): 
119–24; William Roche, “Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence? Screening-Off Vs. No-Defeaters,” Episteme 
15, no. 4 (2018): 451–62. For further discussion, see my “Disagreement and Meta-Evidence,” in 
preparation. 
13 Feldman, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement,” 309. To be more precise, Feldman 
would have to indicate to Hudson in some way that he believes it is Hudson’s birthday in order for Hudson 
to gain the evidence. 
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It seems to me that the way to respond to this objection is as follows: MEP is not 
a norm governing one’s abilities to create evidence by lying. It is a principle about what 
the opinions of others give one reason to believe. This is due to the obvious fact (at least 
it seems obvious to me), which Hudson is here exploiting, that my own claims cannot 
create evidence for me for the content of those claims.14 
 But this is not how Feldman responds to Hudson’s objection, and indeed it seems 
that he cannot. For if he were to acknowledge that the evidence possessed by one person 
may not be evidence for another, then the principle would fail to do the work he initially 
set for it, which is to show that evidence that a peer has evidence for p is evidence for me 
that has defeating power for my own first-order evidence about p. Goldman makes a 
similar point: 
… even if [a report of there being some evidence is not defeated]…, the hearer 
does not necessarily acquire the same evidence possessed by Smith. Smith's 
saying that he had a certain visual experience, for example, does not reproduce in 
the hearer the same visual experience, with its full evidential load. So the hearer 
does not acquire the same evidence for P as Smith has.15 
 
Clearly if evidence for one person cannot be assumed to be evidence for another person, 
then it does not follow that Feldman’s evidence that it is Hudson’s birthday is also 
evidence for Hudson that it is his birthday. 
Instead of making this (I think) sensible reply, Feldman replies by biting the 
bullet: “I think that in his example Hud does get some evidence for the proposition that it 
is his birthday today. But this is not problematic.”16 It isn’t problematic, supposedly, 
because the evidence that Hudson receives through his lie is minimal and is easily 
 
14 This is barring various unlikely scenarios involving amnesia and the like. 
15 Goldman, “Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement,” 211. 
16 Feldman, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement,” 309. 
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swamped by the other evidence that he has that it is not his birthday. Feldman reminds 
the reader, rightly, that to have some evidence for p is not to be justified in believing p, 
since justification has to do with the balance of one’s total evidence. So, since Hudson 
does not obtain justification through his lie, there is no problem. 
This seems to me to miss the force of the objection. The objection is not that 
Hudson obtains a justified belief that it is his birthday by lying about it being his birthday, 
but rather that he obtains evidence for the proposition that it is his birthday by lying about 
it being his birthday.17 Shifting attention away from this odd result and toward an even 
stranger result (justification) does not remove the original oddity. Surely evidence cannot 
be manufactured so easily. If it can, then all I need to do to obtain evidence for some 
view is to make a convincing show of evidence to someone else. But evidence, 
intuitively, has to do with having a reason to believe that something is true. As Kelly 
says: 
… the concept of evidence is closely related to other fundamental normative 
concepts such as the concept of a reason. Indeed, it is natural to think that ‘reason 
to believe’ and ‘evidence’ are more or less synonymous, being distinguished 
chiefly by the fact that the former functions grammatically as a count noun while 
the latter functions as a mass term.18 
 
And surely the person who lies to another doesn’t thereby gain a reason to believe 
anything about the content of the lie. If, after Feldman forms the justified belief that it is 
Hudson’s birthday, we ask Hudson, “Do you have any more reason to believe that it is 
your birthday than you did a moment ago?” the intuitive answer is no. But if evidence 
 
17 Of course, it is possible--even common--that people obtain evidence through lies. If a stranger tells me 
he’s from Detroit, I have evidence that he is, even if he’s in fact from Seattle. The point is that he does not 
thereby gain evidence that he’s from Detroit. The evidence he has for that proposition--which is 
presumably nil--remains exactly as it was before the lie. 
18 Thomas Kelly, “Evidence,” Section 1. 
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gives one a reason to believe something, then MEP entails that the answer is yes. I find 
this highly counterintuitive, even if such reasons are always defeated by other competing 
reasons. But as I say, Feldman cannot respond differently, for if he concedes that 
Hudson’s claim creates evidence, but not evidence for Hudson, then he must admit that 
evidence of evidence is not always evidence for just anyone. And this would undercut the 
usefulness of the principle for his position, which is to establish that in a case of peer 
disagreement with private evidence, a peer’s reported disagreement can defeat one’s own 
private seemings. 
 It is also important to be clear about what peer disagreement is actually evidence 
of. Consider Christensen’s mention of Feldman’s principle: 
Suppose I have good reason to believe that my friend’s evidence, though different 
from mine, is just as good (for example, suppose my friend and I have done 
similar polls of distinct but comparable sample populations and have reached 
conflicting conclusions). Here, the reasons for our disagreement need not be 
cognitive--it could just be that one of the samples was not representative. But 
absent some special reason for treating her evidence or reasoning differently from 
mine, it seems clear that in evaluating explanations for our disagreement, I should 
regard our opinions as equally likely to be accurate, and thus I should alter my 
opinion toward hers.19 
 
Assuming that one has not seen the peer’s evidence directly, why should it follow that the 
peer’s opinion is “equally likely to be accurate”?20 To see the point a bit more clearly, 
consider another case. Returning to the courtroom scenario discussed above, imagine that 
you are a defense attorney. Your client has claimed his innocence, and given the evidence 
 
19 David Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” Philosophical Review 116, no. 2 
(2007): 211-212. He adds in a footnote here that “This is an example instance of Feldman’s principle that 
‘evidence of evidence is evidence.’” 
20 I take it that this is what Christensen intends. If one had seen the evidence directly, and found it to be 
“just as good” as one’s own, then the uncontroversially correct response would be to suspend judgment, but 




you’ve seen, you’re inclined to believe him. However, the prosecution is not behaving as 
if the defendant is innocent. In fact, it is behaving in a way that suggests it believes 
something you do not. You infer this because you know how you would behave as a 
prosecutor, given the evidence you have, and the prosecution is going well beyond that. 
So here you have some evidence in the form of the prosecution’s behavior. But what 
exactly is this evidence of? The proposition in question here--the proposition in dispute 
between you and the prosecution--is: “The defendant is guilty.” Call that p. You deny p, 
while the prosecution affirms it (or at any rate, they’re tasked with defending it, whether 
or not they actually believe it). You each have evidence relevant to p, some shared and 
some, presumably, not (such as your own interviews with your client). Does the 
prosecution’s behavior give you any evidence for or against p itself? As things stand, 
without knowing more about the prosecution’s evidence, I think that it does not. It gives 
you, rather, evidence for another proposition: “The prosecution has information I lack.” 
Call this q. Note that even your evidence for q is weak, because many other things 
besides extra information could explain the behavior, and some alternative explanations 
are plausible. For example, the prosecution could be posturing, behaving this way to get 
you to think they have more information so that you’ll be more likely to make a plea deal. 
Owing to these alternative explanations, q does not entail that p is either more or less 
likely than you took it to be before observing the prosecution’s behavior. For all you 
know, the prosecution has indeed obtained damning evidence against your client. On the 
other hand, they may just as easily be working with evidence that would be compelling if 
not for a strong defeater that you possess and they lack. Or they could be posturing. 
Whether q turns out to be evidence for p cannot be predicted before you know the content 
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of the prosecution’s information. So it seems that here evidence that there is evidence for 
p (for someone else) turns out not to be evidence for p (for you). In this case, evidence of 
evidence is evidence, but not necessarily evidence of the disputed proposition, and not 
necessarily for both parties to the dispute. 
 But there is, it seems to me, something right about MEP. I think what this is 
comes through in a comment van Inwagen makes about David Lewis: 
Consider… the body of public evidence that I can appeal to in support of 
incompatibilism (arguments and other philosophical considerations that can be 
expressed in sentences or diagrams on a blackboard or other objects of 
intersubjective awareness). David Lewis “had” the same evidence (he had seen 
and he remembered and understood these objects) and was, nevertheless, a 
compatibilist. If I know, as I do, that David had these features (and this feature, 
too: he was a brilliant philosopher), that he had these features is itself evidence 
that is (or so it would seem to me) relevant to the truth of incompatibilism.21 
 
Notice that what is relevant to what van Inwagen should believe about p (in this case, 
incompatibilism) is that Lewis had these features--namely, he had seen, remembered, and 
understood the evidence, and was brilliant.22 And those features are themselves evidence 
pertinent to p. If none of these obtained, the question of the evidential value of Lewis’s 
opinions would be moot. So Feldman’s principle is right in one sense: insofar as one is 
dealing with a perspective that is constituted by certain features of epistemic excellence, 
 
21 Peter van Inwagen, “We’re Right. They’re Wrong,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted 
Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 26. 
22 One may note here that it is also relevant that Lewis testified to the contrary to van Inwagen; otherwise, 
van Inwagen would not have obtained any additional evidence pertinent to p. This is of course true. But I 
want to point out van Inwagen’s emphasis here on Lewis’s cognitive virtues as constitutive of the newly-
acquired evidence relevant to p. Van Inwagen takes Lewis’s testimony to be evidence which can actually 
challenge his own evidence because he is his peer, not merely because it is contrary testimony. The 
relationship between the evidential relevance of disagreement and the actual reporting of contrary 
testimony will be examined in the next two sections. 
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then the views of a person with that perspective may count as evidence for a disputed 
proposition which challenges one’s own evidential seemings.23 
Kelly makes a similar point when he says: 
Let us set aside, for the moment, the special case of disagreement among peers, 
and reflect on a much more general question: in what circumstances does it make 
sense for me to treat the fact that someone else believes as she does as evidence 
for the truth of that which she believes? A true (although perhaps not especially 
informative) answer: exactly when I take her belief to be a reliable indication of 
how things stand in the relevant part of reality. Thus, suppose that I know, on the 
basis of extensive past experience, that, when my weather forecaster judges that it 
will rain the next day, it tends to rain 80 percent of the time. In that case, I will 
treat her judgments to the effect that it will rain as evidence that it will rain, 
inasmuch as I take there to be a positive correlation between the two. Notice that, 
in this respect, there is absolutely nothing special about the way in which the 
judgments of another person come to count as evidence.24 
 
This implies that it is the reliability of a person that makes her opinion evidentially 
valuable, which in turn depends on the person’s reasoning habits. This is not to say that 
testimony from someone with poor reasoning habits has no evidential weight--such 
people can still effectively transmit information, and perhaps even knowledge.25 It is just 
to say that I am not likely to consider the testimony of another person capable of 
undercutting my own evidential assessment unless I take her to be an especially careful 
 
23 Note the implications here for Hudson’s counterexample to MEP: if Feldman takes Hudson to have these 
features of epistemic excellence, then Hudson’s testimony that it is his birthday does give Feldman 
evidence that it is Hudson’s birthday. However, it does not give Hudson any evidence that it is his own 
birthday, because he knows himself to be lying, and therefore to be contravening the conditions for his own 
epistemic excellence, one of which is accurately representing the available evidence. 
24 Thomas Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman 
and Ted Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 132. Note that Kelly seems to imply here a reductionist 
view of testimony, since the forecaster’s report acquires evidential weight only via an observed correlation 
between the report and the world. Notice also his emphasis on “taking there to be a positive correlation” 
between a peer’s judgment and some “part of reality.” It is this, he says, that grounds the evidential value of 
the judgment. It follows that judgments of epistemic excellence--and consequently, judgments that one is a 
peer--are based on observations of this sort of correlation. This strikes me as a Humean point about the 
empirical basis of judgments regarding the beliefs and reasoning habits of others. How to understand such 
judgments along Humean (and Kantian) lines will be the theme of Chapters Eight and Nine. 
25 See the discussion of testimony in the next section. 
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reasoner. In other words, I must take her testimony regarding p to be trustworthy if it is to 
be capable of defeating or compelling me to alter my first-order belief. So we can modify 
Feldman’s principle to yield a more plausible version as follows: 
MEP*: For peers S1 and S2, evidence of S2’s trustworthy judgment that p is 
evidence for S1 that p. 
 
This takes into account the perspectival nature of evidence (that it’s for S1, though not for 
S2); it specifies the object of the evidence (the proposition p); and it emphasizes that 
evidence rooted in a trustworthy judgment, which implies various features of epistemic 
excellence, is evidence that is pertinent to p for S1.26 It thus avoids the objections to 
Feldman’s original principle that we’ve mentioned. 
As stated, MEP* leaves open the question of whether the reported judgment of 
another that is not marked by such features may count as evidence for S1 that p. In fact, it 
is pretty clear that it can: most of us would accept directions in an unfamiliar city from a 
perfect stranger, and accept that we thereby obtain evidence for propositions about where 
things are located. But the focus of this section has been on when the disagreement of 
another provides evidence which can defeat (undercut) one’s first-order evidential 
seemings. MEP* allows for that to happen via higher-order evidence obtained through 
disagreement, and it specifies what is required for that meta-evidence to be capable of 
defeating one’s own prior evidence: namely, a contrary judgment from someone one 
takes to be trustworthy in the relevant domain. 
 
6.2 - Disagreement and Testimony 
 
 
26 A list of such features will be provided in Chapter Seven when I discuss competing notions of peerhood. 
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It is worth noting a connection here between peer disagreement and testimony. 
The epistemological problem of peer disagreement may be thought of as a special version 
of the problem of testimony--i.e., the problem of whether the reports of others can be a 
basic source of knowledge or justified belief.27 This is because the evidence that one has 
in a case of peer disagreement is testimonial evidence: the report of a peer about the truth 
of some proposition. Thus, one is weighing testimonial evidence against the evidence of 
one’s own seemings (including one’s reasoning, perceptions, memory, etc.). Thinking of 
the problem in this way does not necessarily get us closer to a solution, since the issue of 
testimonial justification itself is still controversial. But there is at least widespread 
agreement that testimony is a source of evidence (the debate is mostly about whether it is 
a fundamental or autonomous source of evidence), so if peer disagreement is merely a 
problem of weighing testimony, then the subject of this chapter can be clarified: insofar 
as testimonial reports provide potentially defeating evidence, so do the disagreements of 
a peer. 
Note, however, that in idealized cases of peer disagreement (especially those that 
give rise to the Parity Problem), we are assuming that the peers have done their best to 
share their evidence. The means of sharing is testimonial, but once shared, it is thought 
that the evidence can become one’s own, so to speak. If you write your argument down 
for me, and I read it, whatever inferential justification went into your testimonial report is 
now part of my own inferential evidence base (barring, of course, private evidence). As 
Kelly says, “In cases of peer disagreement, one gets to go underneath the hood, as it 
 
27 For a nice overview of the epistemological issues surrounding testimony, see Jonathan Adler, 




were.”28 So while the epistemic problem of belief adjustment arises because of testimony, 
whether or not there is additional reason to adjust one’s belief beyond the content of the 
shared evidence depends on the nature of the peer’s reasoning habits, and not merely on 
the instance of testimony that gave rise to the disagreement. 
In other words, recognizing peer disagreement as a problem about testimony 
leaves open the question of when the testimony of others should provide defeating 
(undercutting or rebutting) evidence for or against some proposition. I suggested in the 
last section that in order to defeat one’s first-order evidence for p, such testimony needs 
to be rooted in a trustworthy judgment, which is to say that I take your reasoning to be 
marked by certain features of epistemic excellence, features which I take into account. 
 One way of understanding how this works, which I want to raise here as a 
suggestion, without pursuing it in depth, is to think of the disagreement problem in the 
context of a virtue ethical theory of testimony.29 Such a theory has been proposed by Paul 
Faulkner, who discusses the epistemic role of the virtue of trust, utilizing Miranda 
Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice.30 He considers his own version of a “problem of 
disagreement,” which arises from the possibility of conflicting sets of ethical concepts, 
which make it impossible, he argues, to give a purely epistemological account of the 
virtue of trust. This is because it is not reasonable, for various reasons, to presume that a 
speaker is trustworthy in the absence of a relationship that makes ethical demands.31 His 
 
28 Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” 154. 
29 See my and Brett Yardley’s “Epistemic Trust, Testimonial Evidence, and Autonomy,” in preparation. 
30 Paul Faulkner, “A Virtue Theory of Testimony,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society CXIV, no. 2 
(2014): 189-211. See also Miranda Fricker, “Group Testimony? The Making of A Collective Good 
Informant,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXXIV, no. 2 (2012): 249-76. 
31 Paul Faulkner, “A Virtue Theory of Testimony,” 194-195, 202-207. 
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solution to this problem involves an explanation of the way that trust as an ethical virtue 
creates the epistemic tools needed to justify trusting the testimony of others. 
 Faulkner notes that testimony does not occur in a vacuum--the partners in a 
conversation always have some interest in the outcome of the conversation, and thus 
“there are a multitude of potential explanations of any given bit of testimony, where each 
explanation starts from the interest the speaker has in the conversation.”32 Note that while 
“an audience’s basic reason for entering into a testimonial exchange is to find things out,” 
it is not necessarily the case that a speaker’s interest is to help the audience accomplish 
this goal.33 As Faulkner says: 
… from the multitude of potential explanations of any given bit of testimony, 
there is no reason to single out ‘satisfying the audience’s epistemic interest’ as the 
default explanation. And this is to say that a presumption of trustworthiness 
cannot be established as the epistemic default, because testimony does not have 
the proper function of servicing an audience’s epistemic interests.34 
 
It follows from this that 
… what an audience needs, in every case, in order to epistemically rationalize 
testimonial uptake is some judgement that this explanation applies, that the 
speaker’s purpose in communicating is indeed informative, and that the speaker is 
thereby trustworthy. More generally, what is thereby needed is some particular 
reason for thinking that a given bit of testimony is true.35 
 
Now, we must be careful here in interpreting Faulkner’s claim that “a 
presumption of trustworthiness cannot be established as the epistemic default.” It is 
plausible, and widely acknowledged, that under the usual conditions in which one 
receives and depends on testimony, one is reasonable to assume a norm of truthfulness. 
 
32 Ibid., 202. 





For example, Jonathan Adler describes a class of “core cases” of testimonial transmission 
which meet certain conditions, including that the purpose of the speaker is primarily to 
inform. Regarding the core cases, he observes: 
These are ordinary contexts where the norm of truthfulness holds, the purpose is 
primarily to inform, the hearer’s information about the speaker is minimal and 
there is little or no motivation to deceive e.g., the time, the weather, driving 
directions, the location of notable places, prominent historical facts, sports scores, 
the whereabouts of acquaintances, explaining why you are going to the shopping 
mall. In these core cases, hearers generally have no special reason to doubt the 
speaker’s word, as they would if the speaker’s assertion is controversial or self-
serving.36 
 
Further, some epistemologists have offered arguments for the a priori justification 
of such a norm of truthfulness. For example, Tyler Burge says: 
We are a priori entitled to accept something that is prima facie intelligible and 
presented as true.… Intelligible affirmation is the face of reason; reason is a guide 
to truth. We are a priori prima facie entitled to take intelligible affirmation at face 
value.37 
 
Burge here represents a version of the anti-reductionist view of testimony, according to 
which testimony is an autonomous source of epistemic authority, not reducible to other 
sources such as perception and memory, even if it depends on them causally. On the 
other hand, reductionists hold that testimony derives its epistemic authority from these 
other sources. For example, Elizabeth Fricker says that the assumption of a norm of 
truthfulness is “an epistemic charter for the gullible and undiscriminating,” and that “a 
hearer should always engage in some assessment of the speaker for trustworthiness. To 
 
36 Adler, “Epistemological Problems of Testimony,” Section 1. 
37 Tyler Burge, “Content Preservation,” The Philosophical Review 102 (1993): 472–3. Quoted in Adler, 
“Epistemological Problems of Testimony,” Section 1. 
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believe what is asserted without doing so is to believe blindly, uncritically. This is 
gullibility.”38 
 Faulkner defends a theory that is midway between these views, though it is more 
accurately described as anti-reductionist than reductionist. His is a version of the 
Assurance View of Testimony, which holds that “The hearer’s entitlement to belief [on the 
basis of testimony] resides in the speaker’s standing behind his word, giving his 
assurance.”39 Proponents of the Assurance View are suspicious of interpreting the 
epistemic significance of testimony in an evidential sense, because the epistemic import 
of evidence is independent of the presenter of the evidence, which is not typically the 
case in testimonial exchanges. Compare the difference between being told and 
overhearing: the one who is told has a claim against the speaker if the testimony turns out 
to be false, whereas the overhearer has no such claim because she is not entitled to expect 
an intention to inform from what is, to her, mere third-person evidence for the truth of 
what is said. As Adler says, “The overhearer has no… social-ethical duty to the speaker, 
and the speaker feels no ethical obligation of veracity toward the overhearer. Yet the 
overhearer has, it would seem, the same evidence as the hearer.”40 
On Faulkner’s version of the Assurance View, a hearer is not entitled to assume 
without reason that a speaker’s intention in the testimonial exchange is to inform. 
 
38 Elizabeth Fricker, “Against Gullibility,” in Knowing from Words, ed. B.K. Matilal and A. Chakrabarti 
(Boston: Kluwer, 1994), 126, 145. Quoted in Adler, “Epistemological Problems of Testimony,” Section 
6.2. Adler qualifies Fricker’s position as follows: “… if the critical monitoring [of the speaker by the 
hearer] required is only the ‘counterfactual sensitivity’ that ‘if there were any signs of untrustworthiness, 
she would pick them up’… so that no special efforts are required of hearers, [Fricker’s] differences with 
those who uphold… a minimal anti-reductionist thesis seems to vanish.” Ibid. 
39 Adler, “Epistemological Problems of Testimony,” Section 7.3. 
40 Ibid. Compare the utterance of an AI like Amazon’s Alexa: I have no claim against a speaker here 
because there is no speaker; nonetheless, the utterance contains the same evidence as a syntactically 
equivalent utterance overheard between people. 
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Nonetheless, this view is anti-reductionist in the sense that one may be justified in relying 
on the speaker’s testimony without further investigating it for oneself, insofar as the 
speaker presented the testimony to the hearer as true. The hearer is trusting the speaker, 
and this is sufficient for forming a justified belief via testimony. On the other hand, 
confirming the content of a speaker’s testimony with some other faculty, like perception, 
implies that the speaker’s word is insufficient on its own to justify belief.41 Assurance 
views treat testimony as an autonomous source of knowledge. They also hold, however, 
that trust in the truthfulness of a speaker is required for the justification of one’s 
testimony-based beliefs. But this does not entail that one’s testimonial beliefs are 
typically unjustified, because one generally does have such a basis for trust in the sorts of 
core cases Adler notes. For example, if I get the time from someone on the street, I can 
trust that person’s testimony because there are implicit social norms governing trusting 
one another in such circumstances. I know that people don't normally lie about that, 
they’re not normally mistaken about that, they don’t normally have a rational reason to 
be deceptive about that, and so on. Such interactions are still ultimately trust-based, even 
though the relational connection between speaker and hearer is weak. This explains why I 
would feel like I had been wronged if a stranger asserted to me some directions which 
turned out to be misleading. 
So when Faulkner says that “a presumption of trustworthiness cannot be 
established as the epistemic default,” the keyword is epistemic. Treating testimony as 
evidence, disconnected from the assurance to the truth of the testimony by the speaker, 
does not yield a presumption of truthfulness. However, one may presume trustworthiness 
 
41 Note that this would also make any knowledge obtained largely non-testimonial. 
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as an ethical default, which in turn can yield an epistemic norm. The moral reason to 
believe a peer can become an epistemic reason because, as Faulkner says, “the 
presumption of trustworthiness in effect articulates a truth-based explanation of utterance: 
the speaker tells one that p because one visibly needs to know whether p.”42 He 
continues: 
… in the good case, there is an explanatory connection between one’s trusting and 
a speaker’s being trustworthy that runs via the existence of… social norms of 
trust. This connection ensures that it is no accident that the truth-based 
explanation of utterance holds, given one’s presumption that it does.43 
 
This way of thinking about the epistemic significance of testimony helps to clarify 
the problem with Feldman’s assumption, discussed in the previous section, that testimony 
that p is automatically always evidence for p. Feldman would likely reply that testimony 
always provides some (defeasible) evidence because of the presumption that it is intended 
to be informative, and that this evidence is outweighed when one finds out that it wasn't 
so intended. But it is, I think, both less epistemologically loaded and closer to real-world 
experience to say that testimony provides a reason to believe something--a reason which 
could play a defeating role for one’s prior beliefs--only if one is justified in thinking that 
the speaker’s interest is to “satisfy the audience's epistemic interest.” This is less 
epistemologically loaded in the sense that it does not presume that the proper function of 
testimony is to be informative, nor does it require an evidentialist interpretation of 
testimony’s epistemic significance. It is closer to real-world experience because we are 
all well-acquainted with the experience of discovering that being informative was in fact 
 




not a speaker’s intention in delivering some testimony, and feeling as though the speaker 
violated an obligation toward us as a result. 
 This view also implies a solution to Hudson’s case: I do not gain evidence by 
giving false testimony, because--even though the other person testifies with the intention 
to inform--that testimony relies on other testimony (mine) that lacks this intention, and I 
am in a position to know that. The whole testimonial chain must preserve the intention to 
inform. 
 When is it reasonable, then, to believe that a speaker intends to be informative, 
and so is trustworthy? Faulkner’s answer is that “trust, morally understood, is central to 
the epistemology of testimony in that it can be our ‘reason’ for testimonial uptake.”44 In 
other words, we need a virtue theory of testimony. The details of such a theory need not 
concern us here; I want merely to suggest that one plausible way of understanding when 
the testimony of a peer should count as evidence for oneself that could defeat one’s own 
evidential seemings is that this depends in part on whether it is morally appropriate to 
trust that peer. 
 
6.3 – The Problem of Possible Rational Disagreement 
 
In this section I consider the argument that possible peer disagreement presents a 
similar epistemic problem to actual peer disagreement, and that therefore real-life peer 
disagreements are unnecessary to give rise to the epistemological issues at play in the 
debate. 
 
44 Ibid., 204. 
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This issue is raised by Kelly and considered by Christensen, who responds to a 
thought experiment of Kelly’s.45 Kelly considers whether possible disagreement should 
be “intellectually threatening.” He thinks that the answer turns on how rational such 
disagreement would be. That in turn depends on how strong one takes the evidence and 
arguments for a possible contrary view to be. As he says, “the extent to which merely 
possible dissent should be seen as intellectually threatening effectively reduces to 
questions about the strength of the reasons that might be put forward on behalf of such 
dissent.”46 
Kelly offers a thought experiment involving Newcomb’s Problem to support his 
case.47 Imagine a student, call her S, who is considering Newcomb’s problem, weighing 
all of the arguments for both One-Boxing and Two-Boxing, and attempting to make up 
her mind about which strategy is best. Imagine two possible worlds that differ only with 
respect to opinions on this problem. In World A, opinion is divided evenly: about half the 
people who consider the matter are One-Boxers, and about half are Two-Boxers.48 In 
World B, as a matter of contingent fact, everyone is convinced by the arguments for One-
Boxing. Assume that the arguments and evidence pertinent to Newcomb’s problem are 
 
45 See Thomas Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 
Volume 1, ed. John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), Section 5, 
181-185; and Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” Section 5, 505-10. The issue 
is also present in Rosen’s discussion of the nominalist “Bedrockers” discussed above. 
46 Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” 181-2. 
47 This problem was made famous by Robert Nozick in his “Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of 
Choice,” in Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, ed. Nicholas Rescher (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1969), 114-146. The problem is as follows: A player must choose either one opaque box or two 
boxes--the same opaque one and a transparent one. The transparent box contains $1,000. The opaque box 
contains either $1,000,000 (if a predictor has predicted that the player will choose only that box), or 
nothing (if the predictor has predicted that the player will choose both boxes). 
48 This was, apparently, the state of things in the actual world according to Nozick’s first reporting. See 
Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” 19-23, esp. footnote 17. 
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identical in both worlds. Should S differ with respect to her view of the problem 
depending on which world she is in? Specifically, assuming S has considered all of the 
arguments and evidence pertinent to the problem, and is leaning toward One-Boxing, 
should she be less confident in this opinion in World A than she would be in World B? 
Kelly thinks not, since the arguments in the two worlds are identical, and since, even in 
World B, she should realize that she has epistemic peers who are Two-Boxers in World 
A. In other words, the existence of these possible peers who are convinced by the same 
arguments that S already possesses should count the same epistemically as the existence 
of actual peers who were convinced by those arguments.49 As Christensen says, “The 
lesson, if I understand Kelly correctly, is that it’s the arguments that determine what’s 
rational to believe about Newcomb’s problem, not contingent sociological facts about 
what other people think.”50 
Note that given what we said about Kelly in the last chapter, this interpretation is 
probably not quite fair: arguments are only as good as the evidence supporting them, and 
part of the evidence here is purportedly what other people think, which can matter. I take 
it this is why Kelly apparently accepts that multiple independent lines of evidence are 
weightier than a single independent line or multiple non-independent lines, even when 
the arguments in each are the same. So the views of others do seem to have evidential 
 
49 Kelly goes on to argue that the case of radical skepticism in epistemology is a real-life example of his 
point, since almost no philosopher professes skepticism, and yet almost all epistemologists have thought it 
a serious problem worth consideration. Kelly here approvingly quotes Laurence BonJour: “…the need to 
consider skepticism does not depend in any crucial way… on whether or not serious proponents of 
skepticism are actually to be found; if skeptics did not exist, one might reasonably say, the serious 
epistemologist would have to invent them.” See Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 14-15, quoted in Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of 
Disagreement,” 185. 
50 Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” 206. 
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weight for Kelly--he just does not think that this is a special kind of evidence that 
automatically has overriding power when the other people in question are peers. 
Nonetheless, Kelly does suggest with the Newcomb case that possible peers are 
epistemically equivalent to actual peers. This is important for Kelly because he wants to 
maintain that since the arguments in Worlds A and B are the same, if it is the case that S 
shouldn’t lose confidence in World B when no one disagrees with her, then she also 
shouldn’t lose confidence in World A, just because her peers there are actual. What really 
matters in both worlds is what the arguments support. 
Christensen responds by returning to his restaurant bill case, though modifying it 
slightly. Imagine that instead of one peer, there are seventeen superiors, all expert 
calculators, say, and they all independently arrive at the same answer that differs from 
mine. It would obviously be irrational for me to continue to insist on my answer in this 
case, and Christensen says this remains true “even if, in this particular case, [my] answer 
was actually the correct one.”51 So perhaps what the arguments support is not all that 
matters. He applies his conclusion to Kelly’s case, saying that if S: 
…reasonably sees herself as being among others who… are her epistemic peers, 
then the denizen of the divided World A should be less confident of the truth of 
One-Boxing than the denizen of World B, where all the other smart and 
knowledgeable people take the evidence and arguments to support One-Boxing. 
The One-Boxing denizen of World A has real evidence that she may have made 
some mistake in evaluating the arguments.52 
 
Note the phrase “real evidence” in the last sentence. Christensen is implying that the 
evidence provided by the consideration of merely possible peers is not real, or more 
charitably, that it is considerably less weighty than that provided by actual peers. 
 
51 Ibid., 207. 
52 Ibid., 209. 
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 For what it’s worth, I am not sure that Christensen is right about the bill 
calculation case with seventeen superiors. I grant that my own intuitions are that I should 
weaken my confidence in my belief. Nevertheless, there are some cases in which being 
the “lone ranger” is rational. Consider, for example, Plantinga’s case of the person on 
trial for a crime she knows she did not commit--surely here one should not revise her 
belief.53 Or consider Einstein’s claiming, before wide acceptance, that space is curved. 
Surely such a stance--even resilience about such a stance--can be rational. What is the 
difference between these cases and the restaurant bill case? 
It is tempting to think that the difference is making the seventeen people in the 
restaurant case expert calculators, so that we are no longer peers. One might argue that, 
were we all peers, then perhaps there being seventeen of them would not make it less 
likely that I am the one that is right, because it could be that adding peers is like flipping 
coins--their probabilities are not additive. But this is incorrect. After all, the testimonial 
reports of eyewitnesses presumably are additive: seventeen of them gives us better reason 
to believe what they report than one of them. And if what I argued against Kelly above is 
correct--if the views of a particularly excellent reasoner can provide evidence in addition 
to the views of that reasoner’s teacher, even when they agree and have the same 
evidence--then the reports of several such excellent peers would count for more than the 
report of only one. In that case, seventeen peers would have a similar effect on my 
evidence for p as seventeen superiors. So Christensen is probably correct that what the 
arguments support is not all that matters with respect to the justification of my own view: 
 
53 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 450-1. 
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it also matters what other excellent reasoners think the arguments support. This, too, is 
evidence.54 
 Where does this leave us with respect to the question of merely possible 
disagreement? Christensen has one more thing to say about this. As we saw above, he 
thinks that disagreement is a special version of the problem of possible error, and this is 
why it’s epistemically significant. But this implies, he thinks, that actual disagreement 
and possible disagreement are different in the same way that actual error and possible 
error are different: 
Actual disagreement with peers is informative because it provides evidence that a 
certain possibility--the possibility of our having made an epistemic error--has 
been actualized. It makes what we already know possible more probable. Could 
we get this same sort of evidence simply 
by asking ourselves whether merely possible peers might disagree with us 
rationally? It seems not--for in those cases where we have made a mistake in 
assessing the evidence about P, we are overwhelmingly likely to make the same 
mistake in assessing how a rational peer would assess the same evidence about 
the same proposition.55 
 
So the reason we could not get the same kind of evidence from possible disagreement 
that we get from actual disagreement is that when considering possible disagreement, we 
are likely to make the same mistakes in imagining possible disagreeing peers as we make 
in assessing the evidence for ourselves. In other words, our epistemic frailty extends as 
 
54 Christensen has another case: a doctor who finds out she’s been given a drug that causes 99 percent of 
the people who take it to make mistakes on tasks like dosage determination. The doctor, says Christensen, 
is morally obligated to have her dosage determinations checked in these circumstances, even if it turns out 
that she isn’t affected by the drug. But in this case one is not rational to insist on her view because to do so 
she must assume that she got lucky. So the new information about having been drugged serves as a defeater 
for her belief that she prescribed the correct dosage, because she has no defeater-defeaters, such as 
evidence that she is immune to that kind of drug. So this case is sufficiently unlike the cases of peer 
disagreement we’ve been considering as to be unhelpful. See Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: 
The Good News,” 207-208. 
55 Ibid., 208-209. Note here that in the case of possible disagreement as imagined, one need not assess how 
a rational peer would assess the evidence for p; one need only realize that a contrary assessment by a 
rational peer is possible. 
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much to our ability to conceive of the reasons of rational disagreeing peers as it does to 
our assessment of the evidence for p. 
 The problem here is that Christensen misses the force of the possible 
disagreement problem. For the defeater provided by disagreement to kick in, we do not 
need to accurately predict (or predict at all) how a possible peer might assess the 
evidence differently. We need only see that in fact a different assessment is possible. We 
can even build in the assumption, to avoid the sort of worry Christensen has, that 
whatever possible assessment a possible peer would have would be as coherent, detailed, 
fruitful, and so on as our own. The problem Christensen mentions is avoidable if care is 
taken about what views are really possible, consistent with the evidence. And of course, 
ideally, a plurality of people will help us to figure this out, but this is not necessary. It 
may be that the cogency of our ideas of what alternate views are possible is likely to vary 
with our experience of actual peer disagreement. This may not be the case, however, for a 
few excellent reasoners, but it’s sufficient to note that any alternative view consistent 
with the evidence raises the possible disagreement problem. One need not be a 
philosopher to think of an alternate, consistent conclusion drawn from most evidence 
sets, especially given the underdetermination of theory by evidence.56 
Christensen here cites Alston, who argues that possible competing epistemic 
practices “would pose as great a threat to our practice as would actual competing 
practices.”57 Alston takes the upshot of this to be that if we don’t think possible 
 
56 The underdetermination issue will be discussed in Chapter Eight. 
57 Ibid., 208, footnote 23. See William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious 
Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 266-278. In context, Alston is considering Aristotelian 
vs. Cartesian vs. Whiteheadian forms of possible epistemic practice. He says: 
Suppose that there were a diversity of sense perceptual doxastic practices as diverse as forms of 
[mystical practice] are in fact. Suppose that in certain cultures there were a well established 
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competing epistemic practices are worrisome, then we shouldn’t think actual competing 
epistemic practices are worrisome either. 
For what it’s worth, Alston seems right here: if it’s really possible to have 
fundamentally different “sense perceptual doxastic practices” (see note 46) that all give 
rise to similar practical results, then that should cause just as much concern as if those 
forms were actualized. We may not be able to foresee the details of how a rational peer 
would assess the same evidence about the same proposition from one of these 
fundamentally different perspectives (though we can surely try), but nonetheless the 
possibility that they might be able to do so rationally should give us just as much pause as 
if we actually encountered such a person. This is because, in both cases, “we have no 
reason to suppose [our perspective] to be more reliable than these other possibilities.”58 
But Alston thinks that in both cases, we need not be worried about this situation. The 
reason he gives is telling: 
Yet it is difficult to work ourselves up into worrying about these possibilities, and 
even difficult to convince ourselves that it is our intellectual duty to do so. Insofar 
as this has a respectable basis, it is that it is not really clear that the alleged 
possibilities are indeed possible. At least they may not be real possibilities for us, 
 
“Cartesian” practice of seeing what is visually perceived as an indefinitely extended medium that 
is more or less concentrated at various points, rather than, as in our “Aristotelian” practice, as 
made up of more or less discrete objects scattered about in space. In other cultures we find a 
“Whiteheadian” SP to be equally socially established; here the visual field is seen as made up of 
momentary events growing out of each other in a continuous process. Let's further suppose that 
each of these practices serves its practitioners equally well in their dealings with the environment. 
We may even suppose that each group has developed physical science, in its own terms, to about 
as high a pitch as the others. But suppose further that, in this imagined situation, we are as firmly 
wedded to our “Aristotelian” form of [sense perception] as we are in fact. The Cartesian and 
Whiteheadian ausländer seem utterly outlandish to us, and we find it difficult to take seriously the 
idea that they may be telling it like it is. Nevertheless, we can find no neutral grounds on which to 
argue effectively for the greater accuracy of our way of doing it. In such a situation would it be 
clear that it is irrational or us to continue to form perceptual beliefs in our “Aristotelian” way, 
given that the practice is proving itself by its fruits? It seems to me that quite the opposite is clear. 
In the absence of any external reason for supposing that one of the competing practices is more 
accurate than my own, the only rational course for me is to sit tight with the practice of which I am 
a master and which serves me so well in guiding my activity in the world. (273-274) 
58 Alston, Perceiving God, 274. 
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given our actual constitution and the lawful structure of the world. It may be that 
we are innately programmed to perceive the environment in Aristotelian terms, 
and that this program does not allow for social reprogramming into a “Cartesian” 
or a “Whiteheadian” mode. Nevertheless, it seems clear to me that if these 
alternatives really are possible, then they give rise to difficulties for the rationality 
of engaging in SP that are quite parallel to those arising from the actual diversity 
of religions for the rationality of engaging in CP. And so, in that case, if it is 
rational to engage in SP despite these difficulties, the same conclusion follows for 
CP.59 
 
Alston’s point is that it’s not clear that these alternate viewpoints really are 
possible, and it’s hard to care about something that you’re not sure is possible. This gives 
us a way to respond to Kelly’s Newcomb argument more fully than Christensen does. 
Possible disagreements should not be treated the same as actual disagreements, but this is 
not because--contra Christensen--we’re likely to make mistakes in imagining them. 
Rather, it is because until the possibility is actualized in our experience, we don’t have 
good reason to think that the alternative viewpoints really are nomologically possible for 
us--possible, as Alston says, “given our actual constitution and the lawful structure of the 
world.” So S should be less sure of her One-Boxing in World A, where opinion is 
divided, than in World B, where everyone agrees with her, because in World A the 
possibility of an alternative consistent view is actualized, thereby confirming that it is a 
real possibility for people like S. 
 This response allows us to avoid an objection that Christensen apparently does not 
appreciate but that people like Wedgwood, with his “moral evil demon,” do:60 if 
disagreement itself provides defeating evidence (as Christensen maintains), and if 
possible disagreement is as evidential as actual disagreement (which Christensen denies, 
 
59 Ibid. Here “SP” is sense perceptual practice, and “CP” is Christian mystical practice. 
60 See Ralph Wedgwood, “Disagreement and the A Priori,” in The Nature of Normativity (Oxford 
University Press, 2007): 259. 
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but Kelly affirms), then a general skepticism ensues. This is because it is nearly always 
possible to think of an alternative, consistent belief for any issue, and for any actually 
controversial issue, it is possible to think of one that seems rational. It is fortunate, then, 
that we need not grant merely possible disagreement equal evidential weight as actual 
disagreement.61 
 So the problem of merely possible rational disagreement, since it cannot motivate 
genuine epistemic concern, need not detain us any further. It is best to keep the peer 
disagreement issue rooted firmly in everyday experiences of actual disagreement. Such 
experiences motivate interest in the abstract version of the problem, and the 
epistemological discussion of that problem has value only insofar as it helps us to frame 
and clarify our epistemic obligations when we disagree. 
 
61 Note what seems like an agreement between Christensen and Alston: Christensen admits that “an ideally 
rational intellect that knew for certain that it was ideally rational would have no reason to defer to the 
opinions of others who were equally informed, no matter how numerous.” Christensen, “Epistemology of 
Disagreement: The Good News,” 208. Of course, Christensen does not think this amounts to much because 
we are not in fact ideal intellects and so “we would be irrational simply to dismiss the possibility of error.”  
Ibid., 210. But we must also weigh this possibility against the other evidence that we have, and often it just 
will not be enough to tip the scales. In addition, Christensen’s admission regarding the ideal intellect 
suggests that if one could approximate ideally rational conditions, then one should to that extent trust the 
judgments formed under those conditions, irrespective of the views of others. Given what was said about 
the perceptual analogy in Chapter Three, it seems that we have such approximately ideal conditions when 
we have clear, vivid, and stable evidential seemings. 
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Chapter Seven – Peerhood, Conformism, and Nonconformism 
 
7.1 – Defining Peerhood 
 
 
This chapter has three aims: (1) to define more clearly the notion of peerhood, (2) 
to critique an alternative conception, and (3) to demonstrate that both Conformist and 
Nonconformist solutions to the problem of rational disagreement are incorrect. 
In Disagreement, Bryan Frances distinguishes three notions of peerhood: 
1. Equality on “Disagreement Factors” 
2. Equal likelihood to be correct 
3. The conditional likelihood that if you turn out to disagree with me, then you’re as 
likely to be correct as I am (i.e., we are “C-peers”).1 
Option 1 is the common sense notion of peerhood: two people are peers if they are 
equivalent with respect to the things that make one a good assessor of the evidence for 
the truth of some proposition. Call these things “Disagreement Factors” and the view of 
peerhood which depends on them the “Factor Definition of Peerhood” (FP). Frances 
provides a list of such factors: 
• cognitive ability had while answering the question 
• evidence brought to bear in answering the question 
• relevant background knowledge 
• time devoted to answering the question 
• distractions encountered in answering the question 
• relevant biases 
• attentiveness when answering the question 
• intellectual virtues possessed2 
 
 
1 Bryan Frances, Disagreement (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 188-190. 
2 Bryan Frances and Jonathan Matheson, “Disagreement,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/disagreement/, Section 4. 
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He does not specify the intellectual virtues required, but they would include things like 
conscientiousness, carefulness, creativity, thoroughness, fairness, honesty, etc. This is not 
intended to be an exhaustive list, and it should be apparent that one will rarely if ever be 
in a position to know with great precision how similar one is to someone else with respect 
to such factors. That is, the factors can provide only a rough approximation of the 
similarity between the epistemic positions of two or more people. But they do give one 
some idea of how seriously to take the views of others, especially in situations where one 
has had the time and the reason to measure oneself against someone else with respect to 
these factors. 
 Options 2 and 3 are advanced by Adam Elga, and have subsequently been 
influential in the disagreement debate. Option 3 is a development of option 2, so we can 
consider them together, as, in effect, a single view of peerhood. Call it the “Likelihood 
Definition of Peerhood” (LP). Elga begins by noting that taking someone to be an 
epistemic peer means thinking that that person is “as good as you at evaluating” the sort 
of claim you’re disagreeing about, adding the qualification that what matters “is that you 
count your friend as your epistemic peer,” not that your friend really is your epistemic 
peer.3 So far, a proponent of FP might very well agree: given the difficulty of knowing 
for sure when someone else is equivalent with respect to the various factors, what really 
matters for determining what to do in a case of disagreement is whether one takes another 
to be a peer in that sense. But then Elga elaborates: “In other words, you think that, 
conditional on a disagreement arising, the two of you are equally likely to be mistaken.”4 
 
3 Adam Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” Noûs 41, no. 3 (2007): 484, 499 (fn. 14). 
4 Ibid., 487. 
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This is a departure from FP. Recognizing that this will not be obvious to everyone, Elga 
then explains in a footnote: 
My use of the term “epistemic peer” is nonstandard. On my usage, you count your 
friend as an epistemic peer with respect to an about-to-be-judged claim if and 
only if you think that, conditional the two of you disagreeing about the claim, the 
two of you are equally likely to be mistaken. On more standard usages, an 
epistemic peer is defined to be an equal with respect to such factors as 
“intelligence, perspicacity, honesty, thoroughness, and other relevant epistemic 
virtues” (Gutting 1982, 83), “familiarity with the evidence and arguments which 
bear on [the relevant] question”, and “general epistemic virtues such as 
intelligence, thoughtfulness, and freedom from bias” (Kelly 2005). In defense of 
my use, suppose that you think that conditional on the two of you disagreeing 
about a claim, your friend is more likely than you to be mistaken. Then however 
intelligent, perspicacious, honest, thorough, well-informed, and unbiased you may 
think your friend is, it would seem odd to count her as an epistemic peer with 
respect to that claim, at least on that occasion. You think that on the supposition 
that there is disagreement, she is more likely to get things wrong.5 
 
So Elga thinks that “likelihood to be correct/mistaken” is the right concept to invoke, not 
various cognitive virtues, and therefore that LP is preferable to FP. 
 This, however, is a mistake. First, note that in a case like the one Elga describes, 
he apparently assumes that one must think either that one’s friend is more likely to be 
correct, equally likely to be correct/mistaken, or else more likely to be mistaken. But this 
is false. It is possible, and I suspect more common than not in real peer disagreement 
cases, that one simply has no view at all about who is more likely to be mistaken.6 What 
one does have are various past observations relevant to how good one’s friend is at 
 
5 Ibid., 499 (fn. 21). The works that Elga cites here are: Gary Gutting, Religious Belief and Religious 
Skepticism (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982); and Thomas Kelly, “The Epistemic 
Significance of Disagreement,” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1, ed. John Hawthorne and 
Tamar Gendler (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
6 Perhaps Elga means this: if one were to form a judgment about who is more likely to be correct, then one 
would think that the other is less likely. Nonetheless, there are cases, such as the one that follows in the 
main text, in which one would in fact not take a view about who is more likely to be correct. If one were 
asked in such a case who is more likely to be correct, the honest answer would be “I don’t know.” 
Nonetheless, there can be peers in such cases, and further, one can be reasonable in thinking that someone 
else is a peer in such cases, based on similarity with respect to the peer factors. 
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assessing this sort of evidence. In other words, one has some information about how 
similar both parties are with respect to the disagreement factors. For example, if we are 
meteorologists familiar with one another’s predictive track records, and we are 
encountering a weather problem that is unfamiliar to both of us, I can have good reason 
to think you’re my peer with respect to this question, while having no view of who is 
more likely to be correct. So one can think someone else is a peer in the FP sense while 
having no views about whether that person is a peer in the LP sense, which implies at the 
very least that LP will not suffice for all cases of peer disagreement.  
Second, even if one does think that one’s friend is more likely to be mistaken than 
oneself, it must be because of some dissimilarity in one or more of the disagreement 
factors (assuming the friend is rational). I must think that you are not as familiar with this 
kind of evidence as I am, or that you’re distracted, or tired, or what have you. Judgments 
of peerhood depend on judgments about the disagreement factors, and therefore the 
intuitive strength of LP depends on FP. 
 Marc Moffett accepts Elga’s notion of peerhood and offers further support for it: 
Intuitively, we take an individual x to be an epistemic peer with respect to a given 
domain (if and) only if we regard x’s judgments concerning that domain to be as 
likely as our own to be correct given the same evidence. Something like this is a 
very plausible account of the notion of an epistemic peer. For suppose we use a 
different criterion which does not imply this one. For instance, we might try to 
define the concept of an epistemic peer in terms of general intelligence or general 
level of expertise or both, but nevertheless maintain that this criterion does not 
imply an equal likelihood of being correct given the same evidence. Then there 
must be some further truth-conducive factor F which we believe is relevant to 
judgments in this domain and we must believe that we are superior to x with 
respect to F. But this is counterintuitive. If we genuinely believe that F is a truth-
conducive factor in judgment in a given domain and we genuinely believe that we 
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are superior to x with respect to F, then we do not regard x as an epistemic peer in 
the relevant domain.7 
 
But Moffett is here making the same flawed assumption that Elga makes: that one party 
must take the other to be either more, less, or equally likely to be mistaken as oneself, and 
that if one does not, then one cannot consider the other to be an epistemic peer. But again, 
this misses the fact that I can be justified in believing someone is my epistemic peer even 
if I have no idea how likely either of us is to be right.8 For example: I and a friend each 
consider a case that is brand new to both of us, so that neither of us has any idea how 
likely either of us is to be right about it. Intuitively, I can still justifiedly believe that the 
other is my peer because I take her to be more or less the same as me with respect to the 
various cognitive and evidential factors. It is odd to insist, as Elga must, that I cannot 
hold someone to be a peer unless I have a belief about our comparative likelihood to be 
correct. 
Moreover, I can also be unjustified in believing someone to be my epistemic peer 
even if I have good grounds for thinking that we are about equally likely to be right. If I 
have a friend who comes up with the correct answer to math problems exactly as 
 
7 Marc Moffett, “Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry,” Episteme: A Journal of Social 
Epistemology 4, no. 3 (2007): 356-357. 
8 Michael Bergmann makes the same point: 
It’s in part because I think that many interesting cases of disagreement… don’t involve viewing 
the other as equally reliable with respect to the disputed proposition that I won’t be focusing on 
cases of disagreement between those who view each other as epistemic peers. Instead… I’ll be 
focusing on cases of disagreement between people who view each other as roughly equal in 
intellectual virtue and who have tried to share all the relevant evidence they can think of with each 
other. (To be clear, I should note that it doesn’t follow from the fact that the parties to the dispute 
don’t view each other as being equally reliable on the topic in question that each views the other as 
being more reliable or as less reliable. It may be that each person holds no views at all about how 
reliable the other is on the issue.) 
I take Bergmann’s use of “reliable” to imply “likelihood to be correct.” His mistake is to give over the 
notion of peerhood to Elga, and then set it aside altogether, rather than to insist on the common-sense FP 
understanding of it (which is what he does in practice; he merely rejects the label of “peer”). See Michael 
Bergmann, “Rational Disagreement After Full Disclosure,” Episteme 6, no. 3 (2009): 351, fn. 10. 
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frequently as I do, but he uses a calculator and I do the problems in my head, then we are 
obviously not epistemic peers with respect to math, even though we are equally likely to 
be correct about it. Equally obviously, it is our presumed cognitive and evidential 
inequalities that make us not peers. 
Or consider a case in which an apparent peer draws an absurd conclusion from 
some shared evidence. For example: I and a friend have the same kind of disagreement 
about what actor starred in a film that we’ve had a hundred times before. Based on past 
experience, we both believe that the other is about as likely to be right as ourselves 
conditional on a future disagreement about this topic (we can even stipulate that we’ve 
counted the times that each of us has been right). We then have a disagreement about 
who starred in a particular American Western--I think it was John Wayne, and you think 
it was Jane Seymour. Our answers are so drastically different that it seems insane to me 
that you could honestly think it was Jane Seymour. It seems that in this case our 
disagreement gives me evidence that you are in fact not my peer with respect to this 
question, even though prior to our disagreement I would have held us to be equally likely 
to be correct about this sort of question. Now, Elga does consider a case like this--in 
which I believe your answer to be obviously incorrect--and he says that “in order to apply 
the equal weight view, we must determine your prior probability that you would be right, 
conditional on these circumstances arising.”9 In other words, I must ask myself what is 
the likelihood that I would be correct, given that when we disagree I find your answer to 
be utterly preposterous. If I think that in a case like that, I am more likely to be correct 
than you, then I should not consider you my peer. 
 
9 Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” 491. 
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One problem with this is that I can always imagine, prior to a disagreement 
occurring, that someone else might give an answer that I find absurd. I am then left in a 
situation where I must either disqualify that person from being a peer in Elga’s sense 
because she might give an answer I find absurd--hence, no one would ever qualify as a 
peer--or else I must convince myself that if she gives an absurd answer, we are still 
equally likely to be correct. Again, this condition would seem to rule out the possibility 
of epistemic peers in almost all cases. The problem here is that Elga is smuggling in a 
truth-based notion of peerhood, so that peers are those who are really equally likely to be 
correct, when he himself admits, as we saw, that what matters for peerhood is that we 
count each other as peers. But, to the contrary, peerhood as an epistemic issue is about 
what one is justified in believing, not about whether one is correct or incorrect.10 
Another problem is that it is possible that we both consider the other’s answer to 
be ridiculous. Let’s say you find my answer of “John Wayne” to be just as preposterous 
as I find your answer of “Jane Seymour” to be. In that case, Elga says, his view states that 
if, prior to our disagreement, we both agree that, conditional on a disagreement arising 
where we both consider the other’s view to be utterly preposterous, we think we would be 
equally likely to be correct in that situation, then we are peers, and therefore (he thinks) 
when the disagreement does arise, we should accord equal weight to one another’s view. 
Elga says that “that verdict is independently plausible.”11 I disagree. It is not reasonable 
to conclude that your friend is your peer with respect to the identity of the actor when she 
thinks it was Jane Seymour (and you clearly remember it being a man) and finds your 
 




answer of John Wayne to be absurd, even if, per improbable, your prior self would have 
concluded that in the instance where you both find the other’s answer absurd, that you’re 
equally likely to be correct. In this case, she’s just obviously mistaken, despite what you 
might have predicted beforehand. 
Jennifer Lackey offers her own critique of Elga’s conception of peerhood.12 Her 
own definition of peerhood includes evidential equality, cognitive equality, and full 
disclosure of evidence, making it a somewhat stronger notion than others in the 
disagreement debate.13 She defines cognitive equality as parties who are “equally 
competent, intelligent, and fair‐minded in their assessment of the evidence and arguments 
that bear on the question whether p,” and then notes how Elga’s definition of peerhood 
deviates from this.14 
There are… reasons to question Elga’s non‐standard use of this term. For on his 
account, two people could radically differ in both their evidential backgrounds 
and their cognitive abilities with respect to the question whether p, yet 
nonetheless turn out to be epistemic peers regarding this question. For instance, I 
may be a complete novice with respect to identifying birds of prey, and you may 
be an expert ornithologist. When I am sober and you are highly intoxicated, 
however, we may be equally likely to be mistaken about whether the bird flying 
overhead is an osprey. On Elga’s account, then, you and I would be epistemic 
peers with respect to this question, but this strikes me as quite a counter‐intuitive 
result. 
 
I do not share Lackey’s reaction to this case. I think that, given the sensible restriction of 
peerhood to the question whether p, it isn’t hard to believe that we could be peers in 
circumstances in which I am sober and you, the ornithologist, are not. This is because, in 
 
12 Jennifer Lackey, “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance,” in Social 
Epistemology, ed. Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford University Press, 2010), 
302 (see fn. 17). 
13 Note that this makes her notion of peerhood highly idealized, despite her concerns about such 




those circumstances, the cognitive features relevant to identifying ospreys might be equal 
between us. So I do not think this is a successful counterexample to Elga’s LP as stated. 
The problem with his view of peerhood, rather, runs deeper. As we’ve seen, equal 
likelihood to be correct depends on equality of peer factors, not vice versa.15 This can be 
seen by asking why two people who disagree about something are not typically peers: it 
is nearly always because they differ on some peer factor or other. If we answer that they 
are not peers because they are not equally likely to be correct, while this may be true, it is 
not a satisfactory explanation of why they are not peers. In fact, it may not even be true: 
as Lackey hints here without adequately defending (owing to the weakness of her 
example), people who are not peers can be equally likely to be correct/mistaken. For 
example, let’s say that you’re an expert on the Crumple-Horned Snorkack, and I am a 
novice.16 You’re convinced they don’t exist, but I’m pretty sure I just saw one. We are 
not peers with respect to whether they exist (i.e., you are vastly superior to me on that 
question), and yet we may be equally likely to be mistaken about whether they exist.17 Or 
suppose that you’re my defense attorney, but you’re convinced I’m guilty. You know 
more about the evidence than I do, so we’re not peers with respect to my guilt, and yet I 
clearly remember not committing the crime. I’d say that, in cases like these, we may be 
equally likely to be mistaken, even though we are not peers with respect to the factors 
 
15 I do not mean to claim here that equal likelihood to be correct is conceptually parasitic on cognitive and 
evidential equality, in the sense that if one has no view about relative cognitive/evidential equality, then 
one can have no view about equal likelihood to be correct. That seems wrong. Consider again the case of a 
math “peer” in the equal likelihood sense who uses a calculator, or is fed the answers by someone else. 
Cases like this suggest that the two views of peerhood are conceptually distinct. What I am claiming in the 
main text is that if one believes that someone else is or isn’t equally likely to be correct about p, that is 
typically because one has a prior belief about the other’s cognitive/evidential equality with oneself. 
16 See J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix (Scholastic, 2004), ch. 13. 
17 Indeed, I may be more likely to be correct than you about this question, even though you are the expert 
and I am the novice. But see qualification to follow in the main text. 
149 
 
involved in assessing the evidence for the relevant propositions. I say “may be” because 
it’s difficult to know how to weigh one type of evidence (experiential) against another 
type (theoretical). A similar point could be made about other sorts of claims, such as 
those involving religious experience, or claims that a miracle has occurred. To avoid this 
complication, consider a case in which one party has reasons the other lacks, but the 
second party is under some circumstantial fluke whereby they are as likely to be correct 
as the first party. Say, the second party is likely to be right about propositions of the p-
type when they have recently encountered nice weather. If the first party has reasons 
pertaining to p which make him likely to be correct about p, but also knows that the 
weather has been nice recently, then on Elga’s definition of peerhood, the two parties are 
peers. This is highly counterintuitive. 
So equal likelihood to be correct is neither necessary nor sufficient for peerhood, 
and its plausibility as a criterion of peerhood derives entirely from the primary criteria of 
equality in disagreement factors. Therefore, FP is preferable to LP. This is important 
because one’s definition of peerhood affects one’s view of what it is reasonable to do in a 
case of peer disagreement. 
 
7.2 – Responding to Parity: Conformism and Nonconformism 
 
Elga uses his notion of peerhood to support his Equal Weight View, which he 
defines as follows: 
Upon finding out that an advisor disagrees, your probability that you are right 
should equal your prior conditional probability that you would be right. Prior to 
what? Prior to your thinking through the disputed issue, and finding out what the 
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advisor thinks of it. Conditional on what? On whatever you have learned about 
the circumstances of the disagreement.18 
 
This view suffers from a host of problems, some of which have been canvassed in earlier 
chapters and so need not detain us here.19 For our purposes it is sufficient to note two 
things: 
1. If we reject Elga’s notion of conditional peerhood (LP), then the Equal Weight 
View is unmotivated. This is because if peerhood is not a matter of likelihood to 
be correct, then there is no reason to “split the difference”--i.e., assign the 
competing views equal credence probabilities--with an epistemic peer. Further, if 
evidence pertinent to the issue under dispute can count for or against assigning 
peer status to an interlocutor--which Elga’s independent evidence condition 
discussed previously rules out--then whether someone counts as a peer does not 
depend on the conditional likelihood to be correct that one would have assigned 
prior to the disagreement occurring.20 
2. The Equal Weight View, even if correct, could not help with the Parity Problem. 
This is both because (a) the Equal Weight View would recommend considering a 
 
18 Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” 490. 
19 Thomas Kelly provides what is to my mind a satisfactory refutation of the Equal Weight View in “Peer 
Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield 
(Oxford University Press, 2010), 111-74. 
20 Ironically, Elga’s view--which is a form of Conformism--entails that people are in fact seldom in a 
situation in which there is a need to conform their view to that of a peer. This is because he thinks that a 
person may rationally assign peer status based on how much agreement she thinks there is between herself 
and a potential peer. As he says, the Equal Weight View states what you should “defer to an advisor in 
proportion to your prior probability that the advisor would be correct in case of disagreement. In practice, 
this means deferring most to advisors whose views (on matters closely linked to the issue in question) are 
similar to one’s own.” Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” 495. Of course, if only those who already 
agree with you are likely to count as peers, then Elga can avoid the objection that the Equal Weight View 
leads to widespread skepticism on controversial issues--but at the significant cost of recommending as a 
serious epistemic norm the consideration of only views which one already holds. Elga says this is not 
burying one’s head in the sand, but it is hard to see how it could be anything else when it recommends 
choosing peers based on agreement about allied or prior issues. See ibid., 492-493. 
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peer’s view as equally good as one’s own, and therefore would offer a 
straightforward “No” to the question whether reasonable disagreement in a 
situation of parity is possible; and because (b) the Parity Problem represents a 
conflict in one’s own evidential seemings, and not merely between one’s first-
order seemings and the testimonial report of another. The Equal Weight View 
does not recognize such a possibility. 
So, insofar as we are attempting to find a solution to the Parity Problem that allows for 
the possibility of rational peer disagreement, the Equal Weight View must be set aside. 
Likewise, Christensen’s version of Conformism cannot help with the Parity 
Problem, since it too helps to create the problem, and does not consider the need to 
suspend judgment in all cases of legitimate peer disagreement to be a significant cost. 
Christensen, Elga, and even Kelly all mention that most people--philosophers not 
excepted--tend to hold controversial views too confidently, and that therefore the 
Conformist principle of belief revision up to and including suspension of judgment or 
even outright disbelief in one’s prior view, is not so drastic as it might at first appear.21 
Nonetheless, the intuition that began this debate remains strong: people of equal 
epistemic virtue can have long and careful disagreements and remain rational, including 
rationally believing that the disagreeing party is also rational. We want to know if this 
can be a justified view, given a situation of parity. 
 If Conformist views cannot assist us in this task, can Nonconformism do any 
better? Kelly’s Nonconformist view cannot help. This is because Kelly’s “Total Evidence 
 
21 See Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” 497; David Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The 
Good News,” Philosophical Review 116, no. 2 (2007): 214-216; Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-
Order Evidence,” 128. 
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View” stipulates that the preferable view is the one that actually accords best—
objectively--with the total evidence, which includes both first-order evidence for p, and 
higher-order evidence about one’s first-order evidence provided by peer disagreement. 
The problem is that in a situation of parity, one is not in a position to know what the total 
evidence objectively supports. As Elga says, “Even if in fact you have done a much better 
job than your friend at evaluating the claims, simply comparing your verdicts to those of 
your friend gives you no evidence that this is so.”22 
Kelly considers this sort of objection, and he admits that there is something right 
about it, namely that “what it is reasonable to believe about the world on the basis of 
one’s evidence is constrained by what it is reasonable for one to believe about one’s 
evidence.”23 This insight, he says, can naturally lead to the phenomenon of “downward 
epistemic push”: 
even in a case in which [evidence set] E genuinely supports [hypothesis] H, one’s 
justification for believing H on the basis of E will tend to be undermined by 
evidence against the epistemic proposition that E is good evidence for H. And 
one’s justification for believing this epistemic proposition would seem to be 
hostage to what one’s peers think.24 
 
However, Kelly is quick to point out that there is also the complementary phenomenon of 
“upward epistemic push.” This happens if one’s correct assessment of first-order 
evidence provides justification for one’s second-order epistemic beliefs about one’s 
evidence.25 In other words, 
 
22 Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” 487. 
23 Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” 158. 
24 Ibid., 159. 
25 Kelly provides an argument for this involving the ability to “recognize” that E supports H, which entails 
justification. This argument is similar to the one I advanced above regarding the prima facie justification of 
evidential seemings, though with some complications. See above, Chapter Four, pp. 81-83. 
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It is not only that one’s higher-order evidence typically makes a difference to 
what one is justified in believing about the world; it is also the case that one’s 
first-order evidence makes a difference to what one is justified in believing about 
higher-level epistemic matters.26 
 
For this reason, he thinks, the Total Evidence View is preferable to the Equal Weight 
View, which does not allow for the phenomenon of upward epistemic push. 
However, he admits that there is a difficulty with the Total Evidence View’s 
insistence that reasonableness in disagreement situations depends largely on who has 
more accurately evaluated the first-order evidence. As he says: 
Of course, there is no magic red light that illuminates when one responds to the 
evidence correctly, no warning bell that sounds when one does not. Indeed, as a 
phenomenological matter, there might be no introspectible difference between 
how things seem when one is responding correctly and how things seem when 
one is not.27 
 
I have argued that it is just this possibility--that there may be no introspectible difference 
between being right and being wrong--that gives rise to the Parity Problem, and that 
becomes epistemically problematic when one is in the circumstances of prolonged 
disagreement with a peer. Kelly does not consider such circumstances; instead, he ends 
the article by arguing that evidence should not be judged according to what it is 
dialectically appropriate to cite as evidence.28 But the issue in contention between the 
Conformist and the Nonconformist is just this: what should I do when I find myself 
disagreeing with a peer? While Kelly is surely correct that one may be justified in her 
view without knowing that she is, this is hollow succor when the person one is in a 
prolonged disagreement with is obviously an epistemic peer.29 While I may be 
 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 169. 
28 Ibid., 169-172. 
29 Recall van Inwagen’s disagreement with David Lewis. 
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reasonable, in Kelly’s objective sense, to continue believing that my evidence is adequate 
to justify p, when my admitted peer is convinced--with conviction, after thorough 
consideration--that it justifies not-p, such an attitude does not seem commendable. Or, as 
Rosen says, “it is hard to see the virtue in it.”30 So again we see that prolonged 
disagreement with someone marked by the features of epistemic excellence that we have 
labeled “disagreement factors” gives rise to a situation of epistemic parity, in which it is 
difficult to see how the maintenance of one’s view could be commendable or 
epistemically virtuous. 
 Before leaving the topic of what to do in a situation of peer disagreement, it will 
be useful to consider in some detail the view of one more author. Richard Feldman’s 
Conformist stance has already been discussed in earlier chapters. However, after the 
article discussed above, he expressed a somewhat different view of the disagreement 
debate which, to my mind, is much more compelling.31 There, he turns his sights onto the 
various general principles that epistemologists have defended as responses to the problem 
of disagreement, and finds them all wanting, including those in defense of his own 
Conformist view.32 He then adopts and defends evidentialism, the view that (1) one is 
justified in believing a proposition if and only if one’s evidence on balance supports that 
 
30 See Gideon Rosen, “Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism,” Noûs 35, no. 15 (2001): 85-86; 
quoted above in Chapter Four, p. 73. 
31 See Richard Feldman, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement,” Episteme 6, no. 3 
(2009): 294–312. 
32 Jennifer Lackey argues for a similar view in her “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic 
Significance.” Instead of evidentialism, Lackey focuses on justification. For her, instead of affecting one’s 
overall evidence, as for Feldman, peer disagreement affects one’s degree of justified confidence in a 
proposition. Thus, Lackey rejects, as does Feldman, both general Conformist and Nonconformist 
principles, and maintains that her justificationist account can explain the insights of both of those views. 
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proposition, and that (2) one’s degree of justification is determined by how strongly one’s 
evidence supports the proposition.33 Feldman’s thesis is that 
there are no true special principles about justified responses to disagreement. That 
is, there are no general and widely applicable principles specifying what attitudes 
are justified for someone who encounters a disagreeing peer.34 
 
All we need, Feldman thinks, is evidentialism. Nonetheless, disagreement does often 
have an evidential impact, often in the form of higher-order evidence: evidence about the 
significance of one’s first-order evidence. 
Note that principles about conciliating or conforming in the face of disagreement-
-principles that Feldman himself came close to endorsing--do not count against 
evidentialism. Rather, they can be seen as applications of the general evidentialist 
principle in cases of peer disagreement. Nonetheless, Feldman now rejects such 
principles, because they entail that the evidence one obtains from the fact of disagreement 
must overwhelm whatever other evidence one had for the disputed proposition, and this is 
often not the case. For example, consider the case of disagreeing with a peer who is a 
lone dissenter among a larger group of agreeing peers, or the case of disagreeing with a 
wishy-washy or unsure peer when one is well-justified oneself, or the case of a peer who 
is known to be performing below par in this particular instance. In such cases, one’s first-
order evidence for p may outweigh the higher-order evidence provided by the peer 
disagreement. In other words, what’s justified depends on one’s overall or total 
 
33 Feldman, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement,” 294. 
34 Ibid., 295. 
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evidence,35 and there is no guarantee that the higher-order evidence of the disagreement 
will offset the rest of one’s relevant evidence.36 
Feldman notes that there are several ways of modifying conciliatory principles 
(i.e., those that recommend suspending judgment in light of peer disagreement), none of 
which are successful or helpful for understanding what is behind the conciliatory 
intuition. That intuition can be stated simply without mentioning one’s own belief state: 
“The proposition that S’s peer who shares S’s evidence concerning P disbelieves P is 
evidence against P.”37 In Feldman’s view, nothing more than this needs to be said about 
disagreement generally, and trying to say more gets one into trouble. 
For example, conciliationists might try to strengthen their principle by building in 
more descriptive features of the disagreement scenario that rule out Feldman’s 
counterexamples. That is, one disagrees with a peer, and it is not the case that there is a 
preponderance of agreeing peers, and the peer is not unsure, and the peer is performing 
normally, etc. But Feldman claims that this list of and’s will run to infinity: “There will 
always be the possibility of some other factor being present that provides the subject with 
evidence that she ought not defer to the peer this time.”38 If one tries to counteract this by 
adding to the principle that no additional counteracting evidence is acquired, then one is 
still left with the possibility of one’s initial evidence outweighing one’s new evidence 
 
35 Cf. Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.” 
36 Note that this is an apparent departure from Feldman’s earlier view. Though, as he says, “I continue to 
endorse the view that peer disagreement is epistemically significant and threatens to undermine the 
justification of many beliefs in areas of controversy.” Feldman, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, 
and Disagreement,” 304. 
37 Ibid., 298. 
38 Ibid., 298-299. 
157 
 
gained from the disagreement. If one tries to allow for this in one’s principle, then one 
will be left with something like this: 
If S justifiably believes P immediately prior to t, and S learns at t that an 
epistemic peer with respect to P who has evidence comparable to S’s concerning 
P disbelieves P, and S does not learn anything that counteracts the evidence 
provided by this, then S becomes less justified in believing P at t.39 
 
This principle or one like it may well be true, says Feldman, but it is no more than the 
general evidentialist principle combined with the insight that peer disagreement is 
evidence against one’s view. 
Another strategy to salvage conciliationist principles is to modify the definition of 
“peer.” But here again, the only options are to build in requirements on peerhood that rule 
out potential flaws--and this will never be accomplished adequately--or to simply define 
peerhood so that it is true by definition that disagreement with such a person renders 
one’s belief unjustified.40 But of course this latter option is simply defining oneself into 
victory, and leaves the original issue untouched. We can either eliminate the vagueness of 
peerhood by making its requirements so strict that no one will ever actually be peers, or 
we can allow for looser “similarity” criteria of peerhood, in which case we must consider 
each case individually. In the latter case, we are back to our basic evidentialist principles 
again. The same can be said about the vagueness inherent in the concept of “sharing 
evidence.” At the end of the day, Feldman thinks that “there are no simple facts about the 
epistemological significance of evidence of peer disagreement except for the fact (and its 
implications)…that evidence that a peer disagrees has evidential impact.”41 
 
39 Ibid., 299. 
40 This, I think, is the result of Elga’s LP. 
41 Ibid., 303. 
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Feldman next turns to some reflections on higher-order evidence, which is 
evidence “about the existence, merits, or significance of a body of evidence.”42 There are 
at least three different sorts of disagreements involving higher-order evidence: (1) 
Disagreements in which peers disagree about the significance or impact or weight of a 
body of evidence, (2) Disagreements in which one learns that a peer has some 
unspecified evidence supporting the opposing view, (3) Disagreements in which one 
learns that a peer has some specific evidence that competes with one’s own view, but one 
does not acquire that evidence oneself (as in the case of differing perceptions). Feldman 
argues that (2) and (3) are simply cases of how to weigh competing evidence, and nothing 
more than the general evidentialist principles are needed. The first case, however, is more 
difficult. In a case like that--in which a peer and I agree about what the first-order 
evidence is, but disagree about its evidential weight--there are three possible positions: (i) 
I am justified in maintaining my view, and justified in believing that the first-order 
evidence supports P (contra my peer); (ii) I am justified either in maintaining my view, or 
(inclusive) justified in suspending judgment, or (inclusive) justified in disbelieving that 
the first-order evidence supports P (in agreement with my peer); (iii) I am not justified in 
maintaining my view, and I am justified in either suspending judgment or disbelieving 
that the first-order evidence supports P (in agreement with my peer). Feldman argues that 
(i) is unreasonable because its defense would involve arguing that one’s view of the 
evidential support relation in question cannot be mistaken. He argues that (ii) is also 
unreasonable because it implies the odd view that evidential support relations have no 
impact on the justification of one’s first-order beliefs. That leaves only (iii), which 
 
42 Ibid., 304. 
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Feldman believes is very often the reasonable response, hence his conciliationist stance--
though he admits that suspense of judgment or disbelief may not always be recommended 
owing to the possibility of the overriding evidential weight of one’s first-order views, or 
even competing second-order views. In this way, higher-order evidence may serve as a 
defeater for first-order evidence. As he says, “It is, in some ways, like what happens to 
the belief that an object is red when one learns that a red light is shining [on] it.”43 
But again, there is no universal principle to be had here. Feldman concludes: 
“…the main thing to say is that [the evidence from one’s disagreeing peers] should be 
added to the mix. This may seem disappointing--you want some crisper principles that 
you can object to. But, as I said, we shouldn’t expect them.”44 
I agree with Feldman that there are probably no general epistemological 
principles to be had concerning what it is reasonable to do in a case of peer 
disagreement.45 For me, this implies that there is no absolutist, exceptionless solution to 
the Parity Problem, nor any guarantee of a solution that everyone would agree to in any 
specific case of disagreement. Fortunately, finding such a principle is not my aim. In 
Chapters Eight and Nine, I will sketch three possible solutions to the Parity Problem that 
may allow one to reasonably maintain one’s view in the face of prolonged disagreement 
with a recognized epistemic peer. However, I do not expect these solutions to convince 
everyone, nor do I believe that they will settle every case of peer disagreement. 
 
43 Ibid., 308. 
44 Ibid., 310. 
45 Lackey notes something similar when she rejects what she calls the “Uniformity” thesis, which says that 
peer disagreement functions the same epistemically in all circumstances, and therefore is susceptible to a 




Nonetheless, I do think that they can help with many cases, especially the cases that 





Chapter Eight – Proposed Solutions I: Hume’s Contribution 
 
 In this chapter and the next, I propose two solutions to the Parity Problem, one 
inspired by David Hume, the other by Immanuel Kant. I will not be defending either a 
Humean or a Kantian doctrine per se, but rather taking inspiration from (1) the 
argumentative moves they make, (2) their respective insights into the nature of 
rationality, and (3) the nature of certain sorts of judgments, particularly judgments of 
taste. 
I have chosen to focus on Hume and Kant for several reasons: 
First, with respect to nearly any significant epistemological issue, consulting these 
figures is almost an a priori necessity. Kant is the most important contributor to questions 
about human knowledge at least since Descartes, and his contributions cannot be 
adequately appreciated apart from their relationship to Hume, who famously aroused 
Kant from his “dogmatic slumber.” More specifically, there is a prevalent sense in the 
disagreement literature, noted by both Feldman and Lackey in the last chapter, that peer 
disagreement is a puzzle with a demonstrable solution. Hume and Kant help us to see that 
this is unlikely. Note, however, that that does not mean that reasonable disagreement is 
never possible. 
Second, the interaction between the two figures provides a relevant historical 
backdrop for, and in some ways anticipates, the current divisions in the disagreement 
debate. Put another way: the disagreement between Hume and Kant about judgments of 
taste prefigures current disagreement about disagreement. Hume, who seems to think that 
one should adjust one’s beliefs in accordance with the judgment of recognized experts, 
can be seen as anticipating the “Conformist,” “Conciliationist,” “Equal Weight,” or 
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“suspend judgment” views, which hold that the realization of disagreement with a peer 
gives one a strong reason to alter one’s attitude toward the disputed proposition.1 On the 
other hand, Kant, who thinks that it is sometimes appropriate to form judgments which 
are truth-directed, even when one recognizes that one lacks the ability to demonstrate 
their truth, may be seen as representing the “Nonconformist,” “Steadfast,” or “Anti-
conciliationist” views, which hold that it is rational to maintain one’s prior attitude 
toward a disputed proposition in the face of peer disagreement. 
Third, the current debate, though still fairly young, has already produced 
something of a stalemate of positions. The Conformist and Nonconformist views all have 
able defenders, and, with a flourish of irony lost on no one, have generated seemingly 
intractable disagreement among philosophers. The debate is in need of penetrating 
insight. I think that Hume and Kant provide options for such a resolution. 
 
8.1 – A Humean Approach to Disagreement 
 
While Hume did not discuss peer disagreement in the contemporary sense, he was 
self-avowedly motivated by a desire to settle the “endless disputes” of philosophy. He set 
out to base our understanding of human nature and to determine the extent of human 
knowledge on strictly empirical foundations.2 In addition, his concern with weighing 
testimonial evidence against one’s experience of the world can be seen in his well-known 
 
1 See, e.g., the conclusion of Hume’s Natural History of Religion, where he says of religious disagreement: 
“The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspence of judgment 
appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject.” David Hume, A Dissertation 
on the Passions & The Natural History of Religion: A Critical Edition, ed. Tom Beauchamp (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 87. 




argument against the rationality of belief in miracles. In that argument he takes 
competing claims from different religions that a miracle has occurred to count against the 
rationality of belief in miracles.3 If such competition occurs, “there is,” he says, “a mutual 
destruction of arguments.”4 In addition, Hume famously noted the inability of human 
reason to non-circularly demonstrate the reliability of its own sources of belief about the 
world. As he says, once we have “arriv’d at the utmost extent of human reason, we sit 
down contented,” because we “perceive that we can give no reason for our most general 
and most refin’d principles, beside our experience of their reality.”5 
My discussion here is “Humean” in several ways: 
(1) It is inspired by the idea that a theory of disagreement is empirically 
constrained. As Hume says, respecting our knowledge of principles in general: 
…tho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by 
tracing up our experiments to the utmost’ and explaining all effects from the 
simplest and fewest causes, ‘tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and 
any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human 
nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical.6 
 
As Lackey and others have noted, disagreement as an epistemological issue arose 
because of prolonged philosophical and religious disagreement, and it should remain 
focused on real people in real situations of peer disagreement. This is what motivates the 
Parity Problem, and what tells against Nonconformist views which take the objective 
accuracy of one’s evidential judgments to justify the decision to maintain one’s beliefs. 
 
3 See David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter Millican (Oxford World’s 
Classics, 2007), Section X, esp. Part 2, paragraph 24, pp. 87-88. 
4 Ibid., Section X, Part 1, paragraph 6, p. 81. 
5 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J Norton (Oxford: Clarendon 




Such views are not sufficiently sensitive to the impoverished evidential situation people 
are typically in when encountering disagreement, nor to their inability to verify the 
objective veracity of their assessments. 
(2) My discussion in this section is “naturalistic” in that knowledge of the 
limitations of disagreement is based on empirical observation of actual disagreement 
(including the experience of having a disagreement).7 
(3) As it was for Hume, this naturalism is motivated by a desire to settle the 
“endless disputes” of philosophy by distinguishing those disputes that are legitimate from 
those that stem from mere idle speculation about things beyond the limits of human 
reason. 
(4) My discussion here is methodologically similar to Hume’s discussion of 
definition as far as its purpose is concerned: to obtain clarity about an obscure idea. In 
Hume’s case, the obscure idea is “necessary connection”; in mine, it is “peerhood.” One 
should begin, Hume says, by tracing the idea back to its initial “impressions” (seemings) 
in order “to fix… the precise meaning of [the] term… and thereby remove some part of 
that obscurity, which is so much complained of in this species of philosophy.”8 
Consider, for example, Hume’s account of the source of moral sentiment: 
sympathy. For Hume, morality is based on (1) feelings of approval and disapproval, and 
(2) the ability to sympathize with others.9 Through sympathy, we move from an idea of 
 
7 Cf. Hume’s claim that “as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the 
only solid foundation we can give to this science [of human nature] itself must be laid on experience and 
observation.” Ibid., 4. 
8 Hume, Enquiry, 45. 
9 See Hume, Treatise, Part 3, Section 1, 367-378. 
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what someone else is feeling to feeling it ourselves. William Morris and Charlotte Brown 
explain: 
There are four steps to this process. I first arrive at the idea of what someone is 
feeling in any of the usual ways. I next become aware of the resemblances 
between us, so we are linked by that principle of association. While we resemble 
every human being to some extent, we also resemble some individuals more than 
others--for instance, those who share our language or culture or are the same age 
and sex as we are. The associative principles of contiguity and causality also 
relate individuals who are located closely to us in time or space or who are family 
members or teachers. According to Hume, we are able to sympathize more easily 
and strongly with individuals with whom we have strong associative ties. The 
stronger the associative relations, the stronger our sympathetic responses. Hume 
then claims--controversially--that we always have a vivid awareness of ourselves. 
Finally, he reminds us that the principles of association not only relate two 
perceptions, but they also transmit force and vivacity from one perception to 
another.10 
 
This is analogous to peerhood in important respects. When we judge that someone is a 
peer, there is a similar stepwise, “sympathetic” process: I first find out how someone sees 
things in the usual way (conversation, body language, etc.). I then notice that that person 
resembles me in how I see things. For Hume, this step can invite bias--I am inclined to 
privilege the perspective of those similar to myself, and so to consider them my equals 
more readily than those not as similar to me.11 Only through noting this resemblance do I 
attribute peerhood to another, for it is only then that I have any reason to take his/her 
opinions seriously. Prior to recognizing the resemblance, I have only evidence about p 
(first-order), and evidence about the other person’s view of p, which is also first-order, 
but about the person, not the proposition. But peerhood is not directly about the 
proposition or the person. It is about the proposition-as-held-by-the-person (Elga phrases 
 
10 William Edward Morris and Charlotte R. Brown, “David Hume,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Spring 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/hume/, Section 7.2. 
11 Cf. Elga’s view of forming peers. See footnote 20 in the previous chapter. 
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this as having an “equal likelihood to be mistaken” about p). Since I am most familiar 
with my own view of p and my own reasoning process about p (we need not follow 
Hume here in the stronger claim that I always have a “vivid awareness” of my own 
thoughts), I will always be more confident of my own conclusion about p than I am about 
another’s conclusion about p, at least initially. But through observation of another’s 
reasoning about p, I may come to see a greater resemblance to me, and then my 
confidence in my own reasoning may be transferred to him/her, so that I begin to see 
him/her as an epistemic peer. Crucially, my judgment of peerhood is based on 
resemblance to me (this is true even if I come to view the other as an epistemic superior 
or inferior). 
For Hume, a belief is an idea that borrows its vivacity from impressions 
themselves. By doing so, the idea becomes like an impression, for example, by sharing its 
behavioral effects. I hear thunder, for instance, and react as though there is lightning: I 
leave the playing field, say, even though I did not see lightning. Similarly, judging 
another as my epistemic peer confers some of the vivacity of my own evidential seemings 
onto his/her putative evidential seemings. On this view, to believe that someone is my 
peer is to view his/her reported evidential experiences about p similarly to how I would if 
they were my experiences. I did not see the lightning, so to speak, but I’m inclined to act 
as if I had. 
(5) My discussion is also methodologically similar to Hume’s discussion of 
analogical argument. In criticizing the teleological argument in the Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion, Hume argues that disputes regarding “the degrees of any 
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quality or circumstance” are incurably indefinite.12 This is because, as Morris and Brown 
put it, 
Analogies are always matters of degree, and the degrees of the qualities involved 
in the design argument aren’t capable of exact measurement. The controversy thus 
“admits not of any precise meaning, nor consequently of any determination.”13 
 
The result is that with such analogies (i.e., those that resist precise measurement), 
everything is analogous to everything else in some respect, and if the similarity cannot be 
specified, then the analogy itself is meaningless. For Hume, this renders all natural 
theology suspect by virtue of being predicated on such an analogy between the universe 
and artifacts. Such analogies, Hume thinks, are unintelligible. Similarly, in the case of 
peer disagreement, if the degree of similarity between one’s own reasoning ability and 
another’s cannot be reasonably compared, then it too would be subject to the 
unintelligibility objection, since it would be no more meaningful than comparing any two 
phenomena.14 
Part of our task, then, is to determine if the “peer-analogy”--“My interlocutor’s 
reasons respecting p are similar to mine”--can be made precise enough to support a 
Conformist or Nonconformist stance.15 Given the argument in the preceding chapter for 
the priority of the “peer factor” approach (FP) to defining peerhood, assigning precise 
 
12 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Dorothy Coleman (Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 92. 
13 Morris and Brown, “David Hume,” Section 8.4, citing Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 
93. 
14 We need not follow Hume here in insisting that the analogues must be susceptible to “exact 
measurement.” After all, we can and do reasonably compare things which cannot be quantified, such as the 
beauty of various works of art. For our purposes, it is enough to note that the imprecise nature of such 
analogies means that they will not yield a single most rational decision principle which can justify either a 
Conformist or Nonconformist stance on the disagreement problem. 
15 Note that the Conformists and Equal Weight theorists usually assume that the peer comparison can be 
exactly quantified; otherwise, I could not assign the proper credences to our views of p and thus calculate 
the reasonable credence. 
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probabilities to one’s peer status will be difficult but not impossible. I may not be able to 
say, as the Equal Weight theorist would like, that my peer and I are each 85% successful 
at evaluating evidential support for propositions like p. But I can say that we are roughly 
equal in intelligence (measured either objectively or by our ability to marshal and 
respond to powerful objections), conscientiousness (measured by our track record of 
sticking to our own stated norms for evidence assessment), carefulness (measured by how 
much time and attention we commit to each piece of evidence and each objection), 
thoroughness (measured by how many objections we consider, and how many sources we 
consult to find them), and so forth. Collectively, such rough measures will plausibly yield 
a tolerably clear comparison between interlocutors, and thus a reasonable means of 
claiming peerhood. But the inherently inexact nature of these measures, especially in 
real-world contexts, means that one’s peerhood-judgments will always be somewhat 
indefinite. Or put differently, they will be underdetermined, an idea which will become 
important below. Because I cannot precisely measure the extent to which my peer and I 
compare with respect to the various peerhood factors, in any particular disagreement it 
could be the case either that in this instance, I am slightly more conscientious, careful, 
thorough, etc., or that my peer is. And of course the same will be the case from my peer’s 
perspective. It is thus up to each of us to decide whether to weigh our own evidence 
assessment more heavily, and so maintain our first-order view of p, or to weigh our 
assessment and our peer’s assessment as equal, and so, perhaps, suspend judgment about 
p. 
The crucial Humean insight here is that there is no numerical means of 
comparison that can ensure that we make the unquestionably most rational decision, 
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because the claim that there is an unquestionably most rational decision about this is itself 
suspect. In order for there to be a quantifiably “correct” way to proceed, we would need 
to be able to measure ourselves and our peer with respect to the various peer factors much 
more precisely than we in fact can. But since all we have to go on in any actual 
disagreement is an imprecise sense of similarity between ourselves, which decision we 
make (conciliate or not) must be made on some basis other than what is demonstrably 
most rational. This levels at one stroke both the Conformist and Nonconformist 
(including the Equal Weight and Total Evidence) responses to peer disagreement, insofar 
as they are interpreted as providing a demonstrable, quantifiable assessment of the most 
rational response to peer disagreement. Hume helps us to see that such a response is not 
to be had. 
 One Conformist, David Christensen, has recognized this issue and hinted at a 
partial reply. In the course of considering a case in which two doctors disagree about the 
proper treatment for a patient, Christensen says: 
… do I think that [the other doctor’s evidence] weighting leads in general to 
equally accurate beliefs? If so, then why think my belief is likely to be more 
accurate now? … On the other hand, if I think her weighting does not lead in 
general to equally accurate beliefs, why should I grant that it’s just as rational to 
form beliefs using that weighting?16 
 
The implication is of course that if I think her evidence-weighting policy is as accurate as 
mine, then I have no reason to prefer mine, and I should conciliate. While if I think that 
hers is less accurate than mine, then I should not grant that hers is as rational as mine. 
Christensen adds in a footnote: 
 




… to say that I believe my weighting policy is more rational than hers need not 
commit me to being able to give an ultimately non-question-begging defense of 
my policy. Hume, I think, showed us that this cannot be the standard for rational 
belief-forming policies. But to the extent that I regard it as my duty to prescribe… 
treatment, I must regard my colleague in somewhat the way I regard the 
counterinductivist: she’s not completely rational even if I can’t demonstrate that. 
We should not take the impossibility of non-question-beggingly demonstrating 
that one method of forming beliefs is uniquely rational to show that more than one 
method of forming beliefs is rationally acceptable.17 
 
Christensen’s point here seems to be that even if Hume is right that we can’t non-
question beggingly demonstrate the superiority of one method of rational belief 
formation, it does not follow that just any method is equal to any other, or even that there 
is more than one rational method. Now, this is true so far as it goes, but it misses the 
force of the problem in Christensen’s own case. Take the second horn of Christensen’s 
dilemma: I think my colleague’s evidence-weighting policy “does not lead in general to 
equally accurate beliefs” as mine (after sharing evidence, discussing it, and so on), but I 
cannot demonstrate this. Should I still think of my peer as being as rational as me? This 
will depend, not on what merits I think that policy has independently of who is 
implementing it, but on whether I take my colleague to be my peer with respect to 
assessing this kind of evidence. I must assess her, not merely her evidence-weighting 
method. Now, the evidence-weighting policies she chooses will surely factor into my 
judgment here, but it will not be the whole of it--I will also need to assess her with 
respect to the various peer factors discussed above. It could be that her similarity to 
myself along those factors is such that I come to believe that she is indeed rational in 
implementing an evidence-weighting policy that I would reject. 
 
17 Ibid., 191-192, fn. 7. 
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So while Christensen is correct that a permissive view of rational evidence-
weighting policies does not follow from the failure to demonstrate the superiority of a 
single one, it may yet follow from the features of epistemic excellence which factor into 
peer-judgments. Now consider the first horn of the dilemma: I think my colleague’s 
evidence-weighting policy does lead to equally accurate beliefs as mine. Is it obvious that 
I should conciliate? I think not, and I think Hume is again helpful here. In particular, 
Hume’s own constructive project regarding causality hints at a means of deciding 
whether or not to conciliate in a given case of disagreement. 
Hume famously argued that causal inference is not demonstratively certain, 
because a priori reasoning does not in fact yield a notion of necessary connection 
between cause and effect.18 In place of reason, Hume suggests that “custom,” or habit, is 
the source of our belief that the future will be like the past.19 While I do not intend to 
suggest that custom is also the source of our beliefs that other people are our epistemic 
peers, I do think that there is a way of understanding peer judgments that is similar in 
spirit to Hume’s constructive account of causal inference. That is, there is a way of 
justifying the choice to maintain one’s own view in the grip of the Parity Problem. This 
Humean way does not require one to think (1) that there is a “necessary connection” 
between the evidence and one’s own view, or (2) that one is any more rational than one’s 
 
18 See Treatise 1.3.6, and Enquiry, Section 4. 
19 See Enquiry, Section 5: “Sceptical solution of these doubts,” e.g.: 
Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone, which renders our 
experience useful to us, and makes us 
expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without 
the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact, beyond what is 
immediately present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to 
ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect. (Ibid., 32-3.) 
See also Treatise 1.3.7 - 1.3.10. 
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interlocutor. Moreover, this Humean path allows us to say that there is a “reasonable” 
solution to the Parity Problem, that is, an epistemically appropriate response. It is 
epistemically appropriate in much the same way that following the “uniformity principle” 
is an epistemically appropriate thing to do in everyday life. It is appropriate, not in the 
sense of being demonstrable from a priori principles, but in the sense that following our 
habits of inference has in general led to beliefs that are satisfactory for us. Perhaps our 
beliefs about the rationality of our peers, and of ourselves, are like this as well: not 
strictly speaking demonstrable, but nonetheless useful for our overall epistemic goals. 
 
8.2 – Moffett’s Millian Solution to Peer Disagreement 
 
One commentator in the recent disagreement literature, Marc Moffett, has come 
close to this conclusion, but by a different route. His guide is John Stuart Mill, who 
argues that one ought to submit one’s views to the assessment of one’s disagreeing 
peers.20 It will be helpful to consider Moffett’s view in detail here, in order to elaborate 
my own Humean solution to the Parity Problem. 
Moffett notes that a Mill-inspired theory of group inquiry has two principles: 
(1) The Millian Platitude (MP): to be fully justified, theoretical beliefs (i.e., those 
that are non-deductively inferred from other beliefs) must hold up against the 
strongest counterarguments practically available at the time. 
(2) The Collective Criticism Condition (CCC): one can be adequately justified in 
thinking that the Millian Platitude is satisfied for some theoretical belief only if 
 
20 Marc Moffett, “Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry,” Episteme: A Journal of Social 
Epistemology 4, no. 3 (2007): 352–367. 
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there is “free and open critical discussion” of the belief with one’s disagreeing 
epistemic peers.21 
In other words, to be fully justified in our theoretical beliefs, we must engage in critical 
discussion with a community of disagreeing peers--indeed, with the best among those 
peers that are practically available. 
Moffett argues that MP entails CCC, at least for creatures like ourselves with 
limited epistemic abilities. MP says that the justification of our theoretical beliefs 
depends partially (i.e., in addition to whatever positive evidence we have for them) on 
our own critical evaluation of those beliefs. Moffett interprets this to mean that we are 
only fully justified in these beliefs (and maybe even adequately justified) if we are able to 
defend them against the strongest practically available objections.22 The strongest 
practically available objections are those which are externally available to one, meaning 
either that one is aware of them, or that one could be reasonably expected to be aware of 
them given one’s current social situation (e.g., given the philosophical/scientific theories 
of one’s community, and given one’s freedom within the community to pursue 
objections). They must be externally available, because if they need only be internally 
available, then one could simply avoid learning about objections, or forget them, and 
thereby improve one’s epistemic situation. Because the emphasis here is on what one is 
able to do (namely, respond to the best counterarguments), one may be justified in one’s 
 
21 Ibid., 352-353. 
22 If this seems too strong, keep in mind that the Millian principles are restricted to theoretical beliefs. 
Moffett notes that beliefs may be more or less theoretical “depending on the nature of their evidential 
support.” Ibid., 364, fn. 1. Still, depending on how “fully” and “adequately” are interpreted here, it may 
turn out that Mill’s principles restrict justification too much, since they would seem to require one to be 
able to defeat all objections in order to have one’s beliefs justified. However, nothing in my argument 
below turns on this interpretation of these principles, nor on the principles themselves. 
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views, even if one doesn’t have reason to believe that one can respond to the best 
counterarguments, because one can be able to respond to them without believing that one 
has considered the best ones or that one is able to respond to them. 
This leads to a problem if we are considering only the ability of an individual 
herself to come up with the best counterarguments to her views: namely, she is unlikely 
to be able to do so because humans are cognitively limited and prone to bias. Hence, in 
order to really have these objections available to her, she needs to interact with 
disagreeing peers. Hence, MP entails CCC. As Moffett says, “In sum: from the point of 
view of individual epistemology, it is an epistemic good and a practical necessity to rely 
on a network of genuine critics.”23 He continues: “It follows that in the absence of 
epistemic peers with whom x reasonably disagrees, x’s epistemic situation will be 
significantly compromised.”24 Indeed, she would not be able to be justified in her 
theoretical beliefs at all with such an absence unless (per improbable) she is unusually 
gifted at predicting the counterarguments of the strongest possible interlocutors. 
Unfortunately, CCC has negative epistemic consequences in the form of the peer 
disagreement problem. If, for example, Conformists like Elga or Feldman are correct, 
then the existence of dissenting epistemic peers entails suspension of judgment about our 
own controversial beliefs. But then, a requirement for fully justified belief (i.e., CCC) 
would entail that our beliefs are not even adequately justified (because according to the 
Conformist view, peer disagreement undermines justification to the extent of requiring 
suspension of judgment), and this is undesirable, to say the least. But why think that peer 
 
23 Ibid., 355. 
24 Ibid., 356. 
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disagreement undermines justification? Recall Elga’s argument: peerhood, he thinks, is a 
matter of likelihood to be right. This is because if a person takes herself to be right and an 
interlocutor to be wrong, then she must think there is some factor F that makes her more 
likely to be correct, which is just the same as saying that she does not think the 
interlocutor is a peer. Moffett unfortunately accepts Elga’s understanding of peerhood, 
declaring equal likelihood to be correct a “necessary condition” for peerhood.25 But, says 
Moffett, Elga is mistaken to then conclude that peerhood implies that we should accord 
equal weight to our interlocutor’s view, because “Elga does not adequately take into 
account the holistic relation between evidence and theory.”26 By this, Moffett seems to 
mean that Elga does not consider the possibility that revising one’s own belief may be 
much more costly (my word) than simply rejecting one’s interlocutor’s peerhood. 
Consider cases of strong evidence, such as the dean-in-the-quad case (i.e., cases 
of perceptual disagreement). In such cases, says Moffett, it is more reasonable to 
maintain one’s view and reject peerhood because revising one’s view would require 
embracing localized perceptual skepticism. In addition, Elga assumes a false dilemma: 
either we are not peers, or, if we are, I must give our views equal weight. But there are 
other options: I might conclude that because we disagree, your evidence must not really 
be the same as mine (because you have missed some small part of it that I’ve seen); or I 
might conclude that you are simply lying about your conclusions. In these cases, we are 
still peers (in the likelihood to be right sense), but I do not need to give our views equal 
weight. 
 




Unfortunately, this strategy will not work in every case. As Moffett says: 
… given that the disagreement will persist as we proceed further in our collective 
inquiry we will, after a very short period of time, have to regard these critics as 
simply being incapable of attaining the same quality of evidence as us. But this 
amounts to positing a truth-conducive factor on which we are superior to our 
critics and so, to not regard them as genuine peers after all!27 
 
The lesson here, according to Moffett, is that the more idealized our cases of 
disagreement become, the more intractable they are, because our main way of resolving 
them in particular cases is to fall back on the possibility of some shortcoming in our 
interlocutor. But in cases like Mill’s, “As we idealize away from those limitations, it 
becomes much more difficult to avoid epistemic stalemate with our peers.”28 So then 
CCC, while providing ideal grounds for the justification of our theoretical beliefs, also 
simultaneously undermines those beliefs by introducing the problem of peer 
disagreement.29 
Moffett’s solution to this problem involves the underdetermination of theory by 
evidence, which he argues allows us to avoid the dilemma posited by the Conformist: 
either abandon our own view, or else downgrade the “epistemic competency of our 
critics.”30 Unfortunately, Moffett’s explanation of a third option here is not as clear as 
one would like. He says: 
… if one were to accept that one’s current evidentiary position (perhaps including 
whatever theoretical virtues one wishes to posit) does not rationally determine a 
commitment to a unique theory, then one would be free to maintain the 
competence of one’s critics despite their genuine disagreement. Against this 
backdrop, an epistemic peer would be construed as someone who is as likely as 
 
27 Ibid., 358. 
28 Ibid., 359. 
29 Note that while epistemic stalemate in an idealized world may not be much of a threat to us in this world, 
it is a threat to CCC, which Moffett is concerned to defend. 
30 Ibid., 360. 
177 
 
we are to judge correctly given the same evidence and the same background 
theoretical beliefs.31 
 
He adds in a footnote: 
In saying that the individual would judge “correctly” we cannot mean that the 
individual would judge “truly” unless we are also willing to embrace some form 
of anti-realism. What is intended, rather, is that an epistemic peer is as likely as 
we are to arrive at the most rationally supported conclusion given those features 
which fix such a conclusion uniquely.32 
 
I interpret Moffett as saying that a peer is someone who is as likely as me to be right, 
given whatever might make for a uniquely rational conclusion, including both first-order 
evidence, and background theoretical beliefs. The way to avoid denying the peerhood of 
an interlocutor (which I take to be synonymous with Moffett’s confusing usage of 
“competence”) is to recognize that those things which would make for a uniquely rational 
conclusion, namely, sameness of background theoretical beliefs, in this instance do not. 
In other words, our background theoretical beliefs differ, but are equally rational, because 
they are “theoretical beliefs” and so underdetermined by the evidence for them. On this 
view, both interlocutors can admit that the evidence is as consistent with the other’s 
theory as it is with their own, and neither needs to abandon their own view, nor deny 
peerhood to the other. “In this way,” he says, “underdetermination appears to allow for 
blameless (and so, reasonable) disagreement.”33 
Moffett here considers an objection from Richard Feldman: underdetermination 
amounts to the same thing as the Equal Weight View--the result is still suspension of 
 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 366, fn. 8. Italics added. The footnote continues: “This way of framing the issue has the evident 
virtue of making correctness an issue of epistemic rationality rather than truth, which is what we would 
expect of a discussion concerning reasonable disagreement.” On this idea, cf. my discussion of van 
Inwagen’s version of the Uniqueness Thesis in Chapter One. 
33 Ibid., 360. 
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judgment. This is because if there is no uniquely rational theory, then our choice of 
theory is arbitrary and therefore cannot be preferable to our peer’s choice of theory. 
Moffett responds by arguing that epistemic conservatism is true. This is the view that 
underdetermination need not undermine one’s own theory because one has prima facie 
justification for any belief that one holds.34 This is not to say that one was justified in 
forming any belief that one happens to have formed, but rather that one has prima facie 
justification for relying on one’s standing belief. As Moffett says, “For any individual x 
and proposition p, x’s believing that p is both necessary and sufficient for x’s being prima 
facie justified in believing that p.”35 
The question then is: Does the existence of an equally adequate but incompatible 
theory provide counterevidence sufficient to outweigh this prima facie justification? 
Moffett answers no, because believing a theory has theoretical benefits. Believing things, 
Moffett says, is a crucial part of having an overall worldview, and this in turn “is 
fundamental to our ability to produce and develop new ideas and direct the course of 
further investigation.”36 Note that this benefit is distinct from any concern for the theory’s 
truth. As Moffett says, “what is being claimed is that genuinely believing a theory helps 
us to elaborate and develop that theory even though we acknowledge that the current 
evidence in support of it makes it no more likely to be true than some set of 
 
34 A simpler way to respond to Feldman is as follows: if our choice of theory is arbitrary in any meaningful 
sense in this context, then we can simply embrace a “relativistic” sense of rationality. Instead of “going 
agnostic,” as Feldman would have us do, we say we’re both rational, in much the same way that the person 
who sees a rabbit in Wittgenstein’s famous image is equally rational as the one who sees a duck. This is 
arguably a less controversial claim than the epistemic conservatism Moffett opts for. Thanks to Michael 
Wreen for this point. 
35 Ibid., 361. 
36 Ibid., 362. 
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alternatives.”37 Referencing Kuhn, Moffett notes that elaborating and developing one’s 
theories “plays a crucial role in overall theoretical progress,” the implication being that 
genuine belief in one’s view encourages such progress.38 This interpretation of Moffett’s 
view is confirmed when he quotes Mill to the effect that “it is genuine believers who are 
best positioned to… ‘do their very utmost’ for a theory.”39 
There is another benefit as well. Maintaining one’s standing beliefs is more 
conducive to one’s own self-understanding as a seeker of knowledge. 
From the point of view of one’s intellectual development, our theoretical 
commitments shape, not just how we see things, but who we are.… Abandoning 
such commitments simply because an attractive competitor, even an otherwise 
equally attractive one, arises does not do justice to our status as epistemic 
agents.40 
 
I take this to mean that it is reasonable for me to maintain my standing belief in the face 
of an alternative that I recognize is equally likely to be true, because failing to do so 
would undermine my own goal of becoming a responsible and able epistemic agent. Or, 
perhaps more accurately, a habit of failing to do so would undermine that goal, because 
becoming a responsible and able epistemic agent is a long-term project that is hampered 
by giving up too easily. Moffett here considers the objection that this is not a properly 
“epistemic” reason to hold onto one’s belief, but is instead a “prudential” or “moral” 
reason. He replies that, for two reasons, it should be considered epistemic. First, “it is our 
status as epistemic agents which generate [sic] the commitments” to become good 




39 Ibid., 363. 
40 Ibid., 362-363. 
41 Ibid., 363. 
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This is because “what is morally/prudentially required ought to be epistemically 
permissible and, conversely, what is epistemically prohibited ought not to be 
morally/prudentially required.”42 So moral/prudential reasons can have epistemic 
entailments. 
So Feldman, Moffett says, is guilty of “construing the epistemic in an 
inappropriately narrow manner, as reasons which make the belief itself more likely to be 
true.”43 In other words, practical reasons are not precluded from playing an epistemic role 
by virtue of their epistemic entailments. In this sense, something can be an epistemic 
reason for belief even if it doesn’t make the belief more likely to be true.44 Because there 
is this practical benefit to privileging one’s own standing beliefs, one is permitted in 
holding onto them in the face of a competing, equally well justified theory. In this way, 
reasonable disagreement with an epistemic peer is possible. 
 
8.3 - Hume Again 
 
We can now elaborate our own Humean response along similar lines, but without 
Moffett’s problematic view of peerhood. 
Recall the Parity Problem: 
Parity: From the perspective of either party to a peer disagreement, the epistemic 
situation is indistinguishable from one in which the accuracy of the assessments 
are inverted. Things would appear just as they do to the correct party if she were 




43 Ibid., 362. 
44 This is not to say that epistemic and prudential reasons are equivalent. Presumably Moffett would grant 
that there can be purely epistemic reasons, i.e., epistemic oughts which are not prudential or moral. 
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As we saw above, Parity implies a conflict in one’s own evidential seemings: it appears 
to one simultaneously that the first-order evidence supports p, and that one’s recognition 
of that support may be erroneous. Moffett’s solution suggests that a person is reasonable 
to maintain her view in a situation of parity owing to the practical benefits of resisting 
habits of regular belief revision, benefits which accrue to one’s overall theoretical goals 
as an epistemic agent. So far, however, Moffett is still thinking of peerhood judgments in 
terms of comparing the reported seemings of another with one’s own first-person 
evidential seemings. His adoption of Elga’s “equal likelihood to be correct” account of 
peerhood ensures that when I judge that another person is my epistemic peer, the content 
of that judgment is about our comparative capacity to be correct about p. 
This, however, is not what motivates the Parity Problem. If this were all there is to 
peerhood judgments, then Wedgwood’s egocentric epistemic bias discussed above would 
be an adequate solution: we could simply say that my own intuitions about the disputed 
proposition are presumed basically reliable, while yours are not, and justify this by appeal 
to the larger epistemic goal of minimizing sources of error.45 However, the Parity 
Problem arises only when the reliability of an interlocutor’s intuitions become 
indistinguishable from the reliability of one’s own, after long and inconclusive dispute. 
After long dispute with a potential peer, I come to see that his/her methods of evidence 
assessment are very similar to mine, and this then prompts the realization that we are 
epistemic peers. Moffett’s solution, intelligent and well-argued as it is, cannot help here, 
burdened as it is with seeing the peer’s perspective as fundamentally different from one’s 
own. 
 
45 See my discussion of Wedgwood’s view in Chapter Four, pp. 90-92. 
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 This is where Hume is most helpful. Viewed through a Humean lens, peerhood 
judgments are not just about reports of another’s point of view and its likelihood to be 
correct. They are about the resemblance of another’s point of view to my own. To judge 
that another is my epistemic peer is to judge that when he/she has an evidential seeming, 
it is as if I had had it, and hence the reasonable response to that seeming is my own 
response. Put differently, the experience of recognizing an epistemic peer entails that I 
have competing, equally compelling responses to my total evidence: the response that I 
would have had without the disagreement, and the response of my peer, which has 
borrowed its “vivacity” from my trust in my own methods of evidence assessment. 
 From this Humean perspective, the Parity Problem makes sense: it is the expected 
outcome of sustained disagreement with an equally qualified interlocutor. And as we saw, 
a response to the problem based on demonstrative reason is not to be had, owing to the 
rough nature of peerhood. But Moffett’s insight is still helpful: there may be practical 
benefits to maintaining one’s standing belief--the belief one would have had without the 
disagreement--which make holding that belief the overall reasonable thing to do, even in 
a situation of parity. 
To see as much, consider again the case of two philosophers who disagree about 
free will (à la van Inwagen and Lewis). Call them A and B. A and B share all of the 
evidence and arguments related to free will that they can think of over a long period of 
time, and each observes the other acting as carefully, conscientiously, creatively, fairly, 
thoroughly, etc., as oneself. Each consequently comes to believe the judgment of the 
other resembles one’s own. A has a clear and vivid evidential seeming that the first-order 
evidence E (i.e., all the evidence and arguments pertaining to free will that A can think 
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of, plus the evidence and arguments that B has shared with A) supports p. A also knows 
that B has a clear and vivid evidential seeming that the same body of first-order evidence 
supports ~p. After long exposure to B’s habits of thought, A comes to consider B an 
epistemic peer, meaning that A now takes B’s reported evidential seeming to be as 
evidentially weighty as A’s own evidential seeming. That is to say, from A’s perspective, 
B’s report that E supports ~p carries the same weight as A’s seeming that E supports p. 
And A knows that if in fact ~p is correct, things would look just the same to A as they do, 
because as things presently stand, A has the conflicting seemings that E supports p (from 
A’s own first-order evidential assessment), and that E supports ~p (from A’s higher-order 
evidential assessment derived from the recognition of B’s peer status, a recognition 
which carries with it the weight of long observation of B’s epistemic virtue). Unlike most 
cases of disagreement, then, A has more to go on than this piece of disagreeing testimony 
alone--A also has the entire past history of observing B’s reasoning, which has led A to 
believe that B reasons as well as A does about this kind of thing. A is thus in a situation 
of parity with B.46 
 The Hume/Moffett solution to this problem is to see that there is practical, 
epistemic benefit in maintaining one’s standing view, even though one may not think that 
one is more likely to be correct about p. Why not suspend judgment in this case, as 
Conformists such as Feldman would recommend? Because, Moffett says, given our 
limited understanding of the world, a practice of suspending judgment in that way would 
 
46 Note that this situation also satisfies our modified version of Feldman’s Meta-Evidence Principle from 




be devastating for our project of developing a coherent worldview. The benefit of 
standing one’s epistemic ground, Moffett says, accrues at two levels: 
1. The group level: Ceteris paribus, the overall human project of developing a 
coherent worldview works better if people stick with the theories that they hold 
(even while admitting that the evidence does not tell solely in their favor). 
2. The individual level: My goal of becoming a knower involves a long-term 
project that requires resilience in the face of uncertainty and even epistemic 
parity. 
The underlying insight of both points seems to be that if one wants to know, one must 
give it one’s best shot, which implies sticking with a view until there is good positive 
reason to abandon it, and not merely disagreement with a person like oneself. Similarly, 
our Humean approach implies that the habits of considering myself reliable (and my 
seemings prima facie evidential) and of considering those who reason like me to be 
similarly reliable (and so their seemings also prima facie evidential) are ultimately 
productive of knowledge. In general, I must assume that things are the way they seem to 
me to be, even if I can’t demonstrate that they are, and I am reasonable in trusting those 
who see things the way that I do. 
The danger here is that this will result in a situation in which the justification of 
any belief is unlikely to be challenged because the people that one is likely to consider 
worthy dialogue partners are those with whom one already agrees.47 But this can be 
mitigated by building in the Millian expectation that one is seeking out the most informed 
 




disagreeing peers for dialogue, as well as doing one’s best to maximize one’s standing in 
such dialogues by developing all the relevant cognitive virtues--care, thoroughness, 
conscientiousness, etc. One will, as a matter of course, encounter evidence, both first-
order and higher-order, that counts against one’s standing view, especially if one is 
engaged in this Millian project. In most cases, a new standing view will naturally 
develop. It is only when one forms an unjustified attachment to a view, for reasons other 
than any of the peer factors, that the danger mentioned above becomes salient. But our 
Hume/Moffett solution neither implies nor recommends such an approach to belief. 
 So, there is at least one way out of the Parity Problem. Briefly, it is that there are 
practical reasons to maintain one’s view that are properly epistemic reasons without 
being truth-conducive reasons. Essentially, this is to interpret the notion of “reasonable” 
as “epistemically blameless” with respect to what can be expected of knowers, given their 
overall epistemic goals. As Moffett says, “underdetermination appears to allow for 
blameless (and so, reasonable) disagreement.”48 While blameless does not entail 
reasonable in the usual sense of “believing appropriately”--one might, after all, believe 
wrongly through no fault of one’s own--nonetheless, blamelessness might be the best one 
can hope for in a situation of parity with underdetermined beliefs. To be reasonable in 
this sense does not entail being right, or even thinking that one’s position is more likely 
to be right than any other position that one is aware of; it is merely doing the best one can 
in the circumstances. One is “reasonable” in this weaker sense insofar as one is blameless 
with respect to the dispute one is involved in, given one’s overall epistemic goals and the 
 
48 Moffett, “Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry,” 360. 
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norms that govern those goals. To have a reasonable disagreement is to engage 




Chapter Nine – Proposed Solutions II: Kant’s Contribution 
 
9.1 – Kant’s Categories of Judgments and Disagreement 
 
 Just as the Humean solution to the Parity Problem argued for above was inspired 
by a contemporary figure (Moffett), so too the Kantian solution is inspired by another 
recent philosopher: William P. Alston. Specifically, it is inspired by a remark about 
Alston that Thomas Kelly makes in a footnote in “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order 
Evidence.”49 At the place in question, Kelly is considering a potential objection from the 
Equal Weight theorist regarding a situation of peer disagreement in which one party has 
in fact evaluated the evidence more accurately than another. Representing the Equal 
Weight View, he says: 
Even if things are asymmetrical at the bottom level (one’s belief reflects the 
evidence better than one’s peer’s belief…), things are symmetrical one level up: 
one has no justification for thinking that one’s belief better reflects the evidence… 
One is thus no more justified in thinking that one’s own belief accurately reflects 
the evidence than one’s peer is in thinking that his belief accurately reflects the 
evidence. Therefore, given the higher level normative symmetry, it would be 
unreasonable to favor one’s own belief over the belief of one’s peer.50 
 
Kelly then adds this suggestive footnote: 
In response to this objection, a proponent of the Total Evidence View might 
contend that it rests on a ‘level confusion,’ in the sense of Alston (1980): in 
particular, that it falsely assumes that, in order to be justified in believing p, one 
must be justified in believing that one is justified in believing p. In effect, such a 
response concedes, at least for the sake of argument, that there is a higher-level 
normative symmetry between the peers but denies that anything directly follows 
from this about the epistemic statuses of their first-order beliefs. Here I simply 
 
49 Thomas Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman 
and Ted Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 111-74. 
50 Ibid., 155. 
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want to note the possibility of such a response without exploring its prospects; the 
response that I offer in the main text proceeds along quite different lines.51 
 
I think this is a potentially fruitful avenue of response. Just as, according to Alston, in 
order to be justified in believing p, I do not need to also be justified in believing that I am 
justified in believing p, I can judge that p, based on reasons, without needing to be able to 
demonstrate that I have judged correctly, even if I think it’s possible that I haven’t judged 
correctly. Applying this to a situation of parity, I can believe simultaneously that 
proposition p is true because of evidence E, and that I cannot demonstrate this, nor 
provide any more reason to think p is true than my peer can provide to think that p is 
false, because we both appeal to the same shared evidence E. So, to return once more to 
one of the key questions of this study: Is it rational for me to hold onto my first-order 
view of p when I recognize that I am in a situation of parity, and that things would 
therefore seem just the same to me if I were mistaken as they would if I were correct? An 
Alston-inspired response would suggest that the answer is yes, owing to the level 
confusion involved in assuming that higher-order symmetry must alter apparent first-
order asymmetry. But we should like to know more about why this is a “confusion,” 
since, especially in Parity cases, it seems that the higher-order symmetry should make a 
difference to the lower-order asymmetrical justification for p. 
 Kant is helpful here, as he provides a theoretical framework for possible analyses 
of peerhood judgments--judgments that so-and-so is my peer--which provide two distinct 
ways of explaining how it may be appropriate (and in what sense) to maintain one’s view 
in the face of higher-order epistemic parity. Kant thinks that judgments, while always 
 
51 Ibid., fn. 33. Kelly is referring to Alston’s “Level Confusions in Epistemology,” Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 5 (1980): 135–50. 
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essentially propositional, can play various roles that are not reality-focused. In other 
words, some judgments may not be directed at “mapping the world,” that is, recording 
facts about the world. Robert Hanna describes such non-reality-focused roles as “uses” of 
judgments, which include pragmatic, moral, aesthetic, and teleological uses.52 According 
to Hanna, a “non-truth-theoretic,” or simply non-theoretical, use of a judgment has an 
overall purpose other than knowing the truth about the world. 
…non-theoretical judgments… are used non-truth-theoretically. For example, the 
overall rational purpose of a non-theoretical judgment might be to make 
instrumental or non-instrumental free choices or decisions… Or it might be to 
evaluate the beauty or sublimity of phenomenal objects (aesthetic judgments of 
taste)… Or it might be to treat natural things as if they had goal-directed or 
purposive structure, as a heuristic guide for the construction of better mechanistic 
explanations of physical phenomena (teleological judgments)…53 
 
The important thing to note about a non-theoretical use of judgment is that its “rational 
purpose or function… can be realized even if its propositional content is false. What 
matters for a non-theoretical judgment is how things seem to the judger, not how they 
actually are.”54 In support of this claim, Hanna cites the passage in the third Critique in 
which Kant explains the disinterestedness of judgments of taste.55 There, Kant argues that 
the existence of an object is irrelevant to the judgment of its beauty, and that all that 
matters is that the representation of the object gives one satisfaction. “If the question is 
whether something is beautiful,” Kant says, 
One only wants to know whether the mere representation of the object is 
accompanied with satisfaction in me, however indifferent I might be with regard 
 
52 Robert Hanna, “Kinds of Use” Supplement to “Kant’s Theory of Judgment,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/kant-
judgment/, Introduction. 
53 Ibid., Section A. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
90-1 (5: 205). 
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to the existence of the object of this representation. It is readily seen that to say 
that it is beautiful and to prove that I have taste what matters is what I make of 
this representation in myself, not how I depend on the existence of the object.… 
One must not be in the least biased in favor of the existence of the thing, but must 
be entirely indifferent in this respect in order to play the judge in matters of 
taste.56 
 
This would make judgments of taste analogous to peerhood judgments, as these too are 
rooted in how things seem to the judger. How things are, at least in Parity cases, is of no 
justificatory importance, since that information is unavailable to both parties. 
On the other hand, Kant also distinguishes between various uses of theoretical 
judgments, judgments that are directed at recording facts about the world. The primary 
distinction, for our purposes, is that between constitutive and regulative uses of 
theoretical judgments. According to Hanna, a constitutive use of judgment is one for 
which “its meaning, truth, or legitimacy as a ‘principle’ (Grundsatz, Prinzip) is not based 
on any further assumptions, hypothetical conditions, or suppositions.” Alternatively, a 
regulative use of judgment is one for which “its meaning, truth, or legitimacy as a 
principle is based on some further assumptions, hypothetical conditions, or 
suppositions.”57 Michael Friedman helps to clarify this distinction within the context of 
Kant’s larger critical project: 
In the Critique of Pure Reason this distinction marks the division between the 
faculty of reason and the faculty of understanding. The understanding--together 
with its pure concepts or categories--is constitutive of the possibility of 
experience. All experience must conform to the concepts and principles of the 
understanding, which, accordingly, are necessarily realized or instantiated in 
experience: experience necessarily contains substances, causal connections, and 
so on. The faculty of reason, by contrast, is merely regulative in relation to 
experience. Although reason too plays an indispensable role in experience, the 
concepts proper to it--the so-called ideas of reason, such as the idea of God, or the 
idea of the world as a complete totality--cannot be realized or instantiated in 
 
56 Ibid. 
57 Hanna, “Kinds of Use,” Section B. 
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experience at all. Nevertheless, ideas of reason--the idea of a highest intelligence 
or wise Author of the world, for example--still function legitimately to guide 
empirical enquiry into the objects that can be given in experience.58 
 
Friedman here quotes Kant: 
 
… it is said, e.g., that the things in the world must be considered as if they had 
gotten their existence from a highest intelligence. In such a way the idea is only a 
heuristic and not an ostensive concept; and it shows not how an object is 
constituted but how, under the guidance of that concept, we ought to seek after 




Regulative concepts and principles therefore present us, not with objects 
corresponding to them, but rather with a task: the never ending progress of 
empirical enquiry whose ideal terminus--the complete understanding of “the 
constitution and connection of the objects of experience”--can only be approached 
asymptotically.60 
 
So constitutive judgments pertain to the necessary features of all possible experience. 
Regulative judgments, on the other hand, “fill in the general form of pure natural science 
with actual empirical content, which can only be done in a progressive and asymptotic 
fashion.”61 
A further feature of regulative judgments is that they may be empty, in the sense 
of “lacking objective validity,” even though they have the same theoretic form as 
judgments which are not empty (like objectively valid synthetic a priori judgments). For 
example, the proposition “God exists,” while having no proper constitutive use--since it 
 
58 Michael Friedman, “Regulative and Constitutive,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy XXX (1991): 73. 
59 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 606 (A671/B699). 
60 Friedman, “Regulative and Constitutive,” 73. Friedman goes on to complicate this distinction, 
contextualizing it within the state of the current understanding of physics and chemistry at the time of 
Kant’s writing. None of these complications need concern us here. 
61 Ibid., 75. 
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refers to a concept of a noumenal object--nonetheless has a legitimate regulative use in 
morality. As Hanna says, the proposition “God exists” is 
… a “postulate of practical reason,” which in turn is a basic propositional target of 
moral belief or Glauben, according to which our moral lives are to be conducted 
as if we could epistemically believe or scientifically know that God benevolently 
guarantees that all and only the happy people are morally virtuous, in order to 
strengthen our otherwise naturally flawed and shifting moral resolve, and make 
our moral lives fully meaningful (A633-634/B661-662, A812-819/B840-847).62 
 
Cases like this, Hanna says, show that 
… otherwise empty or non-objectively-valid judgments are used regulatively 
when their legitimacy as principles depends on their being adopted solely for the 
purpose of making scientific inquiry or moral life into a coherent, meaningful 
whole.63 
 
With these distinctions in mind, two Kantian solutions to the Parity Problem are 
possible. The first assumes that peerhood judgments, judgments of the form “so-and-so is 
my epistemic peer,” are theoretical; the second assumes that they are not. 
The first possible Kantian solution is this. Assume that peerhood judgments are 
theoretical. They thus may be construed as possibly empty regulative theoretical 
judgments. Due to underdetermination and the vague nature of peerhood, such judgments 
lack objective validity, but we treat them as if they were objectively valid for the purpose 
of making our epistemic lives into “coherent, meaningful wholes.” How is this 
accomplished? It is important for me to be able to judge that another is my epistemic peer 
on the basis of our similar past reasoning (keep in mind that we are considering situations 
of Parity, which are rooted in such observations), since this helps to justify my beliefs 
about the world by giving me reason to believe that others who implement habits of 
 




thought similar to mine come to similar conclusions.64 Via this route, peerhood 
judgments are one way in which my understanding of “the constitution and connection of 
the objects of experience” are approached asymptotically, as Friedman says. Nonetheless, 
in the case of prolonged disagreement with a recognized epistemic peer I have recourse to 
the fact that my judgment of his/her peerhood is merely regulative and empty, and so may 
fail to guide my beliefs about how the world is in any given instance, even as it helps me 
to justify such beliefs overall. By way of analogy, while for Kant the judgment that God 
will reward moral virtue plays an important regulative role, nonetheless it may be 
epistemically appropriate that one should doubt more specific claims about how God 
metes out reward and punishment. Similarly, while it is important for the reasons just 
mentioned that I judge that some others are my epistemic peers, it is epistemically 
appropriate that I should doubt in a specific instance of disagreement that someone’s 
view of p in this case is just as good as mine. Moreover, the justification for the doubt is 
similar in both cases: the claims conflict with how things seem to me given my own 
processes of reasoning about the propositions in question--processes I must trust to 
deliver justified beliefs about the world. 
 But there is also the second Kantian possibility. Assume that peerhood judgments 
are non-theoretical. It may then be reasonable to maintain one’s first-order view in the 
context of Parity because the judgment that someone is a peer does not entail that his/her 
view should make a difference with respect to the truth of a disputed proposition. By way 
of analogy, consider judgments of taste, which Kant also takes to be non-theoretical. As 
 
64 In other words, peerhood judgments lend my beliefs a measure of intersubjective validity that they would 
not otherwise have by making me aware that believing various things on the basis of certain habits of 
thought is not just a fluke in my case. 
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we saw above, for Kant what matters in a judgment of taste is “what I make of this 
representation in myself, not how I depend on the existence of the object.”65 As Hanna 
says, “A visual experience of that thing over there, which you take to be a beautiful rose, 
can be a genuine experience of the beautiful, even if in fact it is not a rose or does not 
even exist.”66 The analogy with peerhood judgments is that they, like aesthetic 
judgments, may be appropriate (rational) even if false, because their function is not to 
produce true beliefs about the world. 
This is not, however, to say that such judgments make no demands on others. For 
Kant, aesthetic judgments are both subjective (based on feelings of pleasure) and 
universal, in the sense that they call for universal agreement. As Kant says: 
It would be ridiculous if… someone who prided himself on his taste thought to 
justify himself thus: “This object (the building we are looking at, the clothing 
someone is wearing, the poem that is presented for judging) is beautiful for me.” 
For he must not call it beautiful if it pleases merely him. Many things may have 
charm and agreeableness for him, no one will be bothered about that; but if he 
pronounces that something is beautiful, then he expects the very same satisfaction 
of others: he judges not merely for himself, but for everyone, and speaks of 
beauty as if it were a property of things. Hence he says that the thing is beautiful, 
and does not count on the agreement of others with his judgment of satisfaction 
because he has frequently found them to be agreeable with his own, but rather 
demands it from them. He rebukes 
them if they judge otherwise, and denies that they have taste, though he 
nevertheless requires that they ought to have it; and to this extent one cannot say, 
“Everyone has his special taste.” This would be as much as to say that there is no 
taste at all, i.e., no aesthetic judgment that could make a rightful claim to the 
assent of everyone.67 
 
 
65 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 90-91 (5: 205). 
66 Hanna, “Kinds of Use,” Section A. Note that this is not to say that one cannot be wrong about having 
experienced a real beautiful object. Rather, the basis of the judgment that something is beautiful--whether 
that judgment is true or not--is the pleasure or “satisfaction” that is caused in one by the representation of 
the object, not the existence of the object, nor any attachment one may have to the existence of the object. 
67 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 98 (5: 212 - 5: 213). 
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But because the judgment is also subjective, it is not really about a feature of the world, 
but rather about a relation between ourselves and something in the world. But the fact 
that I find it pleasurable is also an indicator that the beautiful object has a certain fit with 
my cognitive faculties, and so I can demand that others with similar faculties also find it 
pleasurable. This is the difference between a beautiful object and a merely pleasing object 
for Kant. With a beautiful object, I can reasonably demand a similar response from others 
with similar faculties. 
This is also the place at which the analogy with peerhood judgments arises: the 
judgment that another is my peer is the judgment that he/she has similar faculties as 
myself with respect to assessing evidence. I can thus reasonably demand agreement about 
p on the basis of our shared evidence E. However, as with judgments of taste, if a dispute 
cannot be settled, this does not entail that either party is judging irrationally. This is 
because of the vague nature of the concepts involved in such judgments. As David Stern 
notes, 
This claim to necessity [of an aesthetic judgment] is a sure sign that concepts play 
a role in the judgment. But this is immediately counterbalanced by the claim that 
the concepts in question cannot be determined--and so they do not permit a proof 
that the object is beautiful or not. And that, in outline, is the approach Kant 
adopts: aesthetic judgments are conceptual, and so can claim universal validity, 
but the concepts are intrinsically indeterminate, and so we cannot settle aesthetic 
disputes.68 
 
Something similar can be said for peerhood judgments based on “disagreement factors.” 
These concepts (conscientiousness, thoughtfulness, carefulness, etc.) are not 
indeterminate, but they are vague, and so even though the judgments based on them are 
 
68 David Stern, “Are Disagreements about Taste Possible? A Discussion of Kant’s Antinomy of Taste,” The 
Iowa Review 21, no. 2 (1994): 69. 
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conceptual (i.e., “S is my peer” is a claim that aspires to universal validity), they cannot 
be demonstrated in the way that a theoretical judgment can be.69 Owing to this inability to 
demonstrate the conceptual bases of one’s judgments, the parties in a dispute about taste 
may both be reasonable to persist in their disagreement, both because--contra Hume--the 
truth about whose taste judgments are best cannot be established, and because the 
awareness of another’s differing aesthetic experience does not outweigh my own.70 
Similarly, in Parity situations, the parties in a dispute about what their shared evidence 
supports may both be reasonable to persist in their disagreement, and their peerhood 
judgments do not entail that either should revise his/her view in the direction of the peer. 
 
9.2 – Conclusion 
 
Thus, reasonable disagreement in Parity situations is possible in three ways: 
(1) The Humean Solution. Justified belief is maintained in order to pursue our 
larger epistemic goals, even though we don’t have sufficient reason to believe that we are 
right, and indeed do have sufficient reason to believe that things would look just the same 
to us if we were not right. 
(2) The First Kantian Solution. We classify peerhood judgments as empty 
regulative theoretical judgments, with the result that they do not entail that a peer’s view 
must be as weighty as our own view. 
 
69 That is to say, I cannot demonstrate for my interlocutor: “You are my peer based on factors x, y, z; I 
reasoned this way; therefore, you ought also to have reasoned this way.” 
70 For discussion of the disagreement between Hume and Kant regarding the possibility of an objective 
standard of taste, see Jens Kulenkampff, “The Objectivity of Taste : Hume and Kant,” Nous 24, no. 1 
(1990): 93-110, esp. 99-101. 
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(3) The Second Kantian Solution. We take peer disagreement to be analogous to 
disagreement about taste, with the result that we believe appropriately, and are justified in 
expecting others to believe as we do, even though we cannot demonstrate that, and even 
though we know that our peers are similarly justified. 
There are objections that could be brought against all three of these solutions to 
the Parity Problem. With respect to (1), one may press the objection that even though one 
may be “blameless” in one’s disagreement with an epistemic peer (given one’s overall 
epistemic goals and so on), it does not follow that it is reasonable to maintain one’s 
belief. Perhaps a better view of Parity cases is this: while no one should be expected to 
act any differently than they do, nonetheless one party must be less reasonable than the 
other, even if we cannot tell which. 
With respect to (2), one may object that considering peerhood judgments to be 
regulative leads to negative epistemic consequences. Recall that the thought here is that 
the recognition that others who implement habits of thought similar to mine come to 
similar conclusions would help to confirm my beliefs, thus strengthening my resolve 
about them. This is similar to believing that God rewards dutiful action, for that can 
“strengthen [my] otherwise naturally flawed and shifting moral resolve.”71 The objector 
might say, however, that this view suffers from a similar problem to the one earlier 
leveled against Elga’s Equal Weight View: peer status will be granted to those who 
reason like myself, which is likely to be determined by who agrees most often with me. 
That in turn will lead to an insular, parochial system of beliefs that is unlikely to be 
seriously challenged by new evidence. 
 
71 Hanna, “Kinds of Use,” Section B. 
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With respect to (3), one may deny the analogy between peerhood judgments and 
judgments of taste, arguing that the former are clearly theoretical, i.e., clearly claims 
about the world. While many would grant that there may not be an objectively valid 
answer to the question whether a particular painting is beautiful, can we say the same for 
the question whether two people are epistemic peers with respect to a proposition? As 
with the Humean solution, perhaps there is an answer to this question, even if no one is in 
a position to know what it is. 
Where does this leave us with respect to peer disagreement? Some response can 
be made to these objections. With respect to (1), the objector should be reminded that 
what motivates interest in the peer disagreement problem is the desire to respond well to 
capable interlocutors who disagree with us. Whether or not responding well amounts to 
the same thing as being reasonable is largely a semantic matter, and at any rate would not 
tell us what to do in a real-life case of disagreement under conditions of Parity. The 
Humean solution at least provides some help here. 
With respect to (2), we can reiterate a point made above: avoiding a 
problematically self-referential belief system depends largely on a good faith effort to 
practice the intellectual virtues which one uses to determine peerhood in the first place.72 
While it is probably true that taking peerhood judgments to be regulative is consistent 
with a narrow, self-referential system of belief, I do not think that this view makes such a 
system epistemically superior.73 
 
72 See pp. 184-185 above. 
73 Contrast this with Elga’s Equal Weight View, which apparently recommends choosing peers based only 
on similarity of past conclusions. 
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With respect to (3), I confess that I am not sure whether the question “Is so-and-so 
my epistemic peer?” has an objectively valid answer, or whether there is a fact of the 
matter about peerhood in a given case (i.e., whether peerhood judgments are theoretical). 
As such, I am not sure how far the analogy between peerhood judgments and judgments 
of taste should be carried. But I am also not sure that this question does have an 
objectively valid answer, because the factors used to determine peerhood are often quite 
indefinite indeed, even in the best of real-life prolonged disagreement cases. Perhaps 
there are other pertinent differences between taste judgments and peerhood judgments 
that would ultimately undermine this analogy, but recall that the point of the analogy was 
to illustrate one way that non-theoretical judgments could have implications for the 
relationship between higher-order and lower-order beliefs. This point is not defeated even 
if the analogy with taste cannot be carried very far. 
In conclusion, I believe that peer disagreement in Parity contexts presents a real 
epistemic problem that has not yet been adequately addressed in the literature, and that 
the Humean and Kantian solutions lightly canvassed above go some way towards 
mitigating this problem. Nonetheless, even if all three of these solutions are ultimately 
untenable, it is worth keeping in mind the points made above about the skeptical nature of 
the disagreement problem.74 While the possibility of Parity may yet entail that many 
controversial beliefs are unjustified, it remains true that Parity is likely a rare 
phenomenon for most people, including experts.  
  
 





 In the Introduction, I distinguished between several questions in the literature on 
peer disagreement, and distilled them into three Main Questions: 
(MQ1) What expectations can one reasonably have of a body of evidence for a 
proposition? 
 
(MQ2) What is the relevance of private evidence to peer disagreement?  
 
(MQ3) What are one’s epistemic responsibilities in the context of disagreement? 
 
In this study I have also argued for answers to each of them. In response to 
(MQ1), I argued in Chapter One that Feldman and van Inwagen’s respective versions of 
the Uniqueness Thesis--the view that “a body of evidence justifies at most one 
proposition out of a competing set of propositions”--are untenable.75 Consequently, we 
do not have prima facie reason to rule out the possibility of rational disagreement by 
virtue of the nature of evidence alone. 
In response to (MQ2), I argued in Chapters Two and Three that there is 
unshareable, “private,” evidence that is relevant to the justification of one’s belief in a 
proposition, and that it is best understood in terms of evidential seemings--the felt sense 
that some evidence supports a proposition. Further, these seemings are analogous to 
perceptual seemings in important ways that have not previously been spelled out in the 
disagreement literature. I argued that such seemings have evidential significance in a way 
similar to that of perceptual seemings, and that this significance does not disappear on the 
discovery of disagreement, though the seemings do of course remain defeasible. I then 
 
75 Richard Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations 
on Atheism and the Secular Life, ed. Louise Antony (Oxford University Press, 2007), 205. 
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considered how evidential seemings might be overcome by the higher-order evidence 
against one’s view provided by peer disagreement. 
In Chapters Four through Six, I considered and rejected several ways in which 
disagreement may defeat one’s evidential seemings, such as by providing evidence of the 
contingency of one’s belief (à la Gideon Rosen), by creating epistemic symmetry 
between peers so that a peer has no way to identify which peer’s seemings are correct (à 
la David Christensen and Adam Elga), or by constituting meta-evidence: evidence that 
there is evidence for p (à la Richard Feldman). I concluded that the fact of disagreement 
itself does not necessarily provide defeating evidence regarding what one should believe 
about p, and that meta-evidence may not in fact constitute evidence for a subject that is 
directly relevant to the disputed proposition. However, I argued that there is something 
important about higher-order evidence: insofar as one is dealing with a perspective that is 
constituted by certain features of epistemic excellence, the views of a person with that 
perspective may count as evidence for a disputed proposition. In the context of Parity, I 
argued, prolonged disagreement with such a person may provide evidence sufficient to 
counterbalance one’s own evidential seemings. 
I also considered the related issue of the relationship between the epistemological 
problems of testimony and disagreement, as well as the problem of merely possible 
rational disagreements. With respect to the former, I argued that thinking of testimony in 
a virtue-theoretic way helps to clarify when disagreement, as known through testimony, 
carries evidential weight (namely, when the peer is recognized as trustworthy). Regarding 
the latter, I argued that the problem of possible rational disagreement, while initially 
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puzzling, does not actually create a unique epistemic problem, nor does it worsen the 
standard problem of disagreement rooted in real-world disputes between peers. 
In response to (MQ3), I argued that once the notion of epistemic peerhood is 
clarified, both the Conformist and Nonconformist positions on the disagreement problem 
can be seen to be inadequate to deal with the problem of prolonged disagreement under 
Parity. To this end, in Chapter Seven I argued that an influential view of peerhood 
advanced by Adam Elga is mistaken. I then argued that Conformist views (e.g., those 
defended by David Christensen, Richard Feldman, and Adam Elga) place too much 
emphasis on the evidential value of disagreement itself, mistakenly taking the fact of 
disagreement to have some defeating power that it does not in fact have. They also tend 
to assume (e.g., Christensen) that peer disagreement is epistemically similar to 
disagreement with a superior, which is unwarranted. On the other hand, Nonconformist 
views (e.g., those defended by Thomas Kelly, Marc Moffett, and Michael Bergmann) 
tend to underestimate the significance of epistemic parity produced by long disagreement 
with someone one takes to be a peer. 
In Chapters Eight and Nine, I proposed and discussed three possible solutions to 
the Parity Problem, one inspired by David Hume, and two inspired by Immanuel Kant. 
The Humean solution (Chapter Eight) held that practical considerations stemming from 
the underdetermination of one’s views by the available evidence, as well as one’s larger 
epistemic goals, can justify maintaining one’s view in a Parity situation. I argued that 
Hume helps us to see that it can be epistemically appropriate to maintain a view even 
when one knows that it cannot be demonstrated to be the uniquely rational conclusion to 
draw on the basis of some evidence set. Alternatively, in Chapter Nine I drew on Kant’s 
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theory of judgment to argue that judgments that someone else is an epistemic peer may 
be classified as either (1) empty regulative theoretical judgments, or (2) non-theoretic 
judgments (analogous to judgments of taste). In either case, I argued, rational 
disagreement under Parity may be possible. 
We are left, then, with the view that rational disagreement between recognized 
epistemic peers who have shared their evidence with one another is indeed possible. In 
fact, in a typical case of peer disagreement, such as most people may find themselves in 
with a colleague, a family member, or a stranger, rational disagreement is not even very 
difficult to achieve. It requires merely that one is justified in not weighing the second- or 
third-person testimonial report of a peer’s evidential seeming, in the present case, as 
heavily as one’s own first-person evidential seeming to the contrary. I argued above (§ 
2.2, § 4.2) that one is typically so justified. In most cases of peer disagreement, either the 
disagreement itself or the granting of peer status to one’s interlocutor is short-lived. This 
is because considering someone else an epistemic peer is an inexact approximation, and 
given the choice between weighing someone’s evidential seemings the same as my own, 
or simply not considering them a peer in this case, it is nearly always rational to 
temporarily revoke peer status. 
With respect to typical cases of peer disagreement, then, Nonconformists like 
Kelly are generally correct: one is under no epistemic obligation to alter one’s views in 
most peer disagreement situations. On the other hand, exceptional cases can always be 
dreamt up by a clever philosopher. For this reason, Feldman, a Conformist, is also correct 
to point out that there are no general principles regarding what is rational that hold for all 
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possible peer disagreement cases. Nonetheless, the Nonconformist approach is likely 
sufficient for most real-life cases. 
 However, the peer-revoking policy recommended by Nonconformism is not 
justified in cases of prolonged disagreement about the same issue, in which one continues 
to recognize the peer status of the other about that issue. While relatively unusual, such 
cases do occur, and they are, I argue, the seminal cases in the peer disagreement debate, 
which has its roots in discussions of religious pluralism within the philosophy of religion. 
I have argued that these cases present a unique challenge that has been largely 
overlooked, or paid only scant attention, in the disagreement literature. By creating a 
situation of Parity, prolonged disagreement with a recognized peer, where both parties are 
doing their best to share their evidence and to understand the point of view of the other, 
can lead to a situation in which it is rationally required that one weigh the evidential 
seemings of a peer the same as one’s own (§ 4.2, § 8.3). The Hume and Kant-inspired 
approaches to peer disagreement are meant to ameliorate this worry, and to explain how 
we can maintain a Nonconformist stance even in situations of Parity. 
 I must confess here that I am less than fully confident about my own solutions to 
the Parity Problem, for the reasons I gave in the last chapter. I have personally 
experienced at least one disagreement that I would describe as peer disagreement under 
Parity, and I find that the Humean and Kantian solutions I’ve offered, while somewhat 
helpful, do not ultimately remove the discomfort I feel in continuing to believe as I do, 
when I know that my peer understands the issue as well as I do and disagrees. Here I 
believe it is worth remembering something that commentators on all sides of the peer 
disagreement debate agree about: most people are too confident about their controversial 
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beliefs. Insofar, then, as the epistemology of disagreement discussion encourages some 
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